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Jagannath Chakravorty (1923-1992) :

A Memoir

A. C. Sukla

I cannot believe that so soon Professor Jagannath Chakravorty will be consecrated to memory. I believed that with his Spartan habits and energetic physique he would be an octogenarian, but Time took him away more than a decade before he reached his 80th birth day.

Chakravorty deceived time by his deceptive countenance throughout. I met him first in a rainy morning of July 1963 when he was one of the triumvirs of the department of English of Jadavpur University, other two being Professor S. C. Sengupta and Dr. Sisir Chatterjee. With *khaddar* 'dhoti' and 'punjabi' Chakravorty's look was a decade younger than his age, and his behaviour - a bachelor, but so sweet, with even a touch of effeminacy, that I rank with none but my mother's (I had lost my mother four years back). Since then for the last three decades Jagannath Babu remained the principal source not only of my intellectual career, but also the very source of my life itself.

He was accessible to all his students but perhaps destined to initiate me to all that he attained and designed to attain through the years he lived. Born in Jasore a district of the undivided Bengal (now in Bangla Desh) Chakravorty started his education in Benaras as a student of Sanskrit. Later he graduated from Calcutta University with 1st Class Honours in English and Sanskrit among other subjects. He stood first in the intermediate and 2nd class first in M.A. in English with literature group and first class first with language group winning the glamorous R. Guha gold medal for the best English essay in the M. A. examination.

Chakravorty's professional career started as a journalist under the *Ananda Bazar Patrika* group where he was immensely influenced by Saroj Acharya a senior journalist with whose family his tie remained the closest till he breathed his last. Journalism led him to his fascinating career of an established modern Bengali poet. Mostly an Eliotian during the wars, he published his first collection of poems *Nagar Sandhyá* (The City Evening) in 1946 and soon after breaking with the tradition of Sukanta Bhattacharya he took up the post-war mode of English poetry mostly of the poets of The Movement - their precision, tight form, cool tone and intellectual background. Although Larkin is frequently reflected in his poems, Chakravorty's deep concern for the heritage of Indian poetry - from classical Sanskrit to the modern Bengali, from Valmiki to Madhusudan

Dutta and Rabindranath Tagore, distinguishes him as an Indian poet with the essoteric sentiments, images and ways of living - all with a peculiarly Bengali nuance. He believes with the Vedic sages and Sri Aurabindo that poetry is essentially a *mantra* (hymn) in its literal sense of "contemplation." Therefore, for *him* not only Kalidasa and Rabindranath are poets, philosophers like Aristotle, poeticians like Ánandavardhana and scientists like Einstein also are pots (vide his poems 'Sántanu Syámali' and 'Mantradrastárah'). Chakravorty has published several hundred poems in about a dozen of collections. His poems have been translated into German, Russian, Japanese, Oriya, Punjabi, Gujrati, Assamese and Maharastri. Hindi translation of some of his best poems is still in its manuscript form.

Chakravorty himslef is a skilled translatior. His Bengali translations of the Old Russian *Igor Tale* (12th century) and Eliot's *The Waste Land* and *Four Quartets* have been widely acclaimed. His Bengali biography of Gandhiji *Rájkot, Rájpath, Rájghát* earned him the Russian Nehru prize and particularly rebuilt the Gandhian idealism most effectively for the iconoclast Nuxalites of the Seventies.

It is during the sixties that Chakravorty entered into critical scholarship. Much earlier he gave up journalism and joined the West Bengal Govt. Education Service and finally joined the department of English of Jadapur University where he worked under the headship of his teacher - the doyen of Shakespearean scholarship in India - Professor S. C. Sengupta. In 1969 he published *The Idea of Revenge in Shakespeare : With 'Special Reference to 'Hamlet'* a version of which earned him the Ph. D. degree of Jadavpur University in 1967. The work was a pioneering one insofar as the theme was untouched until then and Chakravorty's work was independently completed and published almost simultaneously with Eleanor Prosser's *Hamlet and Revenge*. The work immediately attracted the notice of Shakespearean scholars like Alfred Harbage, William Merchant and Geoffrey Bullough for which he was invited to the international Shakespeare Congress at Startford-upon-Avon in 1974 where he was the first Indian to chair a session.

Subsequently, as a Shakespearean scholar Chakravorty was fascinated by Carolyne Spurgeon's study of imagery in Shakespeare and found its methodology most appropriate to apply for a critical analysis of Madhusudan Datta's modern Bengali epic *Meghanádabadhá*. If spurgeon said "In the case of a poet, I suggest it is chiefly through his images that he, to some extent unconsciously, gives himself away" Madhusudan wrote much earlier "The thoughts and *images* bring out words with themselves - words that I never thought I knew." This Bengali work earned him the D.Litt. degree of Calcutta University.

The only stream of Modernism that continues through the post-modernist era is undoubtedly existentialism and it was not an exception for Chakravorty to be fascinated by the thinkers of existentialism and phenomenology. He made his second observation on Shakespeare in the light of existentialism and generated *King Lear : Shakespeare's Existentialist Hero* (1990). But his fascination for this mode of post-modernism reached the apex when he studied Rabindranth's Nobel Prize winning poems *Gitanjali* as an expression of an existentialist ego with special reference to Sartre. He is convinced that Rabindranth who died in 1941 might have been aware of Sartre's *La Nausie* and *La Imagination* published during 1931-1936. Chakravorty's presentation of papers on this aspect of the *Gitanjali* in different seminars of Visvabháratí, Calcutta and Burdwan Universities convinced the scholars of English, Bengali and comparative literature and finally he was invited to present a fuller version of his studies at the seminar of the Commonwealth Institute, London on the occasion of Tagore's 125th anniversary. A Bengali version of this essay is published in 1988.

The magnum opus of Chakravorty is perhaps his contribution to Indian lexicography editing the National Dictionary (*Játiya Abhidhán*) in several volumes a major project of the Abhidhan Centre of Jadavpur university. The dark phase of Chakravorty's life is his association with the Asiatic Society of Bengal as its General Secretary. The Society founded by Sir William Jones was one day responsible for dissemination of Indology and Asian studies among the Europeans, contributing a lot to the German idealism in philosophy, romanticism in poetry and to the evolution of a new branch of language study - comparative philology which paved the way for a revolutionary linguist like Ferdinand de Saussure. But during the last few decades the Society underwent a miserable setback in the hands of some selfish Indian politicians. Chakravorty wanted to restore the image of the Society by a radical change of its structure, function and administration transforming a wing of it into a deemed university meant for original researches in the subjects the Society aimed at its birth. This hampered the selfish interest of a group of people who not only applied all their force to obstruct the noble aim of Chakravorty, but also defamed him. A sincere, sensitive and saintly man was at last betrayed by the same persons who introduced him to the Society's secretaryship. In his early seventies, Chakravorty could not sustain the shock of this failure. The severe anguish (as I believe) caused by this failure gave him ultimately the fatal blow in the fall of 1990. It is only for the tremendous mental strength and strong hope for fulfilling the scholarly desires that he struggled with the bone cancer for a year and a half. When I saw him last in the fall of 1991, I could not believe that so active, so lively and so youthful a man would have been bed-ridden for months together. Even knowing fully that his days were

numbered, he never lost his zest for life. While patiently tolerating the exquisite pain causing spontaneous flow of scalding tears he was forced to express "See, this is life". His lips were still satiating the charm of living, eyes were still burning with hope for long life and the whole face was still radiating with enthusiasm and inspiration.

Jagannath Chakravorty passed away on 28th March, 1992. Can't he commit the second mistake as he desired in his poem 'Next Day' :

I have committed a mistake by dying;
And want to commit
The second mistake
By living again.....?

Remembrance, Recognition and the Aesthetic Way

DUSHAN PAJIN

We start with the hypothesis that myth is a solidified memory of (metaphorical) occurrences, and situations that existed in *illo tempore* (primordial time). Myth-telling and later, recital and drama, help man to recollect and remember these occurrences, and also to recognize the same pattern repeating in his life, in actual time. It is a process of double recognition : in myth and drama he recognizes the pattern of happenings which he remembers from his, or other peoples lives, and in his, or other people's lives he recognized the pattern exemplified in myth or drama.

1.1 With Plato's theory of *anamnesis* (remembrance, recollection) we leave aesthetic and approach epistemology, we part with poetry and drama, end enter philosophy. In the former case, remembering meant keeping in memory what has been told and retold in tradition. With Plato, remembrance and recollection refer to a special faculty and protohistory of the soul, "recollection of the things (i.e. ideas -D.P.) formerly seen by our soul when it traveled in the divine company" (*Phaedrus*, 249b). This means that the soul (*psyche*) has seen and known something before birth, and after birth it has forgotten this knowledge. But, why ?

There are two reasons : One is prenatal and the other postnatal. In *The Republic* (620) Plato explains, in the myth of Er, that before the souls are reborn (incarnated) each has to drink from the River of Forgetfulness (*Lethe*). As they drink they forget everything they have seen and known in the world beyond.¹⁾

New oblivion or forgetfulness adds to this after birth. "Because every pleasure and pain has a sort of rivet with which it fastens the soul to the body and pins it down and makes it corporeal, accepting as true whatever the body certifies" (*Phaedo*, 83).

However, under the guidance and help from philosophy, the willing soul can remember its knowledge (*noesis, episteme*), and recognize its true identity, and independence from the body. The main point is that this knowledge is actually nothing new for the soul - it is potentially there, all the time, but obscured by ignorance which is oblivion. The same goes for the independence and identity of the soul. It is pure and free from becoming and decay. But, obscured by emotions, it accepts "as true whatever the body certifies", and is

excluded from the "fellowship with the pure and uniform and divine". The main task of philosophy is, therefore, not to impart some new knowledge, really unfamiliar to the soul, but to help it to remember. Ignorance is oblivion, knowledge is recollection, "learning is just recollection (*anamnesis*)" (*Phaedo*, 72-76).

Without help the "pregnancy" of the soul with this memory is only a potential, because, under oblivion, the soul is the willing prisoner of the body.

"Every seeker after wisdom knows that up to the time when philosophy takes it over his soul is a helpless prisoner... and wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy can see that imprisonment is ingeniously effected by prisoners' own active desire, which makes him first accessory to his own confinement " (*Phaedo*, 82). The possibility of liberation from this confinement rests upon three factors. The one is *anamnesis*, the other is *philosophy*, or guidance by a philosopher, and the third are sensible objects. The third factor is important because in the dualism of his idealism Plato ascribes a double role to the sensible world. On the one hand it deludes the soul, keeps it in ignorance and bondage, as a source of pain and pleasure of the body, on the other hand it serves as help in recovering knowledge.

"...we acquired our knowledge before our birth, and lost it at the moment of birth, but afterwards, by the exercise of our senses upon sensible objects, recover the knowledge which we had once before..." (*Phaedo*, 75).

However, only few people retain an adequate remembrance of that, and "when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt in amazement, but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no radiance in our earthly copies of justice or temperance or those other things which are precious to souls... But of beauty. I repeat that we saw her there shining in company with the celestial forms : and coming to earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the clearest aperture of sense " (*Phaedrus*, 250f).

So, the easiest and most accessible way to *anamnesis* is by way of sight and love for beauty. Giving this special credit to beauty, Plato is not willing to single out art as a primary source in remembering the idea of beauty. In *Symposium*, Diotima explains that ascending course to beauty starts with the perception of beauty in forms, then in souls and deeds, institutions and sciences.

"He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love... when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty... a nature which in the first place is everlasting, knowing no birth or death, growth or decay.. (*Symposium*, 210-211). For Plato, aesthetic experience is, therefore, not

exclusively related to art. Beauty is first perceived (*aisthesis*) by the sense of sight, and later only by *noesis*. Love (*eros*), on other hand, is not exclusively an emotional relation between the sexes (or between man and man, in homosexuality), but an instinct or drive which leads to the recollection of the idea of beauty through cultivation and contemplation.

1.2 These rich metaphors and imagery would serve as inspiration for Platonism and Gnosticism.

Being born, man "falls" or is "thrown" into the world and the body. The soul forgets her original habitation and identity. She is overwhelmed with desires and worldly cares, being engaged and involved, more and more. Gnosticism speaks of "sleep", "drunkenness" and "oblivion". Man is dispersed, and divided, by cravings and cares. He is engulfed by the noise of the world, by the fear, hope and disappointment. This is the world or darkness, utterly full of evil... full of falsehood and deceit... A world of turbulence without steadfastness,a world in which the good things perish and plans come to naught" (in Jonas, 1963, 57). In Gnostic dualism the opposition between "this world" and "the other world" is greater than in the philosophy of Plato. The duality of light and darkness, of good and evil, corresponding to the duality of the two worlds, is greater than the Platonic duality of ideas and "shadows", since darkness is the essence and power of *kosmos*. There is no mediation and resemblance which one can find between the ideas and the "shadows".

Even the light in this world is really darkness, "black light" (Jonas, p.58). In such a world there is no beauty; if to keep man in oblivion and ignorance, to show its ugly back at the end. In order to regain and remember knowledge, *gnosis*, man needs help and a "call from without".

"The call is uttered by one who has been sent into the world for this purpose and in whose person the transcendent life once more takes upon itself the stranger's fate: he is the Messenger or Envoy-in relation to the world, the Alien Man" (Jonas, 75-6). This redeemer was in Christian Gnosticism identified as Jesus Christ.

Gnosis is insight, immediate vision of truth. Man who has *gnosis* knows from where he comes and where he goes; he can remember his true identity and understand his present condition. Jonas (1963, p.81) summarized contents of the call (or *gnosis*) as follows; "the reminder of the heavenly origin and the transcendent history of man; the promise of redemption.... and finally the practical instruction as to how to live henceforth in the world....."

This call has to help man, or initiate his self-recognition as (or through) remembering. This knowledge (*gnosis*) is effective in the sense that it is sufficient for salvation and the ascent of the self (*pneuma*) back to its origin (divine light).

To be reminded means to be reawakened for the knowledge of one's true identity, to recognize that man in the world is not at home, because he is not of this world. He is an alien, a stranger, unprotected, who does not understand the way of the world, nor does the world understand him.

"The stranger who does not know the ways of the foreign land wanders about lost; if he learns its ways to well... the distress has gone, but this very fact is the culmination of the stranger's tragedy. The recollection of his own alienness, the recognition of his place of exile for what it is, is the first step back; the awakened homesickness is the beginning of the return" (Jonas, p.49-50).

For Gnosticism, suffering in the world is not an expiation for sins but a reminder²) that the man has been thrown into the world, and a thrust toward recognizing his *pneuma* (self), and otherworldly origin.

Among modern writers, Marcel Proust had the feeling that man is either reincarnated, or that he is other-worldly. He sees that the obligations of moral life, or strivings toward perfection, are hard to explain if we consider only this one life. Contemplating after the death of Bergotte he says - it seems that we enter life under a burden of obligations already fixed in some previous life. There is no reason, he says, that we should be kind and good-hearted, and there is no reason for the artist to be obliged to start or polish his work for the twentieth time, since - once he is dead - the admiring his work would arouse will mean nothing to his dead body. All these obligations - he adds - are not sanctioned in this life, and seem to belong to a different order, some other world completely different from this one. And we have these laws in ourselves, without knowing who has inspired our being with them (Proust, *La Prisonniere*, I. 246).

However, in Gnosticism we find extreme dualism. There are not only two worlds, but two gods and two selves, as well. One God is the creator God, responsible for this world, the other is the unknown God yet to be recovered at the end of the time. One self is the self of the world (*psyche*), the other self (*pneuma*) is not from here and it is not of this world. The transcendence of the other world and the unknown God do not stand in any (positive) relation to the sensible world, and the pneumatic self has no relation to the psychic self. Therefore, Jonas calls this teaching "acosmism" - the main values being beyond cosmic origin and significance. Every culture must confront itself with the principal relation of man with the world, and the relation of past, present and future, in

individual existence and in cosmo- historical time. These are basic questions which also determine the possible answer to the question : what is the meaning of life, how is man supposed to use his time and power available in this life? Gnosticism proudly announces "the knowledge of who we are, what we become, where we were, where into we have been thrown, where to we hurry, where from we are redeemed, what birth is, and what rebirth" (Clement of Alexandria: *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, 78. 2, in Jonas, 1963 :334).

1.3) Throwness, forlornness and homelessness can be found as subjects in Existentialism, especially in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*.³ Also the theme of the alien, stranger and emigrant can be found in the writings of the 20th century authors, like Camus (*The Stranger*) and M. Crnjanski (*Migrations, The Novel on London*). The best description of the world (as if) made and governed by the bad god *Demiourgos*, can be found in Kafka's novels and novels of dissident writers from Eastern Europe (Solzenytsin, Shalamov, Kundera). While in Gnosticism the man is thrown into a kosmos as nature (*Physis*), here man is thrown into a kosmos of social and political relations (state, *polis*). Both are governed solely by power.

However, in Gnosticism there is still *gnosis*, the other world, and an assumption, that man can save himself and return to real, eternal light and life. In modern literature there is no call (save to the trial or prison), no open doors, no meaning, no promise, no faith, no knowledge, only absolute contingency.

"This makes modern nihilism infinitely more radical and more desperate than gnostic nihilism could ever be... That only man cares, in his finitude facing nothing but death, alone with his contingency and the objective meaninglessness of his projected meanings, is a truly unprecedented situation" (Jonas, 1963:339).

There is neither Gnostic knowledge (*gnosis*) or Christian faith (*pistis*) neither possibility of ascent⁴, or salvation; only will to power and class struggle.

Among the modern writers, Nietzsche⁵ and Proust proclaimed that only esthetically world and life can be justified. For them, art and aesthetic experience were important as *gnosis* was in time of Gnosticism.

To be saved by, or through art, was a life credo of some modern artists. Since aesthetic values do not need any transcendental support it seemed that art can survive the downfall of the "intelligible world" of philosophy and the "death of the God" of religion.⁶

Art was not calling upon knowledge or faith - aesthetic wonder was sufficient - its message was valid even when philosophy and religion were

corrupted. Even when man lost faith in ideas and gods, he still could wonder - being in front of a work of art, in a meadow full of flowers, meeting a creature, or being in love, could perhaps, be a sufficient reason to live (even if one is without hope, faith, or meaning).

II

2.1 "I pay my homage to Śiva the omniscient-poet, who created all the three worlds, and thanks to whom people are able to attain aesthetic bliss by watching the spectacle of the play that is our life in this world", says Bhattanayaka (10th. AD), Indian aesthetician.

In Trika Śaivism we find a original contribution- the "aesthetic way", a possibility to attain liberation not only through purification and perfection in ethic, poetic, ascetic or devotional values, but through aesthetic contemplation : in peace (*śāntarasa*) and wonder (*camatkāra*).

However, this was not a result of nihilism, of a downfall of religious or philosophical order, but a contribution beside them; it was introduced out of plenty, not because of want. With Proust we see that art and aesthetic experience were a last refuge in the wasteland - for Abhinavagupta (10th C. A.D.) and his predecessors it was a matter of choice. For Gauguin and Van Gogh art was the last resort - something to hang on after everything else has failed.

Abhinavagupta often quotes *Vijñānabhairava*, a work which can be considered as one of the best expositions of the aesthetic (or should we say "ecstatic") way of Trika Śaivism. In *Vijñānabhairava* there is no principal difference between aesthetic experience related with work of art and experience of relish, joy, or expansion in front of a beautiful landscape. The same continuum of the "aesthetic way" we have already found in Plato's gradual ascension to the idea of beauty, through contemplation of beauty in art and other domains including erotics. The same principle is present in Chinese and Japanese "aesthetic way", exemplified in the tea ceremony⁷ in the cult of plum and cherry blossoms (contemplation in front of the tree, or contemplation of a picture, with a poem on the margin) or in garden contemplation, of a garden which is "not real", but an abstract (sometimes even without flora), and is therefore, a work of art and, at the same time, an object of *nature naturata*.

In India, this principle was extended to performing arts as well. Cosmic play (*līlā*) in Kasmir tradition includes the drama of life and drama as a stage performance; therefore, aesthetic bliss is possible while watching play in life and on stage.⁸

However, to look upon life as (a part of cosmic) play, for most people is possible only after meditative training. It is easier to obtain this experience through poetry or drama. Abhinavagupta and other aestheticians from Kashmir explain this factor - in modern parlance known as aesthetic distance - in a similar way: by generality (*sādhāranya*) of the presentation in art. This presentation creates beyond the space of personal interest and concern, and at the same time gives the recipient an opportunity to remember his personal experiences and moods, to recognize them in events of drama, and to identify with main personalities. "Generality is thus a state of self-identification with the imagined situation, devoid of any practical interest... of any relation whatsoever with the limited self, and as it were impersonal (Gnoli, 1969:XXII).

The aesthetic experience is, therefore an invitation to the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) of the higher impersonal self (*ātman*), it points to the same goal as meditative experience,⁹ which can also be realized in an aesthetic setting beyond art.

2.2 However, this happens under certain conditions, which, also, explain why people, generally, do not attain liberation during or after aesthetic experiences. Plato said that the aesthetic experience governed by *Eros* should lead gradually to the recognition of the idea of beauty. To this Gnoli (1968:XLVII) adds citations from *Theologia Platonica* of Proclus, where the wonder¹⁰ that appears in aesthetic and mystic experience and the astonishment of the soul in front of beautiful and sacred are compared. The cessation of ordinary world, of the limitations of everyday experience and practically oriented functional consciousness is related with wonder and amazement. We cannot say what is the cause and what the effect - non-ordinary or non-worldly (*alaukika*) and wonder (*camatkāra*) are in a synchronic relation: without wonder everything is just worldly (*laukika*) and in ordinary we cannot recognize the non-ordinary without wonder. According to Abhinavagupta, *camatkāra* is consciousness without obstacles (*vighna*). It is the consciousness of a subject "who is immersed in the vibration (*spanda*) of a marvellous enjoyment (*adbhutabhoga*)" - *Abhinavabhāratī*, (Trans. by Gnoli, 1968:60). This consciousness cannot be intentional and it is the result of tuning in, or resonance with a certain vibration. This is possible for the *sahridaya*, ("one with a hearth") who is sensible and possess the consent of his own heart. These traits we also find in blissful moments (*moments bienheureux*) of Marcel Proust: bliss and wonder, cessation of obstacles, non-intentionality and tuning of the personality to the ecstatic, extemporal vibration. These blissful moments for Proust were not related (for the most part) to the works of art, but to the superposing of remembered and actual impressions. Of the eleven principal moments listed

by Shattuck (1964 :70-74), one is related with work of art (septet by Vinteuil). This puts them close to *dhāranās* from *Vijñānabhairava*. For example, with *dhāranā* 49 we are reminded of the first blissful moment (*madeleine* sequence, Proust, 1934:I, 34-36) related with the taste of tea and cake and the exquisite pleasure: "When one experiences the expansion of joy of savor arising from the pleasure of eating and drinking, one should meditate on the perfect condition of this joy; then there will be supreme delight" (*Vijñānabhairava*, verse 72).

For Proust, blissful moments are generally a blending of past and present. However, there is one exception - moment related with "the steeples of Martinville" (Proust, 1934: I, 138-140) does not include any memory. The sequence begins with the enigmatic "call" from various impressions to decipher the meaning of happiness related with them. While riding to Martinville, on one of the turns the two steeples appear glowing in the sunset. Full of joy, Marcel feels that this glow seems to contain and to conceal some meaning.

This reminds us of *dhāranā* 51: "Wherever the mind of the individual finds satisfaction, let it be concentrated on that. In every such case the true nature of the highest bliss will manifest itself" (*Vijñānabhairava*, verse 74).

The prevalent pattern of Proust's blissful moments is the superposing of past and present, while *dhāranās* are mostly related with the present. But the difference is superficial - The means are different, the goal is the same: to tune in with time (eternal now, paradox of time without transiency), and recognize one's extemporal being. In *Time Regained* Proust says that he could not contemplate solely on actual experience, since he could not apply his imagination - his only faculty for enjoying beauty - in actual situation. In order to apply imagination he needed the superposing of present with past experience. Thus, connecting past experience (remembered and imagined) with present experience, he could immobilize and isolate pure time, he could recognize this being (*cet être*) that feeds upon the "essence of things".

Blissful moments are based on non-intentional, involuntary remembering¹¹, while voluntary remembering is governed by some practical aim¹²

The common feature of blissful moments and *camatkāra* is overcoming time and obstacles. This brings bliss.

"The so-called supreme bliss, the lysis, the wonder, is therefore nothing but tasting... of our own liberty". says Abhinavagupta (*Abhinavabhāratī*) in Gnoli, 1968:XLIV).

Through lengthy volumes Marcel is repeatedly challenged to solve the enigma of happiness related with blissful moments. In the last volume (*Time Regained*) he understands that these moments are blissful because he is free from the anxiety and doubts concerning his future (will he be a writer, is he "losing" time). He gains time free from transiency and certainty which makes him indifferent to death. Finally, he recognizes in himself this being (*cet être*) which belongs to the extempore order, the common source of the past and the present. That being is also beyond the anxiety related with future, fear of time, transiency and death. Beside wonder, recognition of this other self is the second precondition for attaining liberation through aesthetic experience.

III

3.1 Colpe (1980 : 40-41) related Proust's idea of liberation from time with the Gnostic notion of immortality, and the recognition of everyday self and the extemporal "this being" (*cet être*) with the recognition of the psychic and the pneumatic self in Gnosticism. However, Proust has a greater affinity for this world than any Gnostic. He accepts as genuine its call to confront the mystery of beauty and destruction, love and pain, wonder and despair, being and death. For him, these are not distractions, or a negative hint for a "call from without". Mostly, the call to solve the enigma is received from the beauty of the world: the steeples of Martinville, the three trees in Hudimesnil, the azure sky of Venice, or the sound of a spoon striking against the plate.

For Proust, art was a first class media to save and communicate what he considered as the *summum bonum*, the meaning of his life, his legacy - the bliss of privileged moments.

This gives credit to the understanding of art as the revivification of significant consciousness events, proposed by Mueller/1988.

"Art has to do with how we memorize the human condition, and how we 'play it back' in our minds. /.../ An artist has the gift and skill to weave valuable human consciousness experiences into an art form. /.../ Art, perhaps more than any other human activity, provides the possibility of true immortality. If indeed art is successful as a source of mnemesthemes of significant moments, it can satisfy the human need to embody significant moments of consciousness in some imperishable form. /.../ Proust realized... how important it is to make permanent and memorable the impermanent, fleeting moments of human existence and insight" /Mueller, 1988:191-194/.

3.2. But, how should we understand the concluding part of *Time Regained*, the *matinée* at Guermantes which follows the last blissful moment? After a long

intermission Marcel meets his aged friends, and recognizes them only with considerable effort, realizing the destructiveness of time. Beckett (1978:57), and Shattuck (1964: 38, 111) consider this as proof that blissful moments have failed, that death is not indifferent "because it sets limit to one's human capacity to create", that time was not regained or recovered, but only obliterated (for a while), and now strikes back with the load of years, and the powder covering hair and faces of his acquaintances.

Confronted with this *dance macabre* Beckett and Shattuck gave up the meaning and importance of blissful moments and were willing to surrender to oblivion (*oubli*) the hardly won recognition (*reconnaissance*) of the extemporal self (*cet être*). Perhaps Abhinavagupta would have understood this better. For him, the essential nature of the self (*ātman*) is hidden owing to the innate forgetfulness (*moha*). The purpose of *pratyabhijñā*¹³ (recognition, *reconnaissance*) is to remove this forgetfulness concerning *ātman*¹⁴. In *iśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśini* he says that recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is the unification of the two experiences: remembrance (*smarana*) and perception (*anubhava*) - quoted by Kaw, 1967:145. For Abhinavagupta and Proust the power of remembrance (*smarana-śakti*) supports the view that *ātman* (*cet être*) is permanent and extemporal.

Did Proust understand the "dolorous synthesis of survival and annihilation" or his bliss failed him at the end? Perhaps he would have found familiar the following lines:

"In this way, if the aspirant imagines that the entire world (or at least Guermantes world - D.P.) is being burnt by the fire of *Kālāgni* and does not allow his mind to wonder away to anything else, then in such a person the highest state of man appears" *Vijñānabhairava*, verse 53). Perhaps *Kālāgni*, the personification of total conflagration at the end of time, presided at Guermantes *matinee*.

Notes and References

1) This differs from the later interpretation, by Vergillius (*Aeneis*), who says that the souls forget the suffering borne in former lives, and then are willing to live again under the sky (i.e. to be reborn).

2) Therefore, Gnosticism could explain the suffering of the innocent, and the good life of the vile. If Dostoyevski were a Gnostic and not an Orthodox Christian, he would have found an answer for his question: why the suffering of an innocent child?

3) Jonas (1963: 320-340) gives an extensive comparative analysis of Gnosticism, Existentialism and Nihilism in the concluding section of his book. Taubes (1954: 155-172) has written a comparative study of Gnostic and Heidegger's notions from *Sein and Zeit*.

4) Metaphors of ascent have been changing: for Plato "wings of the soul"; in Gnosticism, ascending through the spheres of the seven planets; with John Climacus, Climbing the ladder. Now ascent only means becoming rich or powerful, or having a successful career.

5) In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche says that only art can overcome the terror and absurdity of life; only with the help of art man can endure the absurdity of existence; life and world are justifiable only as aesthetic phenomena.

6) Even if art cannot survive, we can be sure that soap operas will survive. If soap operas would have existed in time of Puranas, Indians would have known that it is the only thing that would survive between the kalpas. Even Hegel could not predict such a vital form (of what?). Anyway, in Hegelian system the death of art is predicted, while the opposite is true: the Idea is dead, long live the Art.

7) Tea ceremony is a sophisticated aesthetisation of an ordinary event, blending ordinary (preparing and drinking tea) and non-ordinary (highly stylized manners and conversation), integration of life with ritual, slowing down and becoming attentive to details, leaving aside the hustle, cares and anxieties of everyday life in order to open the mind and heart to the mystery of the eternal now, and to the ineffable meaning that "lies beneath the surface (*yugen*). For further analysis of *yugen*, especially related with the rock garden of Ryoanji, see Deutsch (1975: 24- 35).

8) However, this does not mean that the autonomy of art is obscured. "Abhinava likes to insist on the autonomy of a work of art, on the fact that it is *sui generis* and need have no object corresponding to it in the real world" (Masson and Patwardhan, 1969:51).

9) Masson and Patwardhan (1969:21) state that Bhattanayaka was perhaps "the first person to make the famous comparison of yogic ecstasy and aesthetic experience". He comments on the opening verse of *Natyasastra* (a classic on art of drama, ca. VI cent. A.D.) and states that drama should help people to understand the insubstantiality of worldly objects.

10) The notion of wonder (*ekplekseos*) in writings of Plato and Proclus seems to be different from the wonder *thauma*) which is for Aristotle the beginning of philosophy (*Metaphysics*, 982 b)

11) It is strange that Shattuck (1963: 69-75), who made a careful analysis of these moments, underestimate the importance of involuntary remembering in blissful moments. He makes a summary of their pattern as follows. First, "Marcel is always in a dispirited state of mind; bared, even tired at the time of their occurrence". Second, "he experiences a physical sensation, which comes unexpectedly..." Third, "the sensation is accompanied by a clear feeling of pleasure and happiness which far surpasses anything explained by the sensation alone". Fourth, all these "lift Marcel steeply out of the present", and the past event is "remembered, recognized and assimilated into the same binocular field of vision with the present event". Fifth, the first three components reach out to form a link not only with the past but also with an event or development *in the future*". The sixth element is a variable response to the experience that follows it.

Shattuck (1964:40) mentions the distinction between involuntary memory and conscious recognition, but in a different sense. He puts this involuntary memory of the blissful moments in opposition to the conscious recognition of Marcel's vocation as a writer, and his task of writing. This recognition is-for Shattuck - not the recognition of the extemporal self (which makes death indifferent), but recognition of the vocation and task awaiting him (in time left) before death.

12) Free association in psychoanalysis combines involuntary remembering with a practical aim. The patient has to remember some past experiences (emotional conflicts) in order to recognize their conversion into present symptoms; this frees him from past (conflicts) and from present (repetition of symptoms) The same pattern can be found in Indian meditative traditions. One is to remember previous lives in order to recognize the relationship between unresolved tendencies and his present life. With that he is liberated from karma and the necessity of (further) repeating incarnations.

13) A separate school in Kashmir Saivism developed around the notion of *pratyabhijñā* (recognition, self-awareness). Kaw (1964:49) considers Somananda (9th cent.) as a founder of Pratyabhijñā school (with his *Sivadrśā*), his disciple Utpaladeva as a systematizeer (with *Pratyabhijñā Sastra*), and Abhinavagupta (10th-11th cent.), a disciple of Utpaladeva's disciple, as the expounder and commentator of the ideas and works of this system (with two commentaries on *Īśvarapratya-bhijñā*, second chapter of *Tantrāloka* etc.).

14) *Ātman* in Pratyabhijñā school slightly differs from *ātman* as understood in Vedānta. In Pratyabhijñā *ātman* is a synonym for Maheśvara (Great Lord, ultimate reality), and an individual self, while in Vedānta *ātman* is an individual self identical with *brahman*. In Vedānta ignorance (*avidya*) is two-fold: a confusion of the self (*ātman*) with empirical existence (*anātman*) and, therefore, ignorance of the ultimate identity of *ātman* and *brahman*. Mokṣa (liberation) is attained through insight or knowledge (*vidyā*, *jñāna*). In Pratyabhijñā *moha* (oblivion, delusion) and *ānavamala* (ignorance) conceal the real nature of the self and its power of knowledge and action. Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) of the real nature of the self and its identity with Maheśvara, makes one aware of faculties ordinarily hidden and is actually *mokṣa* (liberation).

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Representation in Painting and Drama : Arguments from Indian Aesthetics

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1. Preface

As early as the 4th c.B.C. drama was conceived in India as the representation of actions of the three worlds - heaven, earth and the underworld i.e. the actions of the gods, human beings and demons. The Sanskrit words used for representation by Bharata, the father of Indian aesthetics in general and dramaturgy in particular, in his work entitled *Nāṭyaśāstra* are *anukṛti* and *anukarana* which literally mean imitation or doing after. But Bharata creates problems when, in his definition of drama, he also uses two other Sanskrit terms *bhāvanākīrtana* and *anubhāvana* which mean re-(or after) description of emotion and re/after occurrence of emotion respectively. These two sets of terms allow a scope for the commentators of Bharata for interpreting the nature of representation in drama in different ways. But before coming to the commentators, it is necessary to understand Bharata's own conception of drama as available in the information he provides about the origin and the nature of the dramatic art taking both the art work itself and its experience by the audience into consideration.

II. Introduction

The gods once appealed to Brahma, the proto-creator of the universe, to present them a toy (*kridaniyaka*) which should be both visible and audible. Such a toy would delightfully purify the creatures of Jambudvīpa (the mythical name of India) who had deviated from appropriate conduct being afflicted by passions (lust, jealousy and anger etc.). Brahma, the composer of the four Vedas, was pleased to grant the appeal and devised the drama, an audio-visual toy, combining physical gestures, dialogues, music, dance and costume. The first appropriate occasion for exhibiting this toy was the banner festival of Indra, the king of heaven and the action represented therein was the battle between the gods and demons that led to the defeat of the latter. The action naturally enraged the demons since their defeat delighted the gods, their rivals. Therefore, they immediately avenged their offence by destroying the stage and stopping the performance and finally complained that Brahma had exhibited parochialism by upholding the victory of the gods and ridiculing their own defeat. Brahma understood that the demons in the audience had identified themselves with the demons represented by the actors on the stage and this identification had been the root of all disturbance. He then addressed the demons, the core point of his

address being that the audience should not identify the dramatic representation with factual reality. As a toy, this representation is meant for the delight of the audience, and what is represented on the stage is not any particular action or event that could be identified with any such phenomenon ever occurring in course of history; it is rather the law of action, a general principle that governs the course of action. So the action and its agents represented in a drama are only the illustrations of this law of action. What was therefore represented in the particular drama staged by Bharata was the principle that in the battle of good and evil, the former always wins and the latter loses. It was only incidentally that Bharata took the gods and demons as the examples of good and evil. There might have been any other event and any other agents exemplifying this principle. The subject-matter of drama covers the whole range of cultural activities - religion, arts, philosophy, customs, laws, emotions and events - not in any particular but in a generalised form.¹

At the same time Brahmá was aware of a critical point; the audience-demons' identification with the actor-demons was due to the fact that the whole event was factually true. It had happened in the very recent course of history with the same gods and demons, who constituted the audience of the drama, as actual participants. So this personal identification was due to the contemporaneity of the action represented. Brahmá therefore instructed that no contemporary action should be represented in the drama; and by such proscription Brahmá wanted to say that the dramatic representation is a fiction and not a fact and the fictionality of an action means a particular illustration of a general law of action. The same law of action may be illustrated severally by several particular actions and their agents. The particular events and characters in a drama do (or should) not have their counterparts in the real world. The nature of the events and agents of the drama is further explicated by Bharata in the sixth chapter of his text where he understands drama in terms of the experience of audience. Although in the first chapter he states that the subject-matter of drama is as wide-ranging as to include the whole range of learning and action - the arts, crafts, morals, history, religion and pragmatic information etc. - so as to attain the authenticity of the fifth Veda, in the sixth chapter Bharata mentions that the sole object (*artha*) of the dramatic representation is to generate emotional delight (*Rasa*). A correlation of both the contexts leads to an observation that the actions represented in the drama are necessarily expressive of emotions. In other words, representation of actions means representation of emotions through actions and their agents, which ultimately generate aesthetic delight. The same point, therefore, explains the nature of the dramatic representation as well as the nature of aesthetic experience. Although any discussion of this point tends toward an overlapping of both the issues, it

is possible to separate the issue of representation and examine it in the light of interpretations offered by several commentators of Bharata who lived during the 8th-10th centuries.

Bharata states that aesthetic delight is generated by the combination of *Vibhāvas* (1. characters that shelter the emotions and² the situations that stimulate the emotions) *anubhāvas* (the actions of the characters) and *vyabhicāribhāvas* (temporary feelings)⁴. So far as the question of representation is concerned, this statement, by implication, refers to the trilateral relation among reality, drama as a literary text and its performance on the stage. The combination as mentioned above takes place in the real world (where they are called cause and effect respectively), it is described in a literary text by the playwright and finally the text is performed on the stage. As Bharata has already stated, the events and characters of the drama (and by implication in all the literary forms such as epic, lyric and prose narrative) do not represent any particular fact or character of the real world, but illustrate the general laws of actions. Now what is the relation between the textual characters and the actors in the performance of the text ? A performance in general is a specific action or set of actions and a dramatic performance in particular is the single occurrence of a repeatable and preexistent text. The text therefore anticipates and even authorizes its several performances (or occurrences) logically transcending them all.⁵

In other words, if the characters etc. of a dramatic text are the illustrations of the general laws of actions, performances (or role-playing) by the actors in different occurrences of the same play are also illustrations of the characters and their actions. The fact that different performances of the same play are repeatedly attended by the same audience evidences the hypothetical 'perfection' of a performance.

The Sanskrit critics, however, have viewed the representational relations differently. Out of several commentaries on Bharata only one by Abhinavagupta (10th c.) survives, and it is rather risky to consider the views of other critics, as mentioned by Abhinava, that he rejects. But it is not unfair, though not adequate, to formulate some theories of representation depending upon Abhinava's elaborate discourse.

III. Representation as Illusion

Lollata (9th c. A.D.) understands that the dramatic representation in a performance is an illusion of reality i.e. the characters etc. in the world are pre-existent to their representation by the actors.⁶ He thinks that in the real world when an emotion (say love) is intensified (*upacita*) by virtue of its combination

with characters and their actions etc., it generates delight (*Rasa*) primarily in those characters, and secondarily in the actors when they represent those characters etc. Here Lollata is reported to have rejected the views of his predecessors Udbhata (8th c. A.D.) and his followers who did not accept such a view, because, they argued, if the actors would personally feel delighted or shocked (by the dramatic incident of death etc.) then it would be difficult for them to concentrate on acting. This kind of understanding is therefore erroneous (*bhrama*). But Lollata answers that since the actors are specially trained, by the power of their memory they can manage to keep up their concentration even when they are affected by pleasure and pain etc. To quote Abhinava's text on Lollata : "The state is present in both the character represented i.e. Rama etc. primarily (*Mukhyayā vṛtṭyā*) and in the representing actor by the power of a recollection (*amusaṇḍhana*) of the nature of Rama etc."

The view thus presented does not make any reference to the audience explicitly. But any theory of representation must make a reference to the addressee: representation is always *of* something or someone, *by* something or someone, *to* someone. Bharata has very clearly mentioned the role of audience which is rather the centre of representation in his text. Since there is every doubt for an adequate presentation of Lollata in the text of Abhinava available so far, the purport of Lollata may be reformulated in a way which would mean that reality is the primary aesthetic object and art, its representation, is a secondary, aesthetic object by virtue of its becoming real (*tadātmaka*).

In other words, to the audience an actor represents the reality to the extent that he becomes reality. But the question is whether the actor really becomes real for the audience or for himself ? That is to say, whether the audience experiences an illusion of reality in the actor because of his semblance to the reality or the actor himself experiences an illusion of reality by factual identification (*tadātmakatva*) or both are true simultaneously. The issue becomes a serious one for the use of the Sanskrit words *amusaṇḍhi* and *amusaṇḍhana* : which are polysemous synonyms meaning recollection, memory, consciousness, reflection and awareness. If the trilateral structure of representation is read into Lollata's thesis the Sanskrit words play a significant role in establishing the theory of theatrical representation as an illusion of reality. Since both the words mean recollection, the theory of perceptual error relevant in the context refer to the Mīmāṃsā theory of *akhyāti* or non-apprehension as advanced by Prabhakara Bhatta (7th-8th c. A.D.).⁷

The Mīmāṃsa school believes in the self-validity of knowledge i.e. every knowledge is intrinsically valid (*Svataḥ prāmāṇya*) ; its validity is not determined

by extraneous factors. A necessary corollary of this theory, therefore, is that every apprehension must be valid. Prabhakara states, "It is strange indeed how a cognition can apprehend itself and yet be invalid." In explaining the nature of perceptual errors such as illusions and dreams Prabhakara distinguishes experience from memory and holds that while every experience (*anubhūti*) is valid, memory is not valid because it is the impression or recollection of the past experience. In an illusion when a shell is mistaken for a piece of silver, our cognition is 'this is silver.' This cognition, though appears as a single one, is a composite of two cognitions - apprehension and memory. 'This' (shell) is perceived, but 'silver' is remembered. The cognition as a whole is valid because its object 'this' is never sublated even in a sublating judgment. But the object of memory 'silver' is sublated by shell. The error consists in our non-apprehension of the distinction between the objects perceived and remembered. The common quality or qualities of the objects of our perception and memory is/are responsible for such non-apprehension (*akhyati*) of their difference.

Similarly, in a theatrical performance, an actor is a representation of reality (Rama etc.) for the audience by virtue of the common qualities - both formal and gestacular such as matted hair, bark garments, holding bow and arrows, weeping for separation from his wife etc. as described in the authentic text the epic *Rāmāyana* - to the extent that for the time being the actor becomes Rama and the audience cognizes Rama in the actor by virtue of his memory (*amisaṇḍhana balat*) of the textual descriptions of Rama. The audience perceives only the actor, but remembers Rama. Therefore the cognition "This is Rama" is not a composite perceptual experience. It is a confusion of experience with memory and Prabhakara says, this confusion is due to a defect of mind (*manadosah*).

That art is an illusion of reality by virtue of the accuracy of its resemblance with reality is as old a notion as the Homeric appreciation of the shield of Achilles culminating in the legendary pictures of Zeuxis and Parrhasius that could confuse both birds and human beings so much so that the birds even pecked at the picture of a bunch of grapes made by the former.⁸

The theory of illusion has recently migrated from myths and legends to the psychology of artistic vision and the optics of aesthetic perception. E.H. Gombrich's critical popularity lies not on any resolution of the problem that seeks to determine the relation between art and the external world, but on his demonstration of the fact that the pictorial artist has always undertaken to produce a two-dimensional form which creates an illusion of the three-dimensional world. His approach through the psychology of visual perception avoids the epistemological problems that tend to determine the cognitive aspect of art distinguishing it from

the cognition of the external world that art represents. The areas of knowledge that Gombrich consults for his observations are the notion of visual perspectives in modern physics and the physical theory of relativity as reflected in both modern optics and structural linguistics. Gombrich confesses that he did not consider illusion in the sense of deceptive cognition as the main aim of art, nor did he make this point the central issue of his title *Art and Illusion* which was originally a series of lectures entitled 'The Visible World and the Language of Art'. "It so happens", he states, "however, that my publishers found this rather a mouthful, and since they also wanted to retain the word Art in the title I drew up a lengthy list of simple alternatives from which the final title was picked by a friend."⁹ "Although the book title does not reflect the content as appropriately as the lecture title, the idea of illusion as the mode of our visual perception forms the key to Gombrich's understanding of art history. His work is essentially an answer to the anti-illusionists led by J. J. Gibson who is convinced that the visual perception of reality can never be mediated by painting because our visual perception based on our visual information of the environment containing the effects of movement and 'gradients' of texture cannot be fully simulated in a painting. But Gombrich argues and demonstrates that the artist simulates through stimulation of the effect of our visual experience, though not of the visual reality. Citing the example of a modern Buddha image of Cylon whose eye balls are put as two dots by the artist in its consecrating rituals, (which, it is believed religiously, enlivens the image) Gombrich argues that the artist is not to fashion a facsimile eye, but to find a way of stimulating the response to a living eye. "The question is not", he writes, "whether nature 'really looks' like these pictorial devices but whether pictures with such features suggest a reading in terms of natural objects . . . it is the meaning we perceive, not the means . . . This appearance of the world has been a constant theme of art educators who want to change our attitude."¹⁰

Gombrich's central thesis of artistic illusion is based on a relativist psychology of perception and he consciously avoids the epistemological questions in both our perception of the external world and its representation in art. He understands that the two types of reaction are particularly closely allied : the perception and representation. Since there is no innocent eye and because of the relativity of our vision there is no objectively 'correct vision' of things, transformation of the three-dimensional world into our two-dimensional perceptual vision is a question of psychological and physical perspectives. Both perception and representation heavily draw on conceptual schemata. Pictorial representation is therefore not a duplication (a two-dimensional form is not obviously a duplication of the three-dimensional world) but a visual description of what the artist sees. If what

the artist sees is not the objectively correct view of the world, then, in a sense, all our perceptual knowledge is only illusory, and further, its representation in a picture, if not an illusion of an illusion, aims at least at a partial subversion of belief by the spectator that he sees the world and not its representation. To put it symbolically, \bar{X} is a representation of Y , if there is at least a partial subversion of belief by the spectator that he is seeing Y and not X .¹¹

Instead of making any attempt at criticising Gombrich's view of art as illusion (which has been already done by several others)¹² we now examine its relevance, by way of putting it as a contrast rather than a parallel, in the context of Lollata's view of the theatre as illusion. Leaving aside the question of visual perspectives and the conceptual schemata in case of the pictorial representation of the three-dimensional world, because it is not applicable to the theatre which is a three-dimensional representation in movement, it is pertinent to ask whether there is any subversion of belief by the spectator that it is not a drama but reality - whether, as Gombrich thought of painting, it is impossible to 'stalk' the illusion in dramatic representation. Obviously not so. Gombrich's duck-rabbit analogy does not hold good here. Actors etc, are not sometimes taken as actors and sometimes as real characters. Nor is there any confusion of the configuration with the representation, because in the theatre both the configuration and representation are ontologically identical - here action is represented by means of action. Besides, as Wollheim observes, Gombrich's notion of representation does not explain the nature of representation in general, i.e. a representation is always different from what is represented.¹³ If to see the picture of a horse is to see it as a horse, then the picture is not a representation of a horse. The point is, precisely, Gombrich's treatment being purely psychological, it eludes the epistemological aspect of the problem which is extremely significant. What might be true of the situation is that in seeing the picture of a horse, we psychologically see it as a horse, but not epistemologically. Therefore the story of the birds pecking at Zeuxis' picture of a bunch of grapes is only a legend and has nothing to do with any philosophical treatment of the subject.

Apart from the major differences noted in the approaches of Lollata and Gombrich to the notion of illusion in art - Lollata's being an epistemological and Gombrich's psychological or perspectival - both the critics almost agree on one point that in art the representation is taken as the represented. Although Lollata's ideas do not approve of any subversion of vision and beliefs swinging between seeing art as a configuration and as a representation, Gombrich's idea of the impossibility of stalking the illusion only partly explains Lollata's drawing

upon the Mimamsa theory of illusion that the confusion of art with reality or the perceptual experience with memory is due to a defect of mind.

Besides, if understood correctly, Gombrich's theory of art as illusion overlaps the Indian doctrines of illusion and doubt. Gombrich understands the artistic illusion as an ambiguity of vision typified in the duck-rabbit figure, a visual puzzle where either the duck or the rabbit can be seen at a time, not both. Similarly there is the 'canvas or nature' dichotomy i.e. the difference between seeing something as a configuration and as a representation. But apart from the truth that it is absolutely possible to see the configuration as a configuration and as a representation simultaneously, Gombrich's duck-rabbit figure is not an appropriate example of his 'canvas or nature' dichotomy : because while in case of the puzzle it is a question to choose one from the two representations, in the other case it is a question of choosing either a configuration or a representation.¹⁴ To follow the Indian thinkers, an illusion is free from doubt, it is a definite cognition. One *sees* a snake in a rope, does not vacillate between a snake and a rope. In that case it will be doubt (*samsaya*). If a statue is accepted as a man, then it is a case of illusion. If the vision moves in between a man and a statue (*sthānurva puruṣo*), it is a case of doubt. Gombrich's idea of the impossibility of 'stalking the illusion' does not form part of the Indian theory of illusion. No Indian critic, however, has considered art as a form of doubt.

However, the principal defect that is true of both the theorists of illusion is to ignore that a representation should be experienced as a representation and not as reality. In other words, the audience perceives art as the representation of reality and not as the reality itself. It is logically unwarranted to ascribe any 'defect of vision' or 'defect of mind' to the audience.

IV. Representation as Artificial Reproduction, Replica and Re-representation.

Sankuka, (9th c. A.D.) the successor of Lollata as a commentator on Bharata, appears to have understood the defects of an illusion theory; and since Sankuka's thesis has been presented by Abhinavagupta in a more detailed and unambiguous discourse, it is easier to examine the thesis with greater accuracy. Sankuka criticizes Lollata pinpointing his attack on Lollata's view of representation as the illusion of reality. He views art as a representation and distinguishes the nature of this representation from four types of related phenomena such as illusion, reality, doubt, and similitude (analogy).¹⁵ He also acknowledges three modes of communication or sign systems - linguistic, pictorial and theatrical and, while distinguishing the linguistic sign system of denotation from the theatrical sign system of acting, he considers the pictorial and theatrical systems as of the same

kind. The main thrust of Sankuka's argument against Lollata is on the nature of the aesthetic object as a representation of reality. Lollata thinks that an emotion in the real world becomes itself an aesthetic object when it is intensified by the combination of characters or determinants and their actions etc. (*Vibhavadi*), and the same (combination of emotion or permanent mental state with determinants etc.) is represented in the theatre by the actor by way of an illusion. But Sankuka says that since Bharata does not mention the combination of the emotion in his axiom where he mentions the combination of the determinants etc. only, it is obviously the purport of Bharata that the emotion is represented in the theatre not directly but through its lexical signs (*linga*) such as the combination of the determinants etc.

Sankuka's discourse, as reported by Abhinavagupta, makes the point clear that it is the theatrical performance which is the ontology of the dramatic art. In other words, no phenomenon of the real world is an aesthetic object, only its representation (*anukarana*, *anukrti*) in art becomes the aesthetic object, and aesthetic perception is not the perception of this representation as reality - experiencing an illusion thereby - but the perception of this representation as the representation of reality.

Sankuka insightfully distinguishes between the verbal representation or denotation (*abhidhana*) and the theatrical representation or acting (*abhinayana*). Both are the media of communication different from each other. Even there is a difference between reading the dialogues of a dramatic text by a non-actor and that by an actor in a theatrical performance. An actor's reading his dialogues involves the illocutionary function of language whereas a reader's reading the same involves the locutionary function. In other words, the dialogues of a dramatic text communicate their meaning by the referential power of language, but the dialogues read by an actor communicate by their perceptible gesticular form. Sankuka explains this difference by several examples quoted from different plays. One such example is from Sriharsa's *Ratnavali*:

"This multitude of droplets, fine rain of tears falling while she painted, produces on my body the effect of a perspiration born from the touch of her hand." A reader understands the happiness of the love-struck hero Udayana as described here by way of reference; but an audience experiences this state of the hero directly perceiving the illocutionary functions of the language as performed by the actor when he touches his body and projects the state of perspiration as the sign of happiness.

It is understood that the linguistic representation is referential. But what exactly is the nature of theatrical representation? Sankuka states, "Though these

determinants etc. are brought into existence by the conscious efforts (*Prayatna*) of the actor) and are thus artificial (*krtrima*), yet they do not appear so (*tathanabhimanyamana*). Since the characteristic signs (such as tears, beating hands on the forehead, choaked voice etc.) of an emotion (permanent mental state of sorrow) lie in (or projected by the actor), the emotion that actually belongs to the original characters (in the epics or legends) such as Rama is (necessarily) represented by in the actor. Therefore Rasa (aesthetic emotion or drama as an aesthetic object) is nothing but another name for the representation (or replica/reproduction) of emotion....; not the same as (*tadatma*) or derived from emotion (*tatprabhava*) as Lollata thought."

Sankuka's distinction between the verbal description of the events, characters and their emotions and their theatrical performance is clear enough for understanding the difference between the narrative and the theatre. But a doubt lurks as regards the status of Rama whom the actor represents. Does he mean the Rama who is supposed to have actually lived some time in India or the Rama who is described in the epic? It seems Sankuka means the latter, since he says that the determinants (characters *vibhava*) are known from poetry (*kavyaharat*). Therefore the actor's representation of Rama does not imply any factual existence of a real Rama whom he has seen or is expected to have seen. Sankuka further says that the gesticular movements, the very means of acting are learnt by the actor through training (*siksha*), obviously referring to the director's instruction and the actor's rehearsal and not to the actor's imitating (copying/replicating) any actual Rama. Sankuka also stresses the actor's own experience of the transitory feelings which he employs in acting.

According to Sankuka, what actually is given on the stage is the performance of the combination of determinants (*vibhava*), gesticular movements (*anubhava*) and facial expression of the feelings (*vyabhiaribhava*) which forms the lexical signs of the permanent emotion. As fire is not directly seen in the smoke but is inferred from it, so also the emotion through its lexical signs is inferred (*pratiyamana*) by the audience.

Coming to the experience of the audience, for whom this representation is intended, Sankuka straight rejects Lollata's theory of illusion and explains that when the audience infers the permanent emotion from its signs as performed by the actors, it does not identify the actor with the *real* Rama, nor does he have an illusion of Rama, nor does he doubt whether the actor is real Rama or not, nor does he cognise the actor as somebody bearing the similitude (*sadrasya*) of Rama as a crow looks like cuckoo, or a cat like a tiger or a wild ox (*gavaya*) like an ox. He concludes, as in the case of a picture horse, the beholder cognises

'This is a horse', so also in the case of the actor the audience cognises - "This is that happy Rama" and not "This actor is happy", "This is real Rama," or "this is somebody like Rama" or "Is this Rama or not?"

But Sankuka explains that although the gesticular movements etc. are made by the actor by his conscious effort and are therefore artificial, the audience does not realise so. In other words, although artificial it looks real (or natural). If this experience is not an illusion then what it is?

Sankuka answers that acting is not an illusion or mistaken cognition which misguides the subject. It is true that illusion takes place when something appears as some other thing. But all such case are not of the same type. There are some cases where something appearing as some other thing, far from misguiding the subject, rather guides him properly, and therefore, is not a case of illusion. Sankuka takes recourse to the arguments of Dharmakirti, a logician of the Sautrantika school of Buddhism, who considers causal efficiency (practical efficacy), the capacity to produce the desired effect (*arthakriyakaritva*) the criterion of valid cognition and the real existence of a thing. Mirage is a common example of illusion where the subject is misguided. Similar are the cases of a shell's appearing as silver or a rope's appearing as snake. But Dharmakirti provides the example of a peculiar case. A gem and a lamp remit rays of light. From a distant place two different persons see only these two rays of light, not the objects that remit the rays. Since none of them has seen the object but only its lexical sign, the ray, each one is under the illusion that the ray comes from a gem. So both of them run to the objects concerned guided by this illusion. But where one gets the gem, the other does not. Now Dharmakirti argues that although both are under illusion in the beginning, the illusion of the man who gets the gem is practically not an illusion since it produces the desired effect i.e. getting the gem.

Since Sankuka distinguishes dramatic representation from both illusion and reality, the more judicious interpretation of his observation in the light of Dharmakirti's logic happens to be this: drama is not an illusion of reality because it does not misguide the audience. It is not that they visit the drama with a hope for getting something, but finally return frustrated. They rather come back fully satisfied because they have got the thing they wanted. But what did they want to get and how did they get it? They did certainly not want to see the real Rama, the Rama of the *Ramayana* moving in flesh and bones or even his similitude, because they know very well that, as described in the epic and other texts, Rama lived (or might have lived) long long ago and there is no possibility of his re-living now. They wanted simply to cognise directly or perceptually the

performance of Rama as described in the verbal discourses. Very clearly, in this sense, Sankuka distinguishes between the communication (*avagamana*) by verbal description (*abhidhāna/vācana*) and the communication by acting (*abhinaya*). Dramatic representation means the audio-visual presentation (or transformation) of the textual description. Therefore, the accuracy of representation as cognised by the audience is judged by comparing the performance with the verbal description and/or with other performances of the same play. Sankuka's understanding of the dramatic representation as 'artificial' is the same as to understand the literary representation as 'fictional'. They have nothing to do with the external reality. Artificiality is not necessarily a property of illusion, nor are all illusions artificial. It is only at times that artificial objects create illusions. The primary difference between artificial object and an illusion is that the former is always a man-made object whereas the latter is a natural occurrence. The Sanskrit word *krtrima*, equivalent to the English word artificial, literally means an object intentionally made/composed/manufactured by a human agency (*karanajjata/racita*). Sankuka's concept of artificiality also corroborates Bharata's treatment of drama as a toy. Although the terms natural and artificial are antonyms, some artificial objects sometimes (not always) create illusions with or without the intention of the maker. But no illusion is artificial. Artificiality is not also necessarily pretension. Dramatic performance is artificial in the sense that the costume, speech and action of the actor have no reference to his natural identity. In this sense, acting is not necessarily an illusion because the actor does not intend to create any illusion although sometimes, for some audience, it becomes an illusion.

The relation of the gem and its ray in Dharmakirti's example explains the relation of the permanent emotion with the gesticular movements etc. respectively; and although the gesticular movements etc. which are the lexical signs of the emotion appear to be illusory because of their artificiality, they are not practically illusory because the desired object i.e. the permanent emotion is cognised through them.

The next important point in Sankuka's discourse is the 'comparison of acting with painting. Sankuka states that the actor's status as Rama is similar to a picture's status as the object it depicts. Pointing out to a picture of a horse one says— "this is a horse" and similarly, pointing out to the actor one says "this is Rama." In saying so, Sankuka obviously considers the artificiality of both the arts, and the point of resemblance pertaining to the term *anukrti* in Bharata's definition of dramatic representation is also obvious. But the deeper critical implication of this comparison becomes clear when viewed in the light of recent scholarship. If representation is interpreted in the sense of 'standing for' then

there is a justification for Sankuka's comparison. As the configuration stands for a horse, so also the actor stands for Rama. Both of them are distinguished from reality, illusion (though sometimes some pictures like *trome l' oeil* are illusory, not necessarily all), doubt and similitude. But the interpretation of "standing for" in the light of linguistic denotation, as a purely conventional symbol - ignoring completely the question of resemblance, ignoring the pictoriality of a picture - accepting anything as standing for any other thing does not hold good of Sankuka; because while equating pictorial representation with acting, he explicitly distinguishes acting from linguistic denotation (contra Goodman). For Sankuka acting and painting belong to one order while a verbal text to another. The common characters that Sankuka observes between these two representations are undoubtedly their visibility and artificiality. In both the cases there is a difference between the represented and the representation as well as a correspondence. Although prior to Sankuka, in the vocabulary of pictorial art, Indian antiquity conceived of symbolic representation not as any material picture but as an abstract, spiritual likeness (*pratirupa*)¹⁸, it seems, he considers only the cases of pictorial or iconic images and not the aniconic ones and what he further considers necessary to make a representation is not accuracy of depiction or realism, but depiction of something visible and the intention to depict. Since he excludes the non-representational arts from his discussion, on the basis of pictorial signs, he uses the expression "this is a horse" and not 'this represents a horse'; and similarly 'this (actor) is Rama' and not "this (actor) represents Rama." Nor does he distinguish between 'simple' and 'complex' objects of representation.¹⁹ Like a word a representation should not only refer to a thing. It should necessarily involve something about the shape or form (*akrti*) of the thing.

Hanna Pitkin, probably of all the recent critics on the subject, comes very close to Sankuka and puts her analogy rather reversely. When Sankuka explains acting in terms of pictorial art Pitkin explains pictorial art in terms of acting: "... the way in which an artist represents is closely related to the way in which an actor represents a character on the stage. For if we are merely identifying the part an actor plays, who he is supposed to be, we say simply 'He is Hamlet.' In the same way we would identify a piece of scenery: 'That is the castle gate' ... Again, as with the picture of a tree which simply 'is a tree', the scenery and the character of Hamlet lack the distance or difference that representation requires: they *are* what they are supposed to be. But in another sense the actor represents Hamlet, and the whole company represents the *Hamlet* on the stage. This refers to their activity of presenting the play and the character in a certain way."²⁰

Pitkin proposes here two kinds of representation : representation as the identification of the represented with the representation as in the case of 'is' relation where the representation is what it is supposed to be and representation as re-presentation or presenting again, or presenting of something not present. Pitkin examines the political notion of artificiality as proposed by Thomas Hobbes. An actor's performance is artificial in the sense that he is not the owner of the stage-action and the ownership of an action is defined in terms of authority or right. Therefore an actor, like a legal representative acts for others. Correlating an actor with the notion of dramatic *persona*, Hobbes understands that since in its Latin origin *persona* signifies the disguise or outward appearance, an actor as a person, like a mask, is always a false front. Therefore to personate necessarily means to act or to represent either himself or another.²¹ But the difference between the political or legal representative on the one hand and the dramatic actor on the other is that while the first two are authorised by the 'owner of action' to act for them, there is no such authorisation for the dramatic actor. Pitkin therefore argues for an illusion theory of theatrical representation. "He (actor) does not pretend to act on authority of Hamlet, but to *be* Hamlet. His entire manner and appearance are directed to creating the illusion that he is someone else, someone whom he is playing or, as we say, representing on the stage."²²

But Sankuka upholds the difference between the representation and the represented and rejects the identity (*tadatmakatvam*) relation as proposed by Lollata. The actor might be psychologically identifying himself with the character, a situation implied by Sankuka's stress on the actor's education and effort necessary for acting, but the audience does not cognise this identity which would lead him to an illusory experience. Identity relation, however, is accepted by the Indian tradition only in case of religious rituals where the material images are identical not only with the spiritual potency they represent but also with the worshipper, the priest implying an identity of all the three points in the traingular structure of representation- 'of', 'by' and 'to' (*devo bhutva devam yajet*). The same also holds true of a ritualised dramatic representation.

Now the question is : if Sankuka rejects the identity relationship between representation and represented both in drama and painting, then what exactly are the terms in which this relationship is defined? It is already observed that according to Sankuka theatrical signs are lexical. Obviously the means of theatrical representation is different from that of painting. Lines and colours are the media of painting and gesticular movements, language, facial expressions and costume (*angika, vacika, sattvika, aharya* respectively) are the four constituents of acting

abhinaya)²³. All these are in conformity with the verbal description of the *Ramayana* (or *Mahabhārata* what the case may be) the authors of which are believed to have personally witnessed the action of Rama etc. that they have described. The actor's conformity to such description may be termed as *nominal portrayal*²⁴. But not all the pictures are of this kind of representation. Particularly the example cited by Śankuka, i.e. picture of a horse is a *real portrayal*, a visible shape or *akṛti* of an animal which exists in the external world. The nature of such an *akṛti* is explained by Mimamsa philosophers of the 7th and 8th centuries.²⁵ There is a Vedic injunction that "One should construct an altar like a syena-bird (*Syena-citam cinvita*).\" The meaning of this likeness is analysed by Kumarila in terms of Sabara's definition of differentia, a specific combination of substance, properties and qualities. This ontic factor is signified by the word *akṛti* (the visual shape) which is not only an epistemological percept (*saṁsthānam*), but also a mental concept. It is the aspect through which an individual of a class is formed. *Akṛti* does not mean any universal (*Jati*) existing independent of an individual. Since it is always realised in a concretised particular, Kumarila holds, as against the Vaiśeṣika realism, that there is no absolute difference between an individual and a universal.

Applying this notion of *akṛti* Kumarila interpretes the Vedic injunction. Construction of an altar *like* a syena-bird means that one should construct an altar with bricks the visual form of which must be similar (*sadrśya*) to the *akṛti* of not a particular syena bird, but to that of any syena bird that is born or is yet to be born.

The picture of a horse, interpreted in the light of Kumarila's doctrine, means a visual shape of two dimensions made of lines and colours which is similar to the *akṛti* of a horse. This is the meaning of Sankuka's statement "This is a horse"; and in the cases of non-existent objects Sankuka would accept the notion of *nominal* portrayals. Representation of *akṛti* comes very close to the representation of the essential characteristics, representation of the species rather than the individual. But according to Kumarila *vastutvam* (thing-ness-the Sanskrit parallel for essence) is an abstract concept which cannot form part of the denotation of a word and therefore, like *Sattā* (beinghood), it cannot form (*akriyate*) the concrete individual or *akṛti*.

This may lead to an understanding that by analogizing an actor with a picture, Sankuka thinks that if a picture of a horse is a visual representation of the *akṛti* of a horse, or, for that matter, even of any non-existent objects described in a text or a legend, an actor is an audio-visual representation of the *akṛti* of the character in the epic or a legend. If this hypothesis is accepted, then the

characters of the narrative genre are treated not as unique (*asāmānya*) individuals but as members of a class (*sāmānya*). In other words, proper names are only different names given to the members of a common class, and the emotions they shelter are also common (*sādhāranya*, *sāmānya*). This hypothesis finds a strong, grounding in the classification of the dramatic characters such as Dhirodatta, Dhiraprasanta, Dhiralalita and Dhiroddhata among males and Mugdha, Pragalbha etc. among females. All the characters available in the whole range of Sanskrit literature are accommodated within this principle of classification. Sankuka's statement "This (actor) is Rama", therefore, most probably means that this actor audio-visually represents the *akṛti* of Rama i.e. a Dhirodatta character, Rama being only one proper name for a member of this class, there may be as many names as possible for other members. Rama is not the only member of Dhirodatta class. Yudhisthira is another member. Similarly, representation of this character by the actor in the sense of performance is either an illustration of the principle of classification or a re-presentation of a member of the same class i.e. presenting again the same character as described in the epic or elsewhere in a different medium (*anukirtana*-Bharata). The relation among several such presentations or re-presentations may be defined in terms of the relation of one horse to another horse i.e. not in terms of similarity but in terms of belonging to the same class. Although the pictorial and theatrical representations differ in their representational codes (or media of representation) and the manners (style/genre) of representation, the principle of their representation is the same i.e. representation of the *akṛti* of an object or character.

V. Representation as the Determinate Presentation of there Indeterminate Reality

Sankuka's tendency for propagating a sister arts theory as evident in his analogising the arts of the theatre and painting has been severely criticised by his successor Abhinavagupta (10th C A.D.) who is the last among the classical commentators on Bharata's *Natyasastra*. Abhinavagupta strongly argues that the codes and genres of representation determine the uniqueness of each art form. He Writes :

Some people say, 'The pigment, orpiment, etc. undoubtedly compose a (*samyaj*) a cow.' Now if the word 'compose' is understood in the sense of 'manifest (*abhivyaj*)', these people also are in error. For we cannot say that minium, etc. manifest a real (*paramarthika*) cow like the one which might be manifested by a lamp etc. All they do is produce (*nirvrt*) a particular aggregate (*samuha*) similar to a cow. The only object of the image 'It is like a cow' is simply this mimium etc., applied so as to constitute a particular arrangement of

the limbs of a cow. In the case of the aggregate of the determinants etc., the situation is different : this - as we have said - cannot be perceived as similar to delight. Thus it is not true that *Rasa* is the reproduction of mental states."²⁶

Here Abhinavagupta indicates the difference among three art forms - literature, painting and drama. He does not understand the pictorial art in the light of Mimamsa doctrine of *akṛti*. He thinks that in all these three art forms the means of representation are three different kinds of aggregates: 1. aggregate of words in literature, 2. aggregate of lines and colours in painting, and 3. aggregate of determinants etc. in form of four constituents of acting, in drama. The functions of these different media are completely different and accordingly the relations between the object represented and its representation in the art forms are also different. In case of painting, the identity of the art form is nothing but an aggregate of colours which is understood in terms of its formal resemblance with a particular object in the external world, say a cow.

On the other hand, representational functions in literature and drama are quite different. Abhinavagupta's theory of language is based on the Mimamsa and the Grammarians' view that language *reveals* (manifests *abhivyaṅj*) reality (*pāramārthika*) as even a lamp reveals an object, and the reality according to the Saiva School of Abhinava is pure consciousness (*Vijñāna*) named as Siva or Paraśiva endowed with five kinds of potency - absolute consciousness (*cit*), delight (*ānanda*), volition (*icchā*), wisdom (*jñāna*) and action (*krīvā*). This ultimate reality is also identified with the highest level of language which is called *parāvāk*, the other levels of language in its hierarchy being *Paśyanti*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikhari*. If the highest level reveals the ultimate reality, the lowest level reveals the phenomenal world. The difference between the pictorial sign and linguistic sign rests on their difference in function. The former resembles the object it signifies whereas the latter reveals its signified. A picture denotes a particular object in the sense that it resembles it. But a word denotes or reveals the whole of the object (not only its visual aspects) - its material and the spiritual aspects all of which are real for a Saiva thinker. Poetry, according to Abhinava, in its highest level, reveals the human emotions as unafflicted consciousness identical with the ultimate reality or Paraśiva, and it does so by the peculiar linguistic potency called *vyānjana* (from the same root *vyaj* - reveal from which *abhi-vyaṅj* is derived).²⁸

Abhinava founds his notion of pictorial art as distinguished from verbal art on Bhartrihari's metaphysics.²⁹ The highest reality is the all-pervading word *Sabdabrahman* which has two potencies Time and Space. Out of these two, Time is more fundamental and identical with the Reality Verbum. Language as well

as the world are, therefore, basically temporal phenomena and the order of sequence is the basic structure of both language and the world it designates. Sentence is the primary unit of language (not word) and verb (*kriyá* - action), the embodiment of Time potency, is the central element of a sentence that determines the subject-object relation.

The evolution of the world means a course of constant change and modifications due to this change. They are of two kinds; temporal (*kriya vivarta* = action modification) and spatial (*Murti vivarta* = Image modification). The former indicates the state of continuity (*śādhya*) and the latter the state of stagnation (*siddha*). Pictorial art or a material image (*mūrti*) belongs to the order of the spatial modification since it is static and limited in extent, whereas language (and poetry) belongs to the order of temporal modification. Painting, for its very medium and the nature of its modification is a limited sign system and is therefore inferior to poetry, both the means (language) and manner (narrative) of representation of which indicate Time in its eternal continuity.

According to Abhinavagupta, drama is an art form the medium of which is spacio-temporal where time dominates over space. The peculiarity of this art form is the perceptual presentation of an action which determines the space of its occurrence. Acting, with its four constituents gesticular, verbal, mental and visual, is a medium of communication that manifests (*abhi-vyaj*) the reality with its completeness and is therefore highest form of art. Bharata's basic notion of drama as a toy is interpreted by Sankuka as an artificial object distinguished from a natural one and therefore there is a scope for comparison between toy as a visual art and its analogy in drama—both being man-made are artificial and the replicas of Nature. But Abhinavagupta interpretes the metaphor of toy rather as a principle than as an artificial object.³⁰ The Sanskrit word *Kridaniyaka* for toy is derived from the root *krid* which means to play with a purpose to delight the mind and *kridaniyaka* in its instrumental form means an object with which one plays for delighting the mind by withdrawing it from distractions. The suffix *ka* indicates a hidden purpose - in the present context a therapeutic one - to purify the mind like a sugar-coated medicine. A toy is used by persons who are neither too happy nor too sad, persons who experience both pleasure and pain. Like a toy drama can be used by the mass (*loka*), by all castes and classes without any social or religious restrictions. It is audio-visual, not tactual (*sparsya*) because had it been tactual, only one could experience it at a time, not many. Drama is meant to be experienced by a mass simultaneously. According to Bharata the subject-matter of drama basically concerns the four objectives (three mundane and one supermundane *dharma, artha, kama, moksa*) of human beings

as legitimatised by the Vedas and other authorities such as scriptures and histories in forms of causal laws, which is presented perceptually. Abhinava argues against Sankuka that in drama reality is perceived, not inferred. Therefore the determinants etc. are not the lexical signs. Since in drama the performance is an autonomous event, it does not convey any meaning by its reference to some other event, as smoke refers to the existence of fire. Acting is an autonomous, self-contained communication system. Bharata therefore uses the term *Sasangraha* which means self-evident experience or perception; and Abhinava refers to its explanation in the Nyaya philosophy-*Sarvá ca pramá pratyaksa pará-* "Perception is the basis of all other means of knowledge."³¹ The instructions of the scriptures and the events of history are all presented perceptually in drama and it is therefore (following Sankuka) erroneous to think that one infers reality from one's perceptual knowledge of drama. When one perceives fire directly, what logic of inferring it from smoke is there?

Abhinava's interpretation of the Sanskrit word *itihasa* (lit. history) used by Bharata is also quite significant for understanding his notion of dramatic representation.³² *Iti-ha-asa* (it is certainly like this) or it certainly happens like this) refers to the perceptualisation of cause-and-effect relation on the one hand, and perceptualisation of past (it certainly happened like this) or re-occurrence of what happened earlier, recurrence or illustration of an archetype (in the sense of myth in narrative) on the other. Here past is presented or the present form of the past continues to the future; the eternal truth of causality that continues through the past, present and future is perceptually presented or illustrated. It is a re-presentation of what has been presented repeatedly. Abhinavagupta uses the Sanskrit word *anuvyavasaya* to designate this nature of dramatic representation. The word literally means after (*anu*) contact (*vyavasaya*) and it has different denotations in the epistemology of Nyaya, Yoga and Saiva systems explaining the nature of perceptual cognition.

In the Yoga psychology of perception the word *anuvyavasaya* refers to the function of the mind in its intelligent (*sáttvika*) aspect by which the sensations (due to the sense-object contact *alocana*) are associated, differentiated, integrated and assimilated into percepts and concepts. It is therefore the creative faculty of mind.³³ The creative faculty of mind has been accepted and interpreted differently by the post-Yoga Buddhist logicians of both Yogacára and Sautrantika schools - by Dinnaga (500 A.D.) and Dharmakírti (650 A.D.) respectively. Dinnaga believes that the nature of reality is absolute consciousness devoid of any subject-object relations that are the constructs of mind (*vikalpa*) and expressed in language. Therefore he states that the cognitive state is a 'self-conscious' or 'self-luminous'

awareness and its expression in propositional form is a mental construction.³⁴ This is attacked by the Nyāya realists who hold that there are two stages of perception—the first stage a non-judgemental awareness of the given, the indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) perception and the second stage is the judgmental awareness, the determinate (*savikalpa*) perception. Both the stages of perception are denoted by the term *Pratyaksa* or *Vyavasāya*. But there is also a third cognitive stage which follows the second one when mind relates it to the second: At the first sight of a pot, for example, one cognises it as something- "this is something." In the second stage one cognises - "this is a pot" and in the third stage the cognition is 'I know this pot' and this third stage is called *anuvyavasāya*.³⁵ But Abhinavagupta does not understand this third stage of perception as *anuvyavasāya*. For him, there are only two stages of perception - one is indeterminate which is due to the contact (*vyavasāya*) of the sense with the object and the second stage that occurs after (*anu*) the contact (*vyavasāya*) is determinate perception or *anuvyavasāya*.³⁶ He therefore is in agreement with the Yoga philosophy in explaining the determinate perception as an *anuvyavasāya* or creative function of the translucent mind predominated by its intelligence stuff (*sattava*).

Abhinavagupta's link with the Buddhist and Yoga idealism is obvious in so far as he considers the nature of the supreme reality (*pāramārtha*) as absolute consciousness and the possibility of its valid cognition only by indeterminate perception. But he differs from the Buddhist as regards the nature of the phenomenal reality (*samvrti*) and its cognition by determinate perception. For the Buddhists the *samvrti* is as illusory as two moons and so also is the determinate cognition. But Abhinava holds that since *samvrti* is the self-manifestation of the Supreme Reality by his own *Māyā* potency, it is also a kind of truth (*satyasya prakāra*), not illusion or unreal like two moons.³⁷ If the unlimited nature of this supreme consciousness is the object of indeterminate cognition (*vyavasāya*), the phenomenal world (*samvrti*), which is the limited form of this reality, is the object of determinate cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). Both the aspects of reality are true and both the means of their cognition respectively are also valid.

Now Abhinavagupta argues that Bharata in his NS 1. 106 understands the word *Vikalpaka* in the sense of this *anuvyavasāya* which is synonymous with *pratisāksātākāra*. Elaborating upon this stanza, Abhinava states that drama is not a replica of any particular character or event of the phenomenal world or the world of determinate cognition; it is rather a presentation of the eternal law of causation, the object of indeterminate cognition presented in the form of determinate cognition. In other words, like any other object or event of the determinate world drama is just another event. Both of them are the same kind of events, since

they belong to the same class (*sajatiya*). The relation between the drama and the external world is just the relation between two horses, so to say, not between a horse and its replica as in a picture or its reflection in water (*sadrśā*).

Abhinavagupta uses the same terms of the Buddhist logic *arthakriyā* (causal efficiency) and *svalaksanata* (particularity) which were used by Sankuka, but applies them skilfully to explain his own arguments as against that of Sankuka.³⁸ If the events and objects of the drama are just parallels of the *samvrti* reality and not their replicas, then they should be as efficacious causally as their co-events are. Abhinava's answer is that the characters and events of the drama are not causally efficient, because they are not particular with *svalaksanata* as their co-phenomenal events or characters are. Only particular objects (*viśeṣa*) are efficacious, and the presentness (*vartamānatā*) is the essential property of a particular.³⁹ The dramatic characters like Rama etc. are not present. Although they are described as particulars in the epics and histories they are not so, since even there they lack the causal efficiency owing to lack of their presentness. It is just for this reason that Brahmā proscribed the re-presentation of the contemporary events and characters in the drama.

Having thus established his own theory of dramatic representation, Abhinavagupta distinguishes it from ten several other phenomena such as imitation or replica (*anukarana*), reflection (*pratvimba*), picture and portrait (*citra* and *alekhyā*), similitude/ analogy (*sādrśya*), metaphor (*āropa*), symbol (*adhyavasāya*), ascription (*utprekṣā*), dream (*svapna*), illusion (*māya*) and magic (*indrajāla*). He also distinguishes nature of its experience by the audience from both the valid cognition (*Prama*) and the four kinds of invalid cognition such as perceptual error (of five kinds), doubt (*samsaya* = confusion between two similar objects i.e. seeing a statue at dusk one might confuse it with a living man or statue), ignorance (*anadhyavasāya* = inability of knowing an object not seen before) and confusion (*anavadharana* = inability of recognising a thing seen before).⁴⁰

Although Sankuka has distinguished the dramatic representation from four kinds of phenomena i.e. reality, similitude, erroneous perception and doubt, Abhinava is not satisfied with the explanation of the nature of cognition that Sankuka gives i.e. "This is that Rama". He argues that Sankuka avoids the critical responsibility in stating that this cognition is subject to the experience (*anubhava*) of the audience and particularly he explains that on verification this cognition will be either true or false, but cannot be neither true nor false.

In the conclusion of his long discourse on the nature of dramatic representation, while explaining Bharata's words *anukṛti* and *anukarana* which literally mean imitation or replica in the Platonic sense of the terms, Abhinava

remarks that while performing the role of Rama, the actor certainly does not imitate the action of Rama, because such imitation requires the simultaneous presence of two particulars - the imitated and the imitator. Obviously this is not the situation concerned. Further, imitation in the sense of mimicry provokes laughter as in the case of a jester's imitating a hero. Role-playing by an actor means doing the same kind of gesticular movements etc. (*anubhavanstukaroti sajjātiyāneva*), but not doing like what Rama did (*natu tatsadrsan*)⁴¹. The point is that since Rama etc. do not have any particular identity either in the epic or in the drama, and their existence is only nominal in the sense that these names are given to certain characters that illustrate the law of causality, they stand for certain types i.e. four in number already mentioned in the section on Sankuka. The actor's performance is ordinarily viewed as an after-doing (*amikarana*) only in a pseudo chronological sense i.e. Rama did this long ago and the actor does this now. But critically considered, the actor does what any other man of the type of Rama should have done. In performing the actions that express sorrow or happiness the actor (and/or the director) does not look for the descriptions in the epic as much as he looks to the people in his society behaving in similar situations. In course of his training he also associates his own personal experience with others' behavior and in this sense of learning he may be said to be imitating the actions of people in general (not Rama) for the sake of propriety⁴². However, this is a point too simple to form the basis of a critical discourse on the dramatic representation.

VI. Conclusion

It is tempting to formulate an illusionistic theory of representation, particularly dramatic, following the Vedantic theory of the phenomenal world as an erroneous existence which is neither true nor false - it is a Maya the nature of which is linguistically indescribable. Correlating with Bharata's metaphor of toy a Vedantin might argue that there are two ways of playing with a toy - a baby's playing with it under an illusion of considering it as real and an adult's playing considering it as an artificial object. But theoretically, illusion and play are not necessarily correlated. A baby plays with the images of men or other beings, but is sometimes afraid of an image of a snake or of other animals of formidable shape. Therefore one can play with a toy only when one considers it a toy and not suffers from the illusion of reality. In other words, enjoyment of pictorial or dramatic representation is not similar to enjoyment of illusions. The illusion theory of representation precludes the enjoyment of representations of non-pleasant things and events. Therefore the Vedantins, who have considered the worldly attachment of ordinary people ignoble, and have compared this

attachment with appreciation of pictures, are aesthetically unsound. But Bhattanayaka's interpretation of the word drama (*natyam*) in the very opening stanza of the NS is a significant contribution to the Vedantic view of art⁴³. Drama, according to Bhattanayaka, is an art form, that is presented by the Supreme Reality (Brahman) as an analogical example of the unreality of the phenomenal world. As the nature of the world is determined by the multiplicity of names and forms, so also is the drama where the actors, like Brahman, are the sole creators of their world with various names and forms such as Rama and Ravana. If the drama is an example of the unreal world, the world is also a drama (*jagannatyam*) created by Siva. Both the worlds are continuously changeful and are attractive for their instantly changing novelty. But their unreality does not end in an illusion only. In fact both of them serve the means of attaining the highest objective of humanity through great contemplation - *moksa* (salvation) in the world and *Rasa* in drama.

While the ignorant are misguided by the unreality of the world and fail to discriminate between illusion and reality, the enlightened succeed in such discrimination and consider it a toy to play (*lila*) with. Isvara of Yoga and Vedanta as well as the sages are the enlightened beings who enjoy the whole creation as a dramatic representation. But, once again, this amounts to the rejection of the illusion theory. Illusion does not exist if illusion is viewed as illusion. In fact, to extrapolate the indications of Yoga and Vedanta, aesthetic cognition is a wisdom which only a few can attain, and this cognition is an experience of the Supreme Reality through its manifestation. The central aim of human wisdom is to experience the transcendental, the unchanged amidst the changeful while enjoying the beauty and dignity of the changeful itself. This is the truth in aesthetics, religion and philosophy.

Notes and References

1. NS1. 11-18. 51-5-7. 11-6-107, 116
2. NS 106-107 : also see Abhinavagupta's commentary on 57-na ca vartamanacaritanukaro yuktoah
3. NS VI. Prose after stanza 31
4. *ibid.* Vibhavaanubhava vyabhicaribhavasainyogadrasamisatti
5. See Henry Sayre, 'Performance' in Lentricchia and McLaughlin (ed.), *Critical Terms for Literary Study*. Chicago, 1990, P. 91.
6. See Abhinavagupta's commentary on NS VI. Rasasutra Note Supra 4.
7. G. N. Jha. *The Prabhakara School of Purvamimamsa* Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi. 1978 PP. 21, 124, 126.
8. Pliny, *Natural History* XXXV. 5, 62. Also See my *The concept of Imitation in Greek and Indian Aesthetics* Calcutta, 1977, P. 30
9. J. B. Derogowski and E. Gombrich (eds.), *Illusion in Nature and Art*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1973, P. 195
10. *ibid.* PP. 202, 205.
11. Dieter Peetz, "Some Current Philosophical Theories of Pictorial Representation" in *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 27. 3. Summer 1987, P. 228.
12. For example see Richard Wollheim, "On Drawing an Object" in Joseph Margolis (ed.), *Philosophy looks at the Arts*. Philadelphia, Temple theiversity Press. 1978, PP. 264-266; also see Nelson

- Goodman, *Languages of Art* Indianapolis, 1976, PP. 34-38, also Goodman's review of Gombrich's *Art and Illusion in Problems and Projects*, PP. 141-145.
13. Wollheim, op. cit. P. 266.
 14. E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*, Princeton, University Press, 1st edn 1960, Second paperback printing 1972, PP. 5, 296-298; Peetz, op. cit. PP. 228-231; Wollheim, op. cit. pp. 265-266.
 15. See Abhinavagupta's com. on NS Rasasutra. Supra Note 4.
 16. *Pramanavartika*, II, 57; See R. Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*, Chowkhamba, 1968 Originally published Rome, 1956), P. 31.
 17. *Sabdakalpadruma*, Calcutta, Vol. II.
 18. See for details Sukla, op. cit. Pt. II, Chap.2.
 19. Hanna F. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, P. 68
 20. Pitkin, op. cit. P. 70. See also PP. 67-73 for fuller account of her view.
 21. Pitkin, op. cit. PP. 24-26.
 22. *ibid.* P. 26
 23. NS VI. 23. The grammarian Patanjali (2nd c.B.C.) also notes the difference among the representations of the same event in different media, theatrical, pictorial and verbal and asserts that the theatrical representation of an event is the most effective because of its perceptualisation of the action in its temporal form which is absent in the static form of pictorial representation; and the verbal representation of the action makes the reader or listener realise the event only mentally. Referring to the theatrical representation of the mythical events such as Krsna's killing Kamsa or Vishnu's captivating Bali, Patanjali writes : "There are the actors who kill Kamsa and bind Bali before your very eyes. Such events of the past are also presented to you in pictures and recitations: the reciters use only the verbal medium and make you realise these past events in your minds.....", *Mahabhasya*, 3.1.26.
 24. John Hospers, *Understanding the Arts*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc, 1982, P. 153.
 25. Kumarila's Akrtivada in *Tantravartika*. See Francis X D'sa, S. J. *Sabdapramanyam in Sabara and Kumarila*, Vienna, 1980, PP. 151-165.
 26. Abhinava's com. on NS Rasasutra Supra Note 4. The English translation of this passage from Gnoli, op. cit. P. 41.
 27. Abhinavagupta's introductory (1st) stanza to NSI.
 28. Sabarabhasya, I. 1. 12-13, *Mahabhasya* I. 1. 4, *Vakya-padiya*, chapter I i also see K. A. S. Iyer, *Bhartrhari*, Poona, Deccan College, 1969; Sastri, G. *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, Calcutta, 1959.
 29. See Sukla, "Truth, Consciousness and Communication : Ontology, Epistemology and Linguistics in Sanskrit Literary Aesthetics", forthcoming.
 30. See Abhinavagupta's commentary on NS I. II
 31. *ibid.* commentary on NS I. 14.
 32. Commentary on I. 15.
 33. S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, 1st edn. London, 1924, reprint Delhi 1995, P. 176.
 34. B. K. Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, The Hague, 1971, P. 82.
 35. S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, 1st edn. Cambridge, 1922, reprint Delhi, 1975, Vol. I, P. 343.
 36. Abhinavagupta's commentary on Utpalacarya's *Isvarapratyabhijna-Sutra*, II. 2. 3.
 37. *ibid.*
 38. *ibid.* II: 3 Passim
 39. Abhinouva's Commentary on NS I. 107
 40. *ibid.*, alro I.1.
 41. *ibid.* I.57; I. 107.
 42. *ibid.* I.107
 43. Abhinava's comm. on NS I. 1.

The Arts of Amarna And India : A Study in Representation

JANE DURAN

The problem of representation cuts across many of the boundaries that we normally think of as demarcating important areas in aesthetics. If painting is involved, it is perhaps habitual to first think of representation as a conceptually difficult area in terms of twentieth-century art versus the portraiture of an earlier period, or in terms of the California neo-realism of the 1970's versus the abstract expressionism of the 1940's and 50's.

Thinking of representation in this particular way, however, may prevent our seeing other sorts of difficulties with this notion, particularly as applied to art of the Third World. In a recent review of Carroll's work on horror, Levinson has noted the interesting use Carroll makes of the Paradox of Fiction.¹ As Levinson notes,

The familiar paradox of fiction is cast with specific reference to movie horror monsters, in which we, as movie goers in possession of our sense, don't believe, and our ostensible fear and revulsion toward them, in the absence of behavioral inclinations of the sort such emotions appear to require.²

I would like to suggest that there is a similar paradox at work with respect to at least some aspects of representation. One hesitates to allude to it as "the paradox of representation", since it affects only a small portion of that which ordinarily might be thought to be representational, and since representation is itself a troublesome notion. Nevertheless, even a cursory look at many areas of Third World art and the traditional art of the ancients familiarizes us with the crux of the dilemma: how can we make sense of the notion of representation when what is allegedly represented is either a mythological entity, or an entity about whom we know so little historically that the notice of accurate representation is moot ? I will suggest here, uncontroversially perhaps, that representation is best thought of as a continuum, with the representational art of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, or even of the post-Renaissance period in general, not on a par with purportedly representational art of an earlier period.

But this merely highlights the other respect in which this conundrum mirrors the paradox that Levinson sets out for us in his discussion of Carroll's *The Philosophy of Horror*. The question is not only-or even not importantly--

whether some piece of art is representational. The question is now we can "believe in" so to speak, the intrinsically representational properties of a piece the referent of which we are not familiar with. Intriguingly enough, this particular set of problems may not reach its zenith for the mythological figure; clearly, the most serious level of difficulty accrues to the portrayal of an historical figure about whom we know little.

In the following I will contrast the art, both painted and sculpted, of two differing periods and cultures. As exemplary of the difficulties posed by representative art portraying historical figures about whom little is known, I will use examples from the Tell el-Amarna site in Egypt, geographic locale of the court of Akhenaton, the revolutionary Egyptian Pharaoh who succeeded Amenhotep III. Since one of Akhenaton's daughters married Tutankhamen, we know more about this general period than about many others in the pre-Christian era. I will offset the class of philosophical problems posed by such art with those derivable from art depicting figures purely mythological. For the latter I will utilize a set of examples taken from the Hindu art of India, much of it rock relief of the first millennium A.D. by contrasting these two sorts of artifacts, we have sufficient paradigmatic material to work on the peculiar paradoxes or puzzles generated by the representation of that with which we are unacquainted.

The notion of representation, at its most fundamental level, would seem to be related to the notion of likeness or mimesis. A representation of something, at least on one view, is supposed to be recognizable lines, slashes and patches of color, we have more and more difficulty in coming to grips with the notion of likeness. We may assume that the artist entitles a work "Mme. Meursan" not because the painting bears any relationship to the actual appearance of said person (in our hypothetical case), but because Mme. Meursan evokes in the artist some set of emotions to which he or she is giving vent, and so forth.

Now the representational art of much of the ancients presents us with a somewhat different problem. We are presented with work which obviously depicts human figures, and in many cases we are told which figures, or are given enough subsidiary information that, because of costumes, ornaments, placing and so forth, we can guess which figures. But how can we know that anything such as a likeness of the actual figure has been obtained? And if the sculpture, relief, frieze or painting is far enough away from what would count as a likeness on a sort of God's-eye view of representation, then what prevents our labeling the work nonrepresentational, fictitious, mythological and the like? These questions might not be perplexing were it not for the fact that we do frequently find

ourselves in the position of being told that a certain work of art is a likeness of an important figure from a given historical period.

At Tell el-Amarna and Karnak, sites in Egypt for the court of Akhenaton, the Pharaoh whose worship of Aton is widely regarded as the first for mutated monotheism, numerous reliefs and statues depict the King as a somewhat physically unusual figure. Because of the enormous amount of literature on ancient Egypt, the importance of Egyptology as one of the first "Orientalist" disciplines, and the unique role of Akhenaton in religious history, a large commentary on the appearance of the King and members of his family has grown up, with the interesting corollary that depictions of him seem to have been taken as more-or-less accurate. Sir Alan Gardiner, one of the foremost British Egyptologists of this century, writes:

A son of more unlikely an appearance than Amenhotep IV [Amenhotep IV, Akhenaton's name before he changed it to signify his new worship] could hardly have been born to altogether normal parents. Though his earliest monuments do not present his features and figure as markedly different from those of any earlier Egyptian prince, the representations of only a few years later provide us with frankly hideous portraits the general fidelity of which cannot be doubted. The elongated head slopes forward from a long thin neck; the face is narrow....³

One wonders about the move from "...the general fidelity of which cannot be doubted" to the description following, and yet Gardiner's commentary is standard along these lines.

Now at this point it would seem to be important to note that there are philosophical problems surrounding the notion of representation *simpliciter* that do not necessarily help in the case I am making here. Although I have treated the notion of representation as if it were straightforwardly related to the concept of resemblance, not all philosophers have been willing to make such an assertion. Some interpretations of Goodman's work, for example, have sought to emphasize how Goodman attempts to divorce the two notions⁴. And if an art form focuses too much on "resemblance", as it were, there is some hesitation about attributing to it the power of representationality. Robert Wicks, in his essay "Photography as a Representational Art", summarizes one position on photography in this way:

For example, Roger Scruton asserts... not that photography fails to be an art, but that photography's mechanical nature prevents it from being an art of representation...

According to Scruton, an aesthetic interest in representation is impossible with regard to an ideal photograph. Since an ideal photograph perfectly reproduces an object's visual appearance, and merely duplicates what we see with the naked eye, he believes that an ideal photograph cannot say anything about its subject.⁵

Wicks goes on to counter this line of argument, but it is clear that, according to some, too great a resemblance between an object and a work of art precludes the notion of representation because it obviates the possibility of the kind of layered interpretation which we think of as being significant in art. By the same token, as we have seen, if there is so little resemblance that recognition is not possible, the notion of representation begins to break down.

But these problems are not primarily what is troubling us here. What is troubling us, I am arguing, is that in many cases it is understood from the outset, particularly with historical figures, that there is some notion of resemblance involved in representation, and the question then is--how much? To return to Gardiner's commentary on Akhenaton, he seems to take it for granted that the representations of the Pharaoh are, in fact close likenesses, and it seems to be comparatively unproblematic for him--or for other Egyptologists--that, save for a death mask (in itself problematic) we do not really know what Akhenaton looked like.⁶

II

Insofar as Akhenaton is concerned, we might want to say that part of the difficulty with which we are grappling is just an instance of the general difficulty with work on the ancient cultures writ small, as it were. The contretemps surrounding our notions of reconstructing the past have been shoved under the rubric of philosophy of archaeology, and much work has already been done on this general problem.⁷ But what is particularly peculiar about the Egyptian Pharaohs, for example, and what lends credence to the notion that we are explicating a "paradox of representation" analogous to Carroll's paradox of fiction, is that some of the likenesses or representations are deemed to be better, from the standpoint of resemblance, than others. Not only, then, do we have a situation in which it is assumed that the representations bear a physical resemblance to the Pharaoh, but it is also assumed that one or more can serve as a standard against which the others--representationally--can be judged. Flinders Petrie writes of "...need[ing]... correct images for his [Akhenaton's] *ka*..."⁸ Gardiner writes, comparing one set of *stelae* to another, that the "...appearance of all these persons is as different from what can be seen in the rest of the tomb as can well be

imagined.⁹ Here images of Akhenaton, and indeed his family, are squared off against images constructed prior to the religious revolution.

Now part of the difficulty here is that, if one were not enamored of the notion of resemblance, and if one took a stand similar to Scruton's as articulated by Wicks, one could get out of all of this by tossing the notion of representation back to the symbolic. Here resemblance no longer counts; as Dickie has noted

...a work of art is by definition an iconic symbol of human feeling....¹⁰

But, as I have claimed, the standard commentary on the ancients does in fact assert that resemblance is at work here. So the conundrum so far is twofold: (1) *contra* theorists like Scruton and Goodman, there does seem, intuitively, to be some relationship between the concepts of resemblance and representation; (2) given that some degree of resemblance does indeed adhere to the notion of representation (even if we cannot precisely articulate its range), in our problematic cases of Akhenaton and his family some standard of representation is taken as being paradigmatic without our being able to specify adequately the conditions under which it should be so taken.

Some light may be shed on this puzzling duo of difficult areas by considering the notion of convention with regard to the representation of ethnic types, emotional states, etc., in the arts. Here the notion of standard becomes clearer. In discussing, for example, various stage Ophelias, Charney and Charney note :

No external sign of madness is more familiar and more often repeated than that of a woman with her hair down, virtually an emblem of madness on the Elizabethan stage. Ophelia, for example, who merely enters 'distracted' in the Folio stage direction... in the 'Bad' Quarto of 1603 comes on stage 'playing a lute, and her hair down singing...

We are grateful to the bad quarts for giving us stage directions that seem to record contemporary stage business, directions that are missing in the more formal texts... Instead of being 'put up', her hair has been let down'¹¹.

Granted that this is a case of representation of a concept, so to speak, instead of a person, we have to ask how it is that a concept came to be so highly marked, as it were. It is, of course, an empirical matter-emotionally distraught persons simply behaved in a certain way in Elizabethan and Renaissance times, and note made of this, over a long period, resulted in a certain convention with regard to the representation of this derangement.

The parallel case with Akhenaton would have to entail that empirical evidence about his appearance crept into the representations in such a way that certain features of them became standard. But the cases are not really parallel, of course- that is the difficulty. The feature that are appreciated in the case of "female distraction" are general features; in the case of Akhenaton, they are not. What would be necessary in the case of Akhenaton-and what we do not have-is some standard which we could be sure would serve. Failing, of course, a photograph, we would need perhaps more than one life mask, or detailed written accounts from his contemporaries, and so on. Flinders Petrie and Gardiner seem to suppose that we have such knowledge; we do not. The paradox of representation leaves us with figures of Akhenaton which might be much closer to the portrayals of mythological entities than we are inclined to think.

III

If it could be argued that there were a paradox of representation with regard to the mythological, it might run along these lines. Given that we have accepted some degree of relationship between resemblance and representation, how can one make sense of the notion of representation of a mythological entity? How can one make sense of the notion of representation with regard to something that does not exist?

The paradox, if paradox there be, is particularly pointed when we remember that we have just finished making the point that a core puzzle for the historical figures was the seeming acceptance of a notion of standard. Still one more citation in this regard-this one taken from the catalog of the widely-cited MOMA "High and Low"- reminds us of this point.

The history of caricature and modern painting and sculpture is a story of evolutionary transformation: a sophisticated and fully developed art form which had previously been allowed to do only one thing [represent] was made to do another, and a new kind of social institution grew up around that newly-altered form.¹²

So it would seem that the mythological presents us with a nearly insurmountable difficulty, since it does not have the sort of visual history to back it up which the object of caricature has. But I argue that the situation is the other way around. The case of the factious is more analogous to the case of a concept, like the Elizabethan concept of madness. Here the build-up of associations is what saves the situation. The connotational aspects are the standard.

In the art of India, Shiva Nataraja- Shiva in his guise as Lord of the Dance is a common, perhaps too-frequently-rendered, figure. Naive village beliefs

about *avatars* and incarnations aside, there is, so to speak, no Shiva. And yet the build-up of semantic intention (I leave philosophy of language aside here) surrounding his name is such that we do have a normative measure of what is constitutive of Shiva's appearance. Precisely because Shiva is mythological, we can come to greater antecedent agreement about a portrayal of Shiva than we can about the Tell el- Amarna figures.

Here is Ananda Coomaraswamy on Shiva Nataraja:

Among the greatest of the names of Shiva is Nataraja, Lord of Dancers or King of Actors. The Cosmos is His theater, there are many different steps in his repertory. He Himself is actor and audience.... How many various dances of Shiva are known to his worshippers I cannot say.

No doubt the root idea behind all of these dances is more-or-less one and the same, the manifestation of primal rhythmic energy.¹³

He is usually depicted holding a trident, and with a crescent moon in his hair.¹⁴ He sometimes is depicted as a halved figure with his consort the goddess Parvati in one of her various manifestations as his other half. The figure is so highly stylized and so utterly conventionalized that he is instantly recognizable to someone from the subcontinent. Benjamin Powland, one of the leading figures in Asian art history of the earlier part of this century, writes of the stone relief "Descent of the Ganges" at Mahabalipuram near Madras:

The greatest achievement of the Pallava sculptors was the carving of an enormous granite boulder on the seashore with a representation of the Descent of the Ganges [from the head of Shiva] from the Himalayas... We have here a perfect illustration of the dualism persistent in Indian art, between an intensive naturalism and the conception of divine forms according to the principles of an appropriately abstract canon of proportions....¹⁵

So the notion of representation turns out to be complex in ways that are difficult to elucidate. An alembicated account of the notion reveals that, if one can buy the non-Goodmanian assertion that resemblance and representation do indeed have some conceptual relationship, representations of actual figures for whom we have no standard (a photograph or detailed written account) are actually more difficult analytically than representations of contemporary figures or mythological figures. The intuitive routing of our concept of representation to the notion of resemblance renders opaque any account, for example, of what a representation of Akhenaton amounts to.

Still one more example helps us come to grips with my point about the intention adhering to the notion of the mythological figure. In their sumptuous *5000 Years of the Art of India*,¹⁶ Bussagli and Sivaramaniurti show figure after figure which, if not virtually indistinguishable to the Western eye, demonstrate little noticeable difference. On p.206 of the text, for instance, we are shown a bronze from medieval Eastern India which looks very much like the bronzes of Vishnu or any one of innumerable other Hindu deities. Yet we are told, authoritatively, that this is a depiction of the pre-Vedic god Surya. One is able to make this distinction, according to the text, because, among other reasons, he is surrounded by " ...blooming lotuses [which] symbolize the rising sun."¹⁷ We are more certain, epistemically, of the mythological referent of the statue than we are of the reliability of the representations of Akhenaton, and yet there is no uncertainty about the actual existence of the iconoclastic Pharaoh.

IV

In this paper I have attempted to make the somewhat recondite argument that representation is a continuum, and that like many such continua, its ends, so to speak, have, more in common than either end has with its middle. If the notions of representation and resemblance are conceptually related, as many want to claim, then the difficulties that we have with historical figures from very early periods are of a completely different degree than the difficulties that we have with either more contemporary figures or with fictitious figures. In a way, the apparent difficulties mirror some of the initial commentary made in philosophy of language on classical versus causal theories of reference. The classical theory asks us to accept that we determine the referent via the encrusted semantic intention associated with a given name. The problem, as Kripke and others pointed out, is that we cannot be absolutely certain that the propositions generated by the semantic build-up are actually true of the referent in question.¹⁸ We want to believe that they are true, but they may not be. The very fact that they may potentially be disconfirmed shakes our notion of what it is that is constitutive of the notion of reference.

The parallel with the problematic introduced by the portraiture of Akhenaton is quite striking. Akhenaton and Shiva do not have the same ontological status. Precisely because Akhenaton was once a human being who walked the face of the earth as we do today, it should, in principle, be possible to obtain a close account of his appearance, if only one had adequate evidence. Because one never knows what evidence might accrue, and epistemological conundrum is constructed whenever, *sans* the evidence, we attempt to take one relief, one depiction, one statue as definitive.

What the Hindu tradition refers to as "Shiva" is according to Ja Heinrich Zimmer and Joseph Campbell, a sophisticated projection of our awareness of our mortality, the passage of time, and the cyclical nature of perishable things. And yet the depiction of this mythological entity, who like Brentano's unicorn has intentional inexistence, is one surer footing epistemically and is conventionalized in the same way that the Renaissance madwoman is conventionalized. Stonewall Jackson and Andy Warhol, like Akhenaton, are not fictional entities. Because they lived during the era of photography (and, in Jackson's case, of a tradition of meticulous written description) representation of them does not present us with the same sorts of conceptual difficulties. I can recognize Stonewall Jackson portrait at Virginia Military Institute or Washington and Lee University not only because I have seen his photograph but because voluminous commentary on the Civil War has provided me with other referential criteria.

At the opening of this paper I commented on Levinson's application of the notion of paradox to Carroll's work on horror, and noted that a similar sort of paradox might be thought to adhere to representation. I will close by citing still one more analogy. In his recent book on visual form, Robert Sowers writes of the relationship between primary colors on a color wheel and primary modalities, such as painting, sculpture and architecture in the visual arts.¹⁹ His point is that one rarely obtains the purely sculptural, the purely architectural, and so forth. The space- articulating capacities of the Taj Mahal are viewed in another way when the intricate Islamic tile composition of much of the walls is viewed at close range. So, I conclude, should we think about the notion of representation. The portions of the spectrum here are similar to those on a color wheel, and similar to the articulated modalities of the visual arts. Although the pure case is rare and perhaps nonexistent thinking about the various forms and modes taken by representation helps us illuminate important areas in aesthetics and the visual arts.

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4. R.A. Goodrich, writing in the *British Journal of Aesthetics*, (Goodman on Representation and Resemblance", Vol. 28, No.1. Winter 1988) has tried to show how Goodman was wrong to attempt to create such a divorce in the first place. As he puts it "To set the scene for our critical examination, we shall briefly summarize the general thrust of Goodman's larger argument which ties the concept of representation to symbol and reference at the expense of representation." Most commentators see at least some relationship between resemblance and representation, even if the relationship is not straightforward.

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9. Gardiner, in *op. cit.*, p.219.
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12. High and Low: the Catalog", New York: MOMA, 1990, Varmedoe and Gopnik, text editors, p. 101.
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14. This image is so familiar that is the subject of various Indian oleo prints, widely available not only abroad, but here in the United States. A particularly well-known one, dear to the counterculture, is from the Eden Shop in Kathmandu, Nepal (also a Hindu nation in part) and was reprinted frequently in the 1970's.
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Dialectics of the Reader-Response : The Indian Approach

R: S. PATHAK

It is said that Moliere evaluated the worth of his plays on the responses of his cook and that T. E. Hulme wanted to speak of poetry in a way as he would speak of pigs. A cook's responses, however, cannot be taken to be reliable, and good poetry cannot be spoken of as pigs. Poetry demands a particular kind of sensibility both in its creation and appreciation. Speaking at a book fair in Turin, Italy, Joseph Brodsky, the new poet laureate of the United States, maintained some years ago that the way to develop good taste in literature is to read poetry, for poetry is "supreme form of human locution, ... the most concise, the most condensed way of conveying the human experience". Poetry, he added, is "an incurable semantic art" and offers "the highest possible standards for any linguistic operation". Brodsky's remarks underscore the most important aspects of the complex process of poetic creation and response.

No literary activity worth the name is possible in a vacuum. Even Jean-Paul Sartre, who regarded creativity as "an incomplete and abstract art", admits that it involves the "coming together of the World and the Self — in relation to artistic creation". A writer is as Dryden says, 'a man with a comprehensive soul', who does not write merely for himself. He knows fully well that "to write is to make an appeal to the reader".² Writing thus presupposes a correlation between the reader and the writer. He who writes has to recognize the rights of his readers and he who reads must take into account the freedom of the writer. The mutual confidence and interaction are the very cornerstones of any literary activity. Writers have generally been cognizant of this fact in all cultures. A well-known Indian poet Kamala Das, for example, has confided : "Large areas of my ignorance had been obliterated by the lesson learnt from life and wanted my readers to know of it. I had realized by then that the writer had none to love but the readers".³ Unless the reader contributes something from his own side, the real significance of a work cannot be brought out. As Wayne C. Booth aptly puts it,

The author creates, in short, an image of himself and another image of his reader, he makes his reader as he makes his second self and the most successful reading is one in which the created selves, author and reader, can find complete agreement.⁴

One of the distinctive properties of a literary work is that "it is a dynamic field through which the reader may atemporally be the characters, be the author of his own text and an interpreter"⁵

The significance of the responsive reader has been variously affirmed by writers in the Western world. Aristotle was probably the first to recognize the crucial role played by such a reader. He divided all readers into two categories, i.e. the common readers and the perfect readers, the latter being more sophisticated and organic in their response. Even Shakespeare, who has been called "the principal entertainer of Elizabethan and Jacobean London", is said to have written "to please his audience".⁶ Milton was all the more categorical in holding a brief for the 'fit' reader. The Romantics particularly valued their reader's response. Wordsworth, for example, said that the reader should not merely be a passive participant, "like an Indian prince or general stretched on his palanquin and born by his slaves". He would rather prefer to be read by "the intelligent reader", whom he would not let be shackled by a poet interweaving "any foreign splendour"

Certain modern writers have also affirmed the relevance of the responsive reader. They seem to believe with I.A. Richards that "An improvement in response is the only benefit, which any one can receive, and the degradation, the lowering of response is the only calamity".⁷ T.S. Eliot, despite his adherence to the impersonal theory of art, has vindicated the role of the responsive reader :

It is only the exceptional reader, certainly, who in the course of time comes to classify and compare his experiences, to see one in the light of others; and who, as his poetic experiences multiply, will be able to understand each more accurately.

Another great English poet W.B. Yeats, however, feels that a poet in his creative activity is justified less by what he expresses than by the quality of life that he conveys and the kind of readers it engenders.⁹ The intrinsic worth of an aesthetic object, he says elsewhere, is less compelling than "the worth of.... the mind", the mind which in due course becomes "the inheritance of his people".¹⁰

It is in F.R. Leavis that we find the clearest and most impressive views on this matter. "The ideal critic is the ideal reader," he maintains. He favours "the complete reader" who will possess "not merely a fuller bodied response, but a completer responsiveness". Leavis also suggests that since the reading demanded by poetry is of a different kind from that demanded by, say, philosophy, the business of a qualified reader of poetry would be "to attain a peculiar completeness of response and to observe a peculiarly strict relevance in developing his response", his real concern being to unravel the mystery of a literary work "in its concrete

fullness".¹¹ To Leavis analysis is a kind of creative process and reading of poetry requires the "total response" of the reader and "a more than ordinary faithfulness and completeness". Emphasizing the value of the perfect reading, Leavis further remarks :

There is about it nothing in the nature of 'murdering to dissect', and suggestion that it can be anything in the nature of laboratory-method misrepresent it entirely. We can have the poem only by an inner kind of possession.¹²

To Leavis the personal appreciative approach is the basic factor in the study of literature. "An approach is personal," says he, "or it is nothing".¹³ Leavis thus shows probably the keenest awareness of the significance of the reader's response in literary analysis and enjoyment. It is a pity that despite his earnestness, he did not thrash the problem of the reader-response in all its aspects.

It were the New Critics, however, who fully shifted emphasis from the writer to the reader. They felt that the reader should be given more importance and that his reading of and response to the text, irrespective of the intention of the writer, should be given priority. Philippe Sollers observed: "Today the essential question is no longer that of the *writer* and the *work*, but of *writing* and *reading*".¹⁴ The result of this approach taken to its logical extremes was the disappearance of the intention of the author and the exaltation of the text. The text, it came to be believed, is more in the consciousness of the reader—an intelligent reader—than in the ~~printed~~ word. George Steiner later summed up the 'new' approach thus :

A text is generated where the reader is one who rationally conceives himself and writing a 'text' comparable in stature, in degree of demand to that which he is reading. To read essentially is to entertain with the writer's text a relationship at once recreative and rival. It is supremely active, collaborating yet also agnostic affinity whose logical, if not active, fulfilment is in 'answering text'.¹⁵

Without the textual demands of the 'answering text' the reader would lag behind the writer and the reading activity would not be as meaningful as it ought to be.

A brief reference to other Western theories regarding the reader's response will not be out of place here. Of the two well known models of reader-oriented interpretive strategies, the phenomenological approach banks upon the belief that the "shared intentional object" gives rise to the author's meaning and the

significance derived by the reader, the reader's main task being to concretize the text. The reader's "horizon of expectations", it is held, is nothing but "a system of references" or "a mind set that a hypothetical individual might bring to any text".¹⁶ The horizon of expectations is thus related to a kind of cultural norms, which make literature meaningful and relevant. The interpretation of a piece of literature meaningful and relevant. The interpretation of a piece of literature will change according to the cultural and social background against which the artifact is perceived and interpreted.¹⁷ As Iser points out, "the structure of the text frequently induces the reader to read the text against the internalized norms of the society, to which he belongs".¹⁸ The reader in the process is able to forge subtle connections with the writer's mind. "These connections," Iser says in a different context, within a text are "the product of the reader's mind working on the raw material of the text, though they are not the text itself".¹⁹

Modern hermeneutics not only recognizes the social context of all linguistic use but also concedes that both the author and the reader are relevant in the process of interpretation. Jenet Wolff remarks :

By referring constantly to the meanings of the artist, his work and society, the sociology of art cannot fail to take account of the nature of art itself, and the aesthetic of art; the work of art; the relationship of these artistic meanings to the world of the artist and his audience will also be an intrinsic part of the analysis.²⁰

The semiotic analysis is concerned with the text-reader dialectics and rejects authorial hermeneutics. It places the reader at the center of the entire literary activity. The interaction between the reader and the text is of crucial importance. Riffaterre, who has called interpretation a co-creative activity of the author and the reader, is of the view that a literary text requires two readings, i.e. the heuristic, and the retroactive. The heuristic reading can give only referential meaning whereas the retroactive reading serves to modify the reader's understanding by filling in 'gaps' and making deviations meaningful and thus generates a self-signifying semiotic text.²¹ A more comprehensive interpretive strategy, however, has been suggested by Scholes who maintains that a text has three components—discursive syntax, semantic pattern, and pragmatic situation, and that an identification and correlation of these three components is necessary for interpretation of a literary text.²² The reader will then be able to recognize the linguistic, propositional and sociocultural codes operating upon the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic components of the text respectively. This approach has put into focus the three basic characteristics of literary artifact—opacity, discontinuity, and fictivity, which are responsible for its openhandedness and multivalence of meaning.

Some linguists and stylisticians also have affirmed the value of the reader's responses. While talking about the two modes of linguistic arrangement, i.e. paradigmatic and syntagmatic, Roman Jakobson, for example, suggests that an ordinary reader may not recognize equivalences in a text.²³ Crystal and Davy are of the opinion that the reader's "intuitive response" precedes the analysis of a poem.²⁴ The possibility of "some prior intuitive interpretation" of a work has been accepted by Widdowson also.²⁵ More recently, Michael Riffaterre and Stanley Fish have considered this issue in some detail. In his critique of the analysis of Baudelaire's *Les Chats* by Roman Jakobson and Levi-Strauss²⁶, Riffaterre objects to their use of "constituents that cannot possibly be perceived by the reader". His answer to Jakobsonian technique would be to introduce the concept of "super-reader" as a "tool of analysis", who would be equipped with a body of appropriate linguistic and literary-historical knowledge and would work through the text in terms of the specified knowledge he possesses.²⁷ Riffaterre's concept of the "super-reader" is, in fact, a development on his earlier notion of the 'Average Reader', who belongs to "the group of informants used for each stimulus or for a whole stylistic sequence". Literary communication, to Riffaterre, is "at the outset the author's response to an exceptional challenge", and proper results, he feels, can be obtained "through the reader" because "he is the consciously selected target of the author". Riffaterre would prefer "cultivated readers" whose even "secondary responses" to the text can be of considerable help.²⁸

Though writing with a different purpose, Stanley Fish also expresses his dissatisfaction with the reader-excluding premises of formalist critics. Attacking vehemently the approach of Wimsatt²⁹ and others, he proposes instead "an analysis of the developing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed one another in time". Fish reaffirms the significance of the "method of analysis which focuses on the reader rather than on the artifact" and declares that "a description of the reader's experience is an analysis of the sentence's meaning". In his category of response, Fish would include not only "tears, prickles" and "other psychological symptom" but also mental operations involved in reading.³⁰ He calls his reader "a construct, an ideal of idealized reader"— "the informed reader", who is a competent speaker of the language out of which the text is built and is in full possession of the semantic knowledge that a mature user of a language wields, including lexical sets, collocations, idioms and various linguistic devices.³¹ The stand taken by Riffaterre and Fish is a good point of departure for stylistics, but a lot more deliberations are needed to work out a plausible theory of the "informed" or competent reader's response to a literary text. As Fowler aptly remarks,

Restoring the linearity of the reading experience is.... a necessary corrective to the rather static creations of the New Criticism and its descendants. But the reader's experience, linear or not, raises a more general question which stylistics must confront in the next phase of its development; the exact theoretical nature of the 'super-reader' or 'ideal' reader' mentioned by stylisticians as diverse as Fish and Riffaterre, a natural constituent of any generative poetics and great in need of clarification.³²

The 'exact theoretical nature' of the responsive reader is yet to be worked out in the Western world, though serious efforts are being made there to understand and appreciate complex processes underlying reading and analysis of a literary text. This is one area in which the deliberations in Indian Poetics can lend useful insight.

Available reader-response theories of the West, however, are cognitive in emphasis. Formalism and Czech structuralism have failed to account for the permanence of an aesthetic appeal. For example, Jakobson's scheme provides no way of deciding which of the equivalences are esthetically significant in a given text. Mukarovsky is right in locating meaning in a reader's aesthetic dispositions.³³ Jonathan Culler also suggests that one should start with the aesthetic effect and then seek an explanation of the effect in linguistic structure.³⁴ But this has rarely been done. The limitations of two representative works may be taken to be symptomatic of the entire gamut of Western Criticism. Wimsatt and Beardsley, while acknowledging that "poets have been leading expositors of the laws of feeling" and that "Poetry is a way of fixing emotions or making them more permanently perceptible", have maintained: "The emotions correlative to the objects of poetry..... [are] presented in their objects and contemplated as a pattern of knowledge".³⁵ This is nothing but an attempt to banish emotions from the reader's experience and to preserve them in the 'objective' structure of a poem. On the contrary, Roland Barthes's *The Pleasure of the Text*, with its notion of 'jouissance', is an advocacy of orgiastic bliss a kind of Dionysian abandonment³⁶ — and does not present a full-fledged theory of aesthetic response.

It is for this reason that Iser has argued persuasively to show that the reader's 'discoveries' pertaining to the text are cognitive as well as emotional. The term used by him, '*Wirkung*' in *Wirkungsästhetik* ('aesthetics of response'), is broad enough to encompass both the poles.³⁷ Kant's identification of the 'beautiful' with "disinterested contemplation" and Coleridge's description of the aesthetic experience as "an immediate and absolute complacency, without irreverence.... of any interest, sensual or intellectual" do not say much about the

nature of the reader's response. It is this fact which has prompted Paul B. Armstrong to remark :

What we need instead is a comprehensive theory of aesthetic emotions which encompasses the full range of feelings art can provoke, from meditative calm to blissful transport, from mourning to celebration, from compassion to fear and trembling. In a truly comprehensive theory of response..... aesthetic emotions deserve equal footing with the cognitive aspects of reading.³⁸

Centuries ago Indian aestheticians had raised and answered similar questions. Creditably enough, they arrived at certain conclusions on the basis of their observation of a vast body of empirical data. It would be instructive to see what they have to say about response to a literary work.

II

Indian poetics have discussed in a systematic way many seminal issues which are being taken up for a fuller consideration in the West now. The concept of *sahrdaya* (the responsive reader) can be taken to anticipate the present-day position in a meaningful way. Indian Poetics attaches great significance to the nature and role of the responsive reader. As C.D. Narasimhaiah has pointed out, "Indeed, history doesn't know of any literature, ancient or modern, which has given such a central place to the critic (*sahrdaya*) as the Sanskrit literature".³⁹ The term '*sahrdaya*' literally means 'one of the similar heart' or 'one akin to the poet's heart'. It has been translated by Gnoli as one "possessed of heart".⁴⁰ The term, however, refers to an ideal reader endowed with all qualities expected of a perfect reader of creative writings. To Masson and Patwardhan he is nothing less than "the intelligent and responsive reader".⁴¹ According to Indian aestheticians, the meaning of the text is realized in the consciousness of such a reader as a state of satisfaction of maximum intensity, which has been conceived of as a form of "textasy".

It may be noted that there had been an excellent tradition of the responsive readers in ancient India. All important cultural centres in India such as Ujjaini and Pataliputra were well-known for readers with culture and critical acumen, whose views could not be set aside even by great creative writers. Kalidas, for example, in his *Raghuvansam* (1/3), addresses himself to his competent readers and critics as "a dullwit aspiring for poetic fame" (*mandah kaviyasahprarthi*). Again, in the Prologue to his masterpiece, *Abhijnanasakuntala*, he clearly states that he would be loth to be proud of his dramatic skill until the responsive readers were satisfied with its performance, and ends the work with the words:

"Let the words of the learned flourish !" (*sarasvātīsrutamahatam mahiyatam*). Even Bhavabhūti, who rightly claimed to be well-versed in Grammar, Interpretation and Logic (*padavakya-pramanajna*) and the minion of the Goddess of Learning, expresses, in the Prologue to his play *Malatīmādhava*, his ardent desire to be read and appreciated by one who is akin to him temperamentally and whom he does expect to find some day somewhere, for the time is endless and extensive is the earth.⁴² A good reader of poetry has, according to Indian aestheticians, to be first of all a *sahridaya*. Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mallinatha are the finest representatives of such readers and critics of poetry.

The worth of a literary work can be evaluated from more angles than one. As K.C. Pandey suggests, in order to ascertain the aesthetic merit of a work, one has to look at it either from the point of view of the author or from that of the reader.⁴³ Indian Poetics, unlike Western Criticism, favours evaluation of literature from the reader's point of view. Speaking about the difficulty of pinpointing factors responsible for the success of a poem, John Wain remarks :

But to illustrate these things in the concrete is to approach the vanishing centre of literary criticism, which..... is bound sooner or later to reach a point at which demonstration breaks down and is replaced by a shared sensibility, though, of course, this point is very much more distant than the anti-critical writers on literature would have us think.⁴⁴

For Indian aestheticians it was not merely 'distant', but actually beyond the horizon. they simply could not think of arguing over the final worth of a work or even its interpretation in quite the same way as has been done in Western Criticism. This fact makes the responsive reader's role all the more significant. It is he who was supposed to have the final say on the worth of a work. It is nevertheless surprising to note that the *sahridayas* tended to agree amongst themselves to an astonishing degree. Mahimbhatta and Kuntaka, for example, disagree sharply with Anandavardhana's views, on account of the principled stand taken by them, but when they comment upon a poet they are in a remarkable agreement.

Indian Poetics has defined literature (*kavya*) used in a very comprehensive sense) with reference to its effect on the responsive reader. According to Anandavardhana, it is characterized by the oneness of word and meaning which causes pleasure to such a reader⁴⁵. Abhinavagupta also believes that the aesthetic pleasure of the reader is the chief end of poetry⁴⁶. The aesthetic susceptibility is considered to be the first and foremost quality of an ideal reader. The

characteristics and responsibilities of the responsive reader, as suggested in Indian Poetics, may be considered briefly.

Indian aestheticians have again and again insisted on the importance of the *sahrdaya*. The opening verse of the *Dhvanyalokalocana* states that the poet and the reader between them form the essence of the Muse's being.⁴⁷ In the *Abhinavabharati* also it has been maintained that only a responsive reader has right to pursue poetry.⁴⁸ In a well-known passage in the *Locana*, Abhinavagupta has defined *sahrdaya* in the following terms :

Those people who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been cleansed and polished through constant repetition and study of poetry, and who sympathetically respond in their own hearts— those people are what are known as *sahrdayas* (responsive or sensitive readers).⁴⁹

In support of his stand, Abhinavagupta quotes a verse from Bharata's *Natyasastra*⁵⁰ which in Manmohan Ghosh's translation (1951, p. 120) reads as follows: "The state proceeding from the thing which is congenial to the heart is the source of aesthetic delight and it pervades the body just as fire spreads over the dry wood". Abhinavagupta, however, seems to take the verse from the *Natyasastra* as an indication of the condition of the ideal spectator or reader.⁵¹

We find the treatment of *sahrdaya* in Indian aestheticians' deliberations on *rasa*. The concept of *rasa* originated in dramaturgy and was later extended to literary theory. Abhinavagupta forcefully maintained that all poetry lives by *rasa*; without it no poem can exist even in the least.⁵² The other terms used as synonyms are *bhavaka* and *rasika*. *Rasa*, which may be defined as the affective response of the competent reader/ spectator to a composition, is born when the pre-existing emotional set (*bhava*) in the reader's or spectator's mind is born and generates poetic meaning.⁵³ The *rasika* is by definition the kind of respondent who is capable of savoring *rasa*.⁵⁴ Abhinavagupta has described this quality as "the capacity to respond to aesthetic stimuli".⁵⁵ The terms *sahrdaya*, *bhavaka* and *rasika* have much wider connotation and none of them refers specifically to the activity of reading. But the flair, penchant, taste, sensibility and perceptiveness denoted by them can be fruitfully applied in literary theory to convey the qualities of the responsive reader. The consciousness of such a reader, when cleared of all distorting factors such as preconceived notions, prejudices and other irritants blocking aesthetic enjoyment, becomes maximally receptive.

The process of aesthetic enjoyment comprises three distinct but interrelated stages: The mind of the responsive reader first becomes attuned to the emotional

situation delineated in the literary work (*hrdayasamvada*); it is then completely absorbed in its portrayal (*tanmayibhavana*); and this absorption finally results in aesthetic delectation (*rasanubhava*). According to this approach, the poet and the reader are temperamentally alike. This identity between the two is the very basis of Indian Poetics. The poet and the reader are very often described in it by the same set of terms. Bhatta Tauta speaks of sympathetic vibrations taking place between the poet and the reader.⁵⁶ The poetic sensibility in the reader, says Abhinavagupta, is nothing but the faculty of entering into an identity with the poet's heart.⁵⁷ As Pratiharenduraja suggests, when ideas are exalted, the expression is transparent and emotion graphically presented, the reader is able to realise completely the poet's mind mirrored in his work.⁵⁸ Thus a circuit of experience is completed between the poet and the reader.⁵⁹

If we analyse the modality of this experience in terms of stimulus-and-response theory we find four entities— the world, the creative writer, the literary form which objectifies the writer's response to the *realia*, and the reader/spectator receiving aesthetic experience— interacting in interesting ways. "The circuit is complete," says Chaitanya, "when aesthetic experience makes the *sahrdaya* a more sensitively functioning entity in the world, with enriched and more refined reactivities". Indian Poetics banks heavily on the reader's/spectator's identification with the creative writer for aesthetic delectation, for which vicarious pleasure is no substitute. A similar full-blooded response from the spectators is said to have been the characteristic of the Elizabethan audience. M.C. Bradbrook writes :

The way in which an audience was delighted or ravished or charmed in Elizabethan times implies their collective assent beyond the level of everyday feeling..... Abhinavagupta, five hundred years before Zeami maintained that the spectator participates imaginatively but actively in the play. He tastes the emotion as immediate experience through an imaginary identification, but it is generalized in his lived or pre-reflected consciousness. To achieve this he has to be trained in feeling, as the actor trained in movement and speech— has to be a qualified spectator, an *adhikarin*.⁶⁰

The value of identification has been emphasized in the Indian concept of *sadharanikarana* (Transpersonalization), which results in sublimation and extension of consciousness. This concept embraces all the three factors in aesthetics: the poetic creative experience, the poem, and the reader's response. The emotions embodied in a poem enter directly into our hearts to vibrate and dance before our mental eye.⁶¹ These emotions do not have spatial and temporal determinations.⁶² "Nothing human is

foreign to us, "maintains Abhinavagupta, and adds: "There exists no living being who is dévoid of the latent impressions of the nine mental states" (*sthayibhavas*)⁶³, which I.A. Richards calls "appetencies".⁶⁴ The realisation of *rasa*, as Visvanatha points out, ultimately results in the expansion of one's consciousness.⁶⁵

Indian Poetics, at its height, attains a rare synthesis between creation and criticism, between the poet and the reader.⁶⁶ Every connoisseur of poetry, according to the Indian viewpoint, is virtually a poet, for he, too, possesses a poetic heart, what though it pulses somewhat lower in him than in the case of a poet. The basic difference is that the poet attains this condition spontaneously whereas the reader is induced by him. As Jameson puts it, the reader actually determines and repeats "that conceptual operation, often of a very specialized and limited type", which took place in the poet's mind.⁶⁷ This is effected by the complete fusion of the reader's self with the life of the poem (*tanmayibhavana*), which indeed is the highest gift. It is this quality, says Bharata, that goes to make one an ideal reader or spectator.⁶⁸ The absence of this quality will make one insensitive to charms of poetry. In the *Tantraloka*, Abhinavagupta has defined *tanmayibhavana* (identification) as "the attainment of one's highest self", adding that "It is the highest stage of fulfilment, and there can be no further fruit after that".⁶⁹ Insensitive readers, he is convinced, will never attain identification: "Those who do not identify, who do not know how to submerge the body, etc. in that object and whose intellect as a means of cognition is not merged— they are known as insensitive".⁷⁰ To insensitive readers the magic casements of poetry remain always closed.

The Indian concept of *sahrdaya* is obviously elasticity. The aesthetic experience is not a common experience. Writings in Sanskrit contain ironical remarks on people who are not meant for poetry.⁷¹ Abhinavagupta has categorically stated that the privilege of enjoying poetry in the true sense is reserved only for those who, because of the good deeds of their past lives and assiduous practice of the present life, have been endowed with a highly developed aesthetic susceptibility.⁷² In his *Tantraloka* he conceives of the *sahrdaya's* heart as vibrating when he enjoys poetry:

When the ears are filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils with the scent of sandal-wood, etc., the state of indifference (non-participation, impersonality, and so on disappears and the heart is invaded by a state of vibration. Such a state is precisely the so-called power of beatitude,⁷³ because of which a person is gifted with aesthetic susceptibility.

Mahimabhattacha also recognizes a distinct subjective condition, which he calls *sahridayatva* and which alone makes the aesthetic experience possible.⁷⁴

Bhoja, however, holds slightly different views. He uses the term '*rasika*' in place of *sahridaya*, which refers, according to him, to some excellence in one's personality. This quality is the very Ego (*ahanakara-tattva*) of the person, the finest development of which results in culture, creative power and appreciative faculty.⁷⁵ It is this that produces in him the power of empathy—the capability to get into others' moods, which is surely the most significant asset of a good reader. Bhoja is of the opinion that the aesthetic experience at the highest level is the experience of the *sahridaya*, the secret of which lies in the good deeds of the previous births and consequent enhancement of divine qualities (*sattvaguna*). Unlike Bhoja, Abhinavagupta does not bother about culture but defines in precise terms how one can become a fit literary enjoyer. His concept of the *sahridaya* reaches philosophical altitudes; the supreme aesthetic experience is akin to the experience of bliss. Raghavan is of the view that Abhinavagupta's "explanation of *sahridayas* contains the most satisfactory theory of literary appeal".⁷⁶ The really competent reader has an admirable potential of transcending self-consciousness. "It is this transcending of self-consciousness— this migrating from the narrow self," says Hiriyanna, "....that constitutes the secret of aesthetic delight".⁷⁷ This wholly unique aesthetic experience is known in Indian Poetics by the name of *rasa*, 'essence or most delectable thing'.

Rasa is *sui generis*.⁷⁸ It has rightly been regarded as "the cardinal concept of Indian aesthetics"⁷⁹ *Rasa* can be experienced by men of sensibility alone.⁸⁰ The men of taste and culture have been defined in Vatsyayana's *Kamasutra* as those who enjoy the good things of this world with a developed taste as members of the cultivated society. There is, in fact, no knowing of *rasa* apart from directly experiencing it; it defies description. According to Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *rasa* is "an inscrutable and uncaused spiritual activity", brought to life through the reader's own capacity and "experienced in an impersonal, contemplative mood".⁸¹ The process of reading and appreciating poetry in Indian Poetics hinges on the concept of *rasa* and its realisation on the part of the reader.

The concept of *rasa* has been an inexhaustible source of polemic discussions to generations of Indian scholars. The term '*rasa*' is used in the *Natyasastra* in the sense of the taste of physical senses. Bharata writes: "Just as well-disposed persons while eating food cooked with many kinds of spices, enjoy its taste and attain pleasure so the cultured people taste the dominant states (*sthayibhavas*)."⁸² The response evoked in the spectator, as mentioned by him, is also not of a very high order :

Slight smile, smile and excessive laughter, "Well done!", "How wonderful!", "How pathetic!" and tumultuous applause or swelling uproar are the signs of success expressed vocally. Joy expressed in horripilation, the rising up from the seat and giving away the clothes and rings are signs of this ...expressed physically.⁸³

With Bharata, *rasa* seems to be an objective concept. But by the time the concept reaches Abhinavagupta's hands, it assumes a purely subjective character.⁸⁴ Borrowing the basic tenets of his theory from Bhattanayaka, Abhinavagupta feels that *rasa*-realisation takes the reader to the blissful state of contemplation and calm (*samvidvisranti*). The reader is then, according to Sankuka and Vamana, in *samplava* (submergence). A modern authority on the Reader-Response E.D. Hirsch also maintains that reading and interpretation are "an affair of conscience".⁸⁵ Aesthetic experience is different from a psycho-physical pleasure, a purely intellectual pleasure and also from the spiritual experience of a yogin. Indian aestheticians have called it *brahmanandasahodara* (akin to god-realisation). Because of its beatific and contemplative character and freedom from the contact with mundane perceptible things, aesthetic experience, says Bhattanayaka, is superior to all these kinds of experiences. Panditaraja Jagannatha maintains that aesthetic enjoyment "is of the form of a mental impression, already crystallised in the mind and implanted in the mind since the time of birth (or since time immemorial) and cognised by the reader or spectator along with the joy of selfrealisation which is absolutely real and self-luminous". He then goes on to say that the relishing of *rasa* is nothing but the breaking off of the mantle of ignorance, etc. covering the pure consciousness or the transformation of the mind into the bliss of pure consciousness which is the nature of the *atman*.

The concept of *sahrdaya* obviously restricts the circle of the competent readers of poetry. Not everybody has the intrinsic capacity to enjoy a poem in the real sense. The secret of poetry, says anandavardhana, would be revealed only to a few gifted souls.⁸⁷ A competent reader is a keen observer of situations and feeling-patterns and has a large fund of experience. Moreover, he possesses a mirror-like sensibility, cleaned, refined and purified by his constant acquaintance with poetry. Aesthetic pleasure is, again, reserved for those who, because of the good deeds of their past lives and assiduous practice, are endowed with a highly developed aesthetic sensitivity. A work of art, according to this view, would bring aesthetic pleasure to its readers in accordance with their sensibility and aptitude. Spitzer says that a good critic must be equipped with "talent, experience and faith".⁸⁸ Many more rigorous qualifications have been suggested in Indian Poetics. Bharata, for example, has given a formidable list of such qualifications.

The ideal spectator, he says, is a man of good character; he is born in a noble family; he is learned and desirous of fame and virtue; he is impartial, mature, attentive, honest and conversant with various disciplines including Grammar and Prosody, and so on.⁸⁹ These qualities, as Bharata himself admits, seldom exist in one and the same person. Moreover, not all men can respond to all emotions properly : *sarvasya na sarvatra hrdayasamvadah*. An ideal reader should possess, besides a general aptitude, a pure intuitive heart which would enable him to find out the quintessential virtues of poetry.⁹⁰ He should be not only well read and wise but also initiated into the theoretical intricacies of poetic discourse.

Indian scholars recognized four types of poets called *cintakavi*, *sutakavi*, *arthakavi* and *pratibhanakavi*, of which the last type is superior to others.⁹¹ There is nothing in the realm of being or in that of thought, Bhamaha feels, which does not serve the poet's purpose.⁹² For a good poet, culture (*vyutpatti*), practice (*abhyasa*) and genius (*pratibha*) are regarded as essential.⁹³ On the whole, Indian system placed greater reliance on genius for the making of a poet.⁹⁴ In the Fourth Chapter of his *Kavyamimansa* Rajasekhara has given a detailed typological discussion on poetic genius and readers. Of the two kinds of *pratibha* (*genius*) mentioned by him, the creative genius (*karayitri*) is an innate equipment of the poet and is of three varieties— *sahaja* (innate/spontaneous), *aharya* (acquired), and *aupadesiki* (learned).⁹⁵ The perceptive genius (*bhavayitri*), says Rajasekhara, "reveals the poet's effort and intention, and because of it the poet's enterprise becomes fruitful". He also mentions the view that the poet and the responsive reader are not different in terms of imagination.⁹⁶ What is even more significant to note in this context is Rajasekhara's hierarchical ordering of four types of readers, i.e. *arocikin* (fastidious), *satrnabhyavaharin* (omnivorous), *matsarin* (miserly), *tattvabhinivesin* (discerning), the last type being the best but not easily available.⁹⁷

The acquired component in the reader, as in a poet, relates to his constant exposure the texts of the inherited literary tradition to which he belongs. The exposure would result in his internalising conventions of the system. However, on account of certain variables even a trained reader's responses may not be always satisfactory. Abhinavagupta has mentioned no less than seven obstacles to aesthetic enjoyment (*rasavighnas*) : poverty of intuitive talent; intrusion of spatial and temporal considerations; interference of personal feelings; defective means of perception; obscurity; absence of a clear knowledge of the relative importance of the depicted elements and doubts about the proper correlations between Determinants, etc. Abhinavagupta's treatment of these obstacles invites a comparison with I.A. Richards' discussion of factors which may result in a defective reading and due to which the reader may have to face the following

difficulties: inability to make out the plain meanings of the poems including sense, feelings, tone and intention; difficulty in sensuous apprehension; weakness of visual imagination; erratic and irrelevant associations from private life; stock responses; sentimentality; inhibitions; doctrinal predilections of the reader; implicit or explicit technical presuppositions; and general critical preconceptions and illegitimate expectations bred by theoretical prejudices.⁹⁹ A good reader of poetry will not let his responses be vitiated by any of these factors.

It is this aesthetic sensibility that distinguishes the responsive readers from others. The aesthetes like Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde also considered it to be of great value to a literary critic. "What is important," wrote Pater, ".... is not that the critic should possess a correct abstract definition of beauty for the intellect, but a certain kind of temperament, the power of being deeply moved by the presence of beautiful objects".¹⁰⁰ The right kind of temperament will make the reader burn like a hard gem-like flame in response. Echoing his mentor, Wilde remarked: "Temperament is the primary requisite for a critic— a temperament exquisitely susceptible to beauty".¹⁰¹ The aesthetic sensibility characteristic of *sahrdaya*, however, is of greater dimension and calls for greater tolerance; he is expected to ignore lapses in a work if it is otherwise competent. To quote Anandavardhana,

The nature of poetry is held to reside even in faulty compositions where the *rasa*, etc. are clearly perceived in like manner as the character of a jewel is held to belong to such a thing as a jewel which is perforated by an insect.¹⁰²

For the *sahrdaya*, unlike a critic, vast erudition (*vahusrutatva*) is not an indispensable qualification. In Indian Poetics aesthetic susceptibility and capacity of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasajnata*) are interchangeable. The Indian approach finds support in a modern thinker's stand in this regard :

The entire qualification one must have for understanding art is responsiveness. This is primarily a natural gift, related to creative talent, yet not the same things; like talent, where it exists in any measure, it may be heightened by experience or reduced by adverse agencies. Since it is intuitive it cannot be taught.¹⁰³

As such a really competent reader is not easy to find; he is, not unlike a great poet, born and not just made. D.H. Lawrence aptly says: "A man who is emotionally educated is rare as a phoenix". The *sahrdaya*, as conceived in Indian Poetics, is not merely a passive reader. He is a competent and 'complete' reader in F.R. Leavis' estimation, who is properly 'educated' both emotionally

and intellectually. He has thought of him as a yogin or devotee to whom alone is the bliss vouchsafed through his accumulated merits.¹⁰⁴ The ultimate test of poetry in Indian Poetics is considered to be the appreciation of such a reader. It seems to be convinced that only the universal appreciation of the best minds can have any real weight in literary appraisal and not the dogmatic assertions of a coterie. It also holds that there can be no finality about response to a creative work; it keeps on unfolding unthought-of layers of beauty and winsomeness to the reader who goes to it with the proper mind and heart.¹⁰⁵ This prerogative is reserved for the *sahridayas*; to others a work of art remains, at its best, an enigma.

The concept of *sahridaya* is thus a great contribution to literary theory. It can enable us to understand the process of creation better and to have a more comprehensive view of the nature and role of the reader in reading and appreciating a work of literature. If we keep the concept of *sahridaya* in our mind, we can convincingly understand and explain the wide differences in literary tastes and judgments and can find appropriate answers to questions as to why one nation's works do not appeal in the same degree to people belonging to another and why one generation's excellent verses fall flat on the ears of the next generation. Though the Indian aestheticians do not employ the manner and terminology of the New Critics, stylisticians and Western authors subscribing to the Reader-Response theory, what they say will appeal to the modern mind. Their deliberations on the subject would satisfy Frye's demand to formulate "the broad laws of literary experience"¹⁰⁶ and Barthe's expectations to develop an aesthetics based on the pleasure of the reader, the "consequences" of which would be "enormous."¹⁰⁷ As Culler remarks, "Whatever its other results, it would no doubt lead to the destruction of various myths of literature."¹⁰⁸ The line of enquiry suggested by Indian aestheticians emerges as far more comprehensive and convincing. For example, 'gaps' and 'indeterminacies' in the text have proved to be the stumbling blocks of the Western Reader-Response theorists. Stanley Fish is not alone in realising "the dangers" of what he terms as "the instability of the text" and "the unavailability of determinate meanings".¹⁰⁹ The most persistent apostles of indeterminacy are Derrida, Lacan, Bloom and their associates. It is interesting to note, however, that Indian literary theory takes due cognizance of omissions and suppressions resulting in 'gaps' and deviations and half-realised or indeterminate elements.¹¹⁰ The *Mimamsakas* postulated three relations of words in a sentence: *akanksa* (Expectancy), *sannidhi* (Contiguity) and *yogyata* (Compatibility) which can be violated for poetic effects. At times poets deliberately created artificial barriers to ensure that their work is read and analysed only by competent readers.¹¹¹ Taken together, the Indian and Western approaches to the Reader-Response

can provide a very powerful theoretical base for all future discussion on this issue. This would be of immense advantage in the whirl of new doctrines of today.

Notes and references

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2. Ibid., p.500.
3. *My Story* (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1988), p. 138.
4. *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago, 1963), p. 138.
5. Joseph A. Kestner, *The Spatiality of the Novel* (Detroit : Wayne University Press, 1978), p. 139.
6. J. Dover Wilson, *The Essential Shakespeare* (Cambridge University Press, 1943), pp. 1, 10-11.
On this subject, see also J.d. Wilson, *The Elizabethan Shakespeare* (1929); A.C. Bradley, *Oxford Lectures on Poetry* (1990); A.H. Thorndike, *Shakespeare's Theater*; and Alfred Harbage, *Shakespeare's Audience*. (1944).
7. *Principles of Literary Criticism* (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 186.
8. T. S. Eliot, *Selected Prose* ed. John Hayward (Penguin, 1953), P. 49.
9. *Essays and Introductions* (London : Macmillan, 1961), p. x.
10. *Explorations* (London :Macmillan, 1962), p.192.
11. *The Common Pursuit* (London : Chatto & Windus, 1953), pp. 212-13.
12. *Education and the University* (London : Chatto & Windus, 193), p. 70.
13. Ibid., p. 68.
14. *Logiques* (Paris : Sevil, 1968), pp. 237-38.
Ronald Barthes, in his *S/Z* (1970), uses the term 'lisible' (readably) for the texts which invite a passive response from the reader. The other kind of texts are called 'scriptible' (writably), which challenge the reader and rouse him into a dynamic process of interpretation. The latter texts are said to be almost rewritten in the process of reading.
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16. R.C. Holub, *Reception Theory* (London : Methuen, 1984), p. 59.
17. D.W. Forkkea & E. Kunne-Ibsch, *Theories of Literature in the Twentieth Century* (London : C. Hurst & Co., 1978), p.31.
18. Wolfgang Iser, "The Indeterminacy of the Text" . in E. Shaffer (ed.), *Comparative Criticism2* (Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.39.
19. W. Iser, *The Implied Reader* (Baltimore : The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 278.
20. *Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art* (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 109.
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26. Roman Jakobson & C. Levi-Strauss, "Les Chats de Charles Baudelaire". in Michael Lane (ed.), *Structuralism : A Reader* (London : Jonathan Cape, 1970).
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30. Stanley Fish, "Literature in the Reader : Affective Stylistics", *New Literary History* 2 (1970), pp. 126-27, 139, 130, 140.
31. Ibid., pp. 154, 145.
32. R. Fowler, "Language and the Reader : Shakespeare's Sonnet 73", in R. Fowler (ed.), *Style and Structure in Literature : Essays in New Linguistics* (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 122.

33. L. Sziklay, "The Pregue School", in L. Nyiro (ed.) *Literature and its Interpretation* (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), p.85.
34. *Structural Poetics* (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 256.
35. *The Verbal Icon*, p. 27.
36. Ronald Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text* Trans. Richard Miller (New York : Hill and Wang, 1975), pp. 19-22.
37. *The Implied Reader*, p. xiii.
38. Paul B. Armstrong, "Toward a Theory of Aesthetic Emotions", *Journal of Literary Criticism* 3/2 (December 1986), pp. 12-13.
39. C.D. Narasimhaiah (ed.), *Literary Criticism : Eastern and European Tradition* (Mysore: Mysore University, n.d.), p.1.
40. R. Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta* (Varanasi : Chowkhamba, 1968), p. Xiii.
41. J.L. Masson & M.V. Patwardhan, *Santarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics* (Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1969), p. iv.
42. Ye nama kecidih nah prathayantyavajnam
janantu te kimatra tan prati naisa yatnah/
utpasyate'sti mama ko'pi samanadharmā
kalo hyayam niravadhir vipula ca prthvi/
43. *Comparative Aesthetics I: Indian Aesthetics* (Varanasi : Chowkhamba, 1959), p. 156.
44. John Wain (ed.), *Interpretations* (London : Routledge, 1955).
45. yo'rthan sahrdayaslaghyah kavyatmeti vyavasthitah/ *Dhvanyaloka* 1/2.
In the very first verse of his great work Anandavardhana writes *sahridayamanahpritaye tat svarupam*. Abhinavagupta's commentary to this verse makes it a point to emphasise the fact that a good poetry must be pleasing to the connoisseurs, as is clear from the following phrases : *sahridayajanamanahprakasamanasya, sahrdayatvabhavanamukulitalocanair nrityate, sahrdayahrdayasamvedyam eva*.
46. Abhinavagupta categorically maintains : *sahridayahrdayahladi-sabdarthamayavatameva kavyalakshanam*. *Locana*, pp. 40-41.
47. apurvam yad vastu prathayati bina karanakalam
jagad gravaprakhyam nijarasabharat sarayati ca/
kramat prakhyopakhyaprasarashubhagam bhasayati tat
sarasvatyas tattvam kavisahrdayakhyam vijayate/
48. srottram vyutpatipriti yadyapyastah ...tathapi tatra pritireva pradhanam. anyatha prabhusammitebhyo
vedadibhyo mitrasammitebhyas cetisasadibhyo ko sya kavyarupasya vyutpattihetor jayasammitatva
laksano visesa iti pradhanyena ananda evoktah caturvargavyutpattirapi cananda eva paryantikam
mukhyam phalam.
adhikari catra vimalapratibhanasalihrdayah. *Abhinavabharati* I. p.279.
49. yesam kavyanusilanabhyasavasad visadibhute manomukure varnaniyatanmayibhavanayogyata te
svahrdayasamvadabhajah sahrdayah. *Locana*, p. 38.
Cf. *Abhinavabharati* I. p. 37: prakravrttalaukikapratyaksanumanadi-janitasamskarasahayena
sahridayasamskarasacivena hrdayasamvada tanmayibha.
50. yo'rtho hrdayasamvadi tasya bhavo rasodbhava/
sariram vyapyate tena suskam kasthanivagnina/ *Natyasastra* 7/7.
51. See fn. 45 above.
52. rasenaiva jivati kavyam, na hi tacchunyam kavyam kincid asti.
53. Cf. Bharata : kavyarthan bhavayanti iti bhavah.
54. rasika eva rasasvade yogya.
55. rasajnataiva sahrdayatvam.
56. Bhatta Tauta : (nayakastu) kaveh srotuh samano nubhavas tatah.
57. kavihridayatadatmyapattiyogyata. *Abhinavabharati* II, p. 339.
58. *Sanskrit Poetics* (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1956), p. 34.
59. *Literature in Action* (London : Chatto & Windus, 1972), p. 42.
60. V. Raghavan, *Some Concepts of the Alankara Sastra* (Adyar : The Adyar Library, 1942), p. 124.

61. nirvighnapratitigrahyam saksad iva hrdaye nivisamanam caksusoriva viparivartamanam bhayanako rasah. *Abhinavabharati* I, p. 279.
62. yatah samvitsvabhavo'sau samvidasca na desena na kalena na svarupena ko'pi bhedah. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
64. *Principles of Literary Criticism*, pp. 35-36.
65. camatkaras cittavistararupo vismayaparapayayah. *Sahityadarpana* 3/34.
Visvanath has delineated aesthetic experience as follows :
"Rasa, experienced by men of sensibility, is born of the dominance of divine qualities, is indivisible, self-manifested, compounded of joy and consciousness, untouched by aught perceived and akin to the realisation of God, its very life being unearthly wonder". *Ibid.* 3/2-3.
66. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit* (Madras : The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, 1945), pp. 13-14.
67. F. Jameson, "Metacommentary", *PMLA* 60 (1971), p. 9.
68. yastuste tustimayati soke sokam upaiti ca/
dainyam dinatvam abhyeti sa natake preksakah smrtah/ *Natyasastra* 27/55.
69. tanmayibhavanam nama praptih sanuttaratmani/
purnatvasya para katha setyatra na phalantaram/ *Tantraloka* IV/209, p.237.
70. yesam na tanmayibhuti te dehadinimajjanam/
avidants magnasamivinmanas stvahrdaya iti/*Ibid.* III/240, p.228.
71. Cf. Dhananjaya : *tasmai namah svaduparanmukhaya*.
An oft-quoted verse in Sanskrit requests the Goddess Sarasvati not to ordain teaching/reciting poetry to an *arasika* : *marasikesu kavyanivedanam sirasi na likha ma likha*.
72. tena ye kavyabhayasapraktanapunyadihetubalad iti sahrdayah. *Abhinavabharati* I, p. 287.
73. tatha hi madhure gite sparse va candanadike
madhyasthyavigame yasau hrdaye spandamanata/
anandasaktih saivokta yatah sahrdayo janah/ *tantraloka* II, p. 200
In his commentary on the *rasasutra* of Bharata, Abhinavagupta quotes the first line of the following famous verse from Kalidasa's *Sakuntala*, which he considered to be the ideal introduction to his exposition of *rasa* :
ramyani viksyam madhurasca nisamyasabdan
paryutsuki bhavati yat sukhito'pi jantuh/
tacetasa smarati nunamavodhapurvam
bhavasthirani janantarasauhrdani/ (5/2)
74. yatah sahrdayanameva carvayitratvacarvananupranatvacca rasasya tadgatameva rasasvarupam nirupaniyam. *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 63.
75. atmasthitam gunavisesamahankrtasya
srngaramahurih jivitamatyayonih/
tasyatmasaktirasaniyataya rasatvam
yuktasya yena rasiko'yamiti pravadah/
sattvatmanamamalajanmavisesajanma
janmantaranubhavanirmitavasatottah/
sarvatmasampadudayatiasaikahehuh
jagarti ko'pi hradi manamayo vikarah.
Quoted in Raghavan, op.cit., p. 466.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 467.
77. M. Hiriyanna, *Art Experience* (Mysore : Kavyalaya Publications, 1954), p. 20.
78. Abhinavagupta writes : eka eva tavat paramarthato rasan. *Abhinavabharati* I, p. 271.
79. Krishna Rayan, *Suggestion and Statement in Poetry* (London : The Athlone Press, 1972), p. 31.
80. tasmadalaukikah satyam vedyah sahrdayairayam/
pramanam carvanaivatratva bhinne vidusam matam/ *Sahityadarpana* 3/26.
81. A. K. Coomaraswamy, *The Transformation of Nature in Art* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), p. 50:
"The theory of Rasa", *JAAC* 11/2 (1952), p. 147.
82. yatha hi nanavyanjanasamkrutamannam bhunjana rasanasvadayanti sumanasah purusah harsadin-
scadhigacchanti tatha nanabhavabhivyanjitan vagangasaltvopetan sthayibhavan asvadayanti sumanasah
preksakah, harsadinscadhigacchanti. *Natyasastra* 6.1., pp. 287-88.
83. *Ibid.* 27/3-17.
84. Abhinavagupta comments in *Abhinavabharati* :
rasanavyaparad bhojanad adhiko yo manaso vyaparash sa eva asvadanam iti darsayati.na rasana
vyapara asvadanam. api tu manasa eva.

- Mammata also writes in *Kavyaprakasa* :
 "śhayaḥ sattvodrekaprakasanandamaya samvid visrantisatsvena bhogen bhujiyate."
 85. *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1967), p. 202. According to Hirsch, the meaning of a poem is not what its author meant but "what the poem means to different readers".
 Walter J. Ong, S.J. also feels that the vital parts of the text are "chewed on, eaten, (and) mouthed" by responsive readers and that their responses are controlled by "connections operating well below the ordinary threshold of consciousness in the unconscious or subconscious realms of psyche". *The Interfaces of the word* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 260, 261.
86. *Rasagangadhara* (K.M. edn.), P.25
 87. sabdarthasasanajnanamatrenaiva na vedyate/
 vedyate sa hi kavyarthatattvajnaireva kevalam/ *Dhvanyaloka* 1/7.
 Cf. Locana, p. 78 : asvadyamanata-pranataya bhanti.
 88. L. Spitzer. *Linguistics and Literary History* (Princeton. 1948). p. 27.
 89. *Natyasastra* 27/50-62.
 90. vimalamukurakalpihutanijahrdayah. *Locana*, pp.22-23.
 91. *Anguttara Nikaya* II. 230.
 Cf. Dandin. *Kavyadarsa* 1/130; *Mahabharata* 12/260.1.
 92. *Kavyalanikara* 5/4.
 93. *Ibid.* 1/5: 1/9.
 94. na kavyarthaviramo'sti yadi syat pratibhagunah/*Dhvanyaloka* 4/6. Cf. Vamana: *kavitvavijam pratibhanam*; Bhamaha: *kavyam tu jayate jatu kasyacii pratibhavatah*; Kuntaka: *yat kincinnapi saundaryam tat sarvam pratibhodbhavam*; Mahimabhaita: *sa hi caksur bhagavatah tritriyamiiti giyate*.
 95. *Abhinavabharati* I. pp. 280-81.
 Abhinavagupta concludes : *sarvatha rasanatmakavitavighnapratitigrahyo bhava eva rasah*.
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 105. Cf. Magha : *ksane ksane yannavatam upaiti tadaiva rupam ramaniyatayah*
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 108. Culler, *Structuralist Poetics*, p.263.
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 110. *gudham saccamatkaroti: gopyamanataya labdhasaundaryam*.
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Laksaná and Deconstruction

KRISHNA RAYAN

Twenty years ago I had explained the first two conditions or stages of *laksaná* as understood in Sanskrit poetics, by applying the concepts to a line and a half in an English poem, thus :¹

Vácyārtha. The literal meaning, thwarted by the incongruity between the word's primary referent and the context. This is what happens in Hart Crane's lines

The dice of drowned men's bones he saw bequeath
An embassy. (At Melville Tomb)

The incongruity stung Harriet Monroe into writing and asking Hart Crane how dice could bequeath an embassy.

Lakṣyārtha. The metaphorical or secondary meaning, obtained by substituting for the primary referent a secondary referent related to it. We thus effect transfer of meaning, relate the vehicle to the tenor and paraphrase the poetic metaphofatally. Hart Crane did this to his own metaphors when he cleared Harriet Monroe's puzzlement. "The dice of drowned men's bones" became "drowned men's bones ground into little cubes by the action of the sea"; "bequeath an embassy" became "washed ashore and offering evidence of messages about their experiences that the mariners might have had to deliver if they had survived".

One of the principal strategies of Deconstructive reading is to focus attention on the incongruity itself (the *mukhyārthabádha*) rather than on the meaning obtainable as a result of its resolution (*arthápatti*). Jonathan Culler's elucidation of this strategy with reference to Paul de Man's ideas is in terms of what in Sanskrit would be called *anupapatti* and *lakṣyārtha* and in English (as in my comments above) "the incongruity" and "the paraphrase".²

Close reading, for de Man, entails scrupulous attention to what seems ancillary or resistant to understanding. In his foreword to Carol Jacobs's *The Dissimulating Harmony* he speaks of paraphrase as "a synonym for understanding": an act which converts the strange into the familiar, 'facing up to apparent difficulties (be they of syntax, of figuration, or of experience) and... coping with them exhaustively and convincingly, but subtly eliding, concealing, and diverting what stands in the way of meaning. 'What would happen,' he asks, 'if, for once, one were to reverse the ethos of explication and try to be really precise, attempting a reading that would no longer blindly submit to the teleology of

controlled meaning'(pp.ix-x)? What would happen, that is, if instead of assuming that elements of the text were subservient instruments of a controlling meaning or total and governing attitude, readers were to explore every resistance to meaning? Primary points of resistance might be what we call rhetorical figures, since to identify a passage or sequence as figurative is to recommend transformation of a literal difficulty, which may have interesting possibilities, into a paraphrase that fits the meaning assumed to govern the message as a whole.

The versions of rhetorical reading offered in Sanskrit poetics and by Culler make strikingly similar assumptions about the two stages or processes involved. However, *laksanā* and Deconstruction are divergent descriptions of reading, because Deconstruction rejects the second process and concerns itself exclusively with the first, i.e., the "literal difficulty". In the same book from which a passage was excerpted at the beginning I had ventured a description of the *laksanā* phenomenon, which departs from Sanskrit poetics and seems now to have more in common with descriptions which have since been offered by Deconstructionists:³

The vehicle, its original reference intact, its identity inviolate, reigns supreme within the metaphor- and its relation to the tenor and its congruity with the context are ever imperfect. The vehicle disrupts the statement and arrests attention. "To shock the audience by the violence and inadequacy of the analogy" (as Martin Foss says, speaking of the "sick simile") is the true function of metaphor. Its premises being what they are, the Sanskrit theory of metaphor, while admitting the fact in fact of this shock, refrains from assigning any function to it and in fact provides for its quick resolution. Sanskrit poetics, like the classical poetry and drama from which it was evolved, is firmly committed to coherence and intelligibility. To us, however, the finding of a secondary meaning to remove the incongruity is but the establishing of rational meaning. The first tier (the disrupted statement) is the poem; the second (the meaning as it stands when the mess is cleared) is the paraphrase. Most of us would regard the latter as unimportant if not illegitimate. The shock is the thing.

This statement was made from premises and in terms that are different from, and indeed antecedent by several years to, those of Deconstruction. What is significant is the common ground which consists in a questioning of (to quote Culler again) 'our inclination to use notions of unity and thematic coherence to

exclude possibilities that are manifestly awakened by the language and that pose a problem'⁴.

Possibilities that pose a problem are commonly awakened by the activity of figural structures in the text, and "rhetorical" reading which focuses attention on these is an important form of Deconstruction. Perhaps the best known example of Deconstructive criticism of this kind is Paul de Man's reading (offered in *Allegories of Reading*) of the following passage in Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu* :

I had stretched out on my bed, with a book, in my room which sheltered, tremblingly, its transparent and fragile coolness against the afternoon sun, behind the almost closed blinds through which a glimmer of daylight had nevertheless managed to push its yellow wings, remaining motionless between the wood and the glass, in a corner, poised like a butterfly. It was hardly light enough to read, and the sensation of the light's splendor was given me only by the noise of Camus...hammering dusty crates; resounding in the sonorous atmosphere that is peculiar to hot weather, they seemed to spark off Scarlet stars; and also by the files executing their little concert, the chamber music of Summer: evocative not in the manner of a human tune that, heard perchance during the summer, afterwards reminds you of it; it is connected to summer by a more necessary link: born from beautiful days, resurrecting only when they return, containing some of their essence, it does not only awaken their image in our memory; it guarantees their return, their actual, persistent, unmediated presence.

The dark coolness of my room related to the full sunlight of the street as the shadow relates to the ray of light, that is to say it was just as luminous and it gave my imagination the total spectacle of the summer, whereas my senses, if I had been on a walk, could only have enjoyed it by fragments; it matched my repose which (thanks to the adventures told by my book and stirring my tranquility) supported, like the quiet of a motionless hand in the middle of a running brook, the shock and the motion of a torrent of activity.

De Man's reading shows that the passage is a "literary text which simultaneously asserts and denies the authority of its own rhetorical mode". On the one hand, there is the buzzing of the flies which is linked to summer by necessity and has appropriated some of its essence. On the other hand, there is the human tune, experienced by chance rather than necessity and linked to summer accidentally rather than essentially. Analogy and contiguity are the bases respectively

of metaphor and metonymy, and de Man points out that the necessity/chance opposition is one way of reaching the analogy/contiguity opposition and that 'the inference of identity and totality that is constitutive of metaphor is lacking in the purely metonymic contact'. Without naming metaphor or metonymy but indirectly by referring to their determining principles, the first paragraph affirms the binary opposition of the two and privileges metaphor over metonymy. In the earlier half of the second paragraph, the narrator claims, partly by implication, that "the substitutive totalization by metaphor" (de Man's words) reproduces - in his imagination and within the room - "the total spectacle of the summer" more effectively than actual sensory perception outdoors of metonymically related fragments of the spectacle could have. However, this "metafigural theory", positing the priority of metaphor over metonymy in terms of the categories of metaphysics and with reference to the act of reading (de Man's words again) is undermined by "the figural praxis" that follows. For, in the latter half of the paragraph, in order to give the claim made for metaphor some "persuasive power", the narrator employs metonymic structures such as (1) the phrase "torrent of activity" which being a cliché in French is not a metaphor but a metonymy embodying a contingent association, and (2) the occurrence of "torrent" and "running brook" in proximity. Thus on de Man's showing, "the assertion of the mastery of metaphor over metonymy" deconstructs itself, as it "owes its persuasive power to the use of metonymic structures".

As Jonathan Culler points out, de Man's 'close readings concentrate on crucial rhetorical structures in passages with a meta linguistic function or metacritical implications'. His reading of the Proust passage, in an attempt to establish that "the figural praxis and the metafigural theory do not converge", examines that theory and indicates the ontological status of metaphor/metonymy, equating it with analogy/contiguity, necessity/chance, essence/accident, and identity, totality/"relational contact". Clearly, this shows that Poststructuralism is as deeply concerned with the metaphor/metonymy dichotomy as Structuralism (chiefly in the person of Roman Jakobson) had been. The most authoritative pronouncement on it was Jakobson's essay "Two Aspects of Language and two Types of Aphasic Disturbances", equating it with or relating it to selection/combination and similarity/contiguity.

If I might end the easy, as I began it, on an egotistic note, I would like to mention that writing in the *Adyar Library Bulletin* in 1984, I had equated *gaunī laksanā* and *śuddhā laksanā* with, respectively, metaphor and metonymy as defined by Jakobson :⁵

But the front on which examination of *laksanā* (in sanskrit poetics has been most significantly productive concerns the relationship of the primary and secondary referents. A considerable number of possible relations have been isolated and defined, and several lists have been offered. It has, however, become increasingly clear that the possible relations fall into two categories. The first kind is based on *sārūpya* or *sādrśya* or *sādharanya* — what can be called similarity. The second kind consists of relations other than similarity— such as, to mention only three out of a large number, *samavāya* or *sāhacarya* (association), *sāmīpya* or *sāmnidhya* (proximity), and *tātsthya* (location). Sanskrit does not have a generic term except *sādrśyetara* for relations other than similarity, but the English word "contiguity" would serve the purpose. The first kind has come to be known as *gaunī laksanā* and the second as *śuddhā laksanā*.

I had also pointed out in the same essay that the examples which Ānandavardhan offers (in the *vṛtti* on the 32nd and 33rd *kārikās* of *Uḍyota* III of *Dhvanyāloka*) for the two kinds of *guṇavṛtti* which he identifies, i.e., *abhedopacārārūpa* (based on absolute identity) and *laksanārūpa* (based on secondary meaning) can also serve as examples of *gaunī* and *śuddhā* respectively.

I think I was the first to point out that both in Sanskrit poetics and in Jakobson's theory, similarity (or identity) and contiguity are recognized as the constitutive principles of metaphor and metonymy respectively, although it is possible that some earlier critic that I am not aware of did notice and draw attention to this remarkable parallelism. I must add that when viewed as an undifferentiated phenomenon involving any transfer of meaning, all *laksanās* can be equated with metaphor as has been done at the beginning of this essay. When, however, *laksanā* is viewed as of two kinds - based on similarity and on contiguity - only the former kind is to be equated with metaphor as has been done in the foregoing paragraph.

The *laksanā* theory and Jakobson's formulation agree in rejecting the notion that metaphor and metonymy are merely tropes and in setting them up as fundamental mutually exclusive semantic categories. However, while Jakobson believes that they between them exhaust all discourse and that any discourse that is not metaphoric is metonymic and vice versa, the position in Sanskrit poetics is that *laksanā* is one among three meaning functions and that there are effects or modes of discourse accounted for either by *abhidhā* or by *vyañjanā*.

If Deconstruction (represented by Derrida and the Yale set) is one face of Poststructuralism, the other face is Lacanian Psychoanalysis which is a rewriting

of Freud. To mention an important concept, Freud had identified condensation and displacement as two processes involved in dream-work which converts the latent content into the manifest content. Developing the notion that "the unconscious is structured like a language", Lacan describes metaphor and metonymy - the two primary operations of language, as defined by Jakobson- as identical with condensation and displacement respectively. Metaphor and condensation work by similarity (which is the basis of *gauní laksaná*), while metonymy and displacement work by contiguity or association (which is the basis of *suddhá laksaná*). Thus the bipolarity marked by the two types of *laksaná* has proved constitutive of certain pairs of categories fundamental to modern linguistics, literary theory and psychoanalysis.

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Multi-level Semantics: an Analysis of Poetic Meaning in Indian and Contemporary Western Theory

DHANYA MENON

All art is considered to be representative of life, thereby distinguishing itself and transcending bare history whose business it is to record and document facts. Literary criticism today has graduated and evolved from the early Platonic interpretation of art as mere *trompe l'oeil*, to the belief in semiotized, signbased interpretation. Both Indian and Western Schools of aesthetics have effectively attempted to deal with the rudimentary yet seminal concepts of literature like reader-response, meaning and interpretation and the true nature of the semantic in works of art.

An attempt has been made here to gauge the comparative affinities with regard to the hierarchical pattern of semantic interpretation as propounded by the early Indian Dhvani theorist Anandavardhana, as well as that of the contemporary western phenomenologist, Roman Ingarden. To club these two apparently incomparable, polar schools and bring them under a common penumbra might at first seem cumbersome; but the more one delves into the specific aspect of their modes of analysis, the more will one be convinced of the essential commonality in these apparently different modes of literary criticism.

A highly technical and stratified framework of analysis has been formulated by the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden in his efforts at evaluating the various "levels" of existence of the literary work of art. Almost parallel to this lies the theory of *dhvani* which dates as far back as the 9th century, and which emphasises upon the full-length study of the poem from the sound- stratum to the level of the entire discourse. This ultimate state which encompasses within itself the whole semantic range released by the text, is realized in its plenitude only by the *sahridaya*, or the "Ideal" reader. He is mainly conceived to "close the gaps that constantly appear in any analysis of literary effect and response".¹ The phenomenological theory of art essentially stresses upon the actual text as well as the response to it, as against the Nietzschean dictum "there are no texts, merely interpretations".

The multi-dimensional, stratiform nature of the literary text was recognized and developed by Ingarden, for whom the stratae, decided as four in number, consist of -1) the stratum of units of word sounds 2) the stratum of units of

meaning 3) the stratum of objects represented and 4) the stratum of "schematized" appearances. The *dhvani* approach to the multiphase quality of the text too conceives of a more or less similar hierarchy. The primary level of *abhidha* is realized at the sound stratum while the figurative, metaphorical meaning of the poem is analyzed at the level of *laksana*. The *gunibhūtavyangya* supercedes these two in that the reader absorbs the various symbolic elements of the text at this level. The poem manifests itself as a true *dhvanikāvya* when the *sahrdaya* realizes and taps all the conceivable semantic potential that can possibly be elicited from the work.

The poem chosen for identifying the various stratae of meaning is Blake's "Tyger" — a poem fecund in meaning and one which releases deeper semantic layers to the informed reader. The basal level conceives of the sound stratum—sound effects which would appeal even to the most untrained of readers, which incorporates into it, metrical devices like the rhyme which affords auditory pleasure. "Tyger, tyger, burning bright,/ In the forest of the night" have an onomatopoeic effect; the *śabdacitra* evoked by *amurananam*, to the Indian theorist. The lines, predominantly trochaic, serve to satisfy the reader's zest for jingle, and appreciate the lines on the basis of the auditory pleasure evoked. The simple "tripping" trochee, here most effectively veils the philosophic profundity conveyed in the poem. Moreover, the child-like repetition of the apostrophe in the opening lines, "Tyger, tyger", achieves the twin purpose of emphasis as well as metrical effectiveness, contributed by sound patterns like rhyme, alliteration and assonance. The lines, rhyming aa, bb, cc, dd (if the last syllable of the fourth line is pronounced/simetrai/) is seen consistently employed throughout. A closer examination would reveal a heavy use of alliteration-- "tyger, tyger", "burning bright", "frame thy fearful", "distant deeps" -- which serve to conjure up word images (*vācyacitra*) as well as sound images (*śabdacitra*) through repeated use. The reader who is capable of confining himself solely to the appreciation of sounds, is struck by the repeated use of interrogatives which are highlighted by a drastic cutting short of verbs which create the effect of breathlessness and intense awe. The speaker, obviously terrified at the beauty and ferocity of the tiger, is obviously at a loss for words, but what has been communicated by the rapidly breathed interrogatives could perhaps never have been effected by any other poetic device. Further more, the repetition of the whole of the first stanza (with the single instance of replacing the word "could" with "dare" in the last line) holds up the pictorial image in all its terrifying vividness to the reader who is by now captivated by the vision he has conjured up of the dark, sinister beast. An analysis of this primary level of the poem finds a parallel in Indian aesthetics too. Images, both verbal and pictorial, are considered in detail while evaluating the poem at this level.

The second stratum, that of the comprehension of meaning, also confines itself to a more or less superficial plain, with its preoccupation with poetic techniques and therefore neither contributes much to the thematic profundity of the poem nor to the philosophic interpretations which would inspire a more informed reader. The Indian theorist here brings in the case of the reader who appreciates the various *alamkâras* — metaphor, and other poetic devices — which serve as ornamental yet integral elements. Here the reader of "The Tyger" would incorporate the elements of sounds as well as the meaning which exists at the surface. The poem then is to him merely one which deals, at the physical level, of the process of the creation of a monstrous creature, ferocious, deadly, mortally terrifying, yet strangely beautiful. The tiger, to him, is a personification of everything that is evil, dangerous and awe inspiring. It is however, stripped of all noble attributes, and he is only frighteningly aware of the creature as an incarnation of sheer bestiality. When thus he is able to absorb the nuances of sound as well as the superficial meaning, he transgresses the boundaries of the purely elementary in his "aesthetic progression" of poem-analysis.

The more Blakian reader is at a stage where he can achieve a comprehensive and complete understanding of the sound structures as well as the primary meaning, and well beyond that — he is now a good way ahead from his less initiated counterpart. He imbibes into his inner being, the best that the poem can offer as a piece of art; the poem is now perceived better, explored deeper. The significance of the seemingly simple line "Did he who made the lamb make thee?" assumes much wider implications here, since the lamb becomes not just a creature diametrically opposed to the terrifying tiger, but becomes evocative of the "unassuming little lamb" drawn by the imaginative genius of the poet. The tiger, who "burns brightly", holds much more meaning - potential than a merely intense exhibition of the physical act of burning; wrath, ardour, fire, all go into the white-hot heat of its creation.

And what shoulder, and what art,
Could twist the sinews of thy heart ?
And when that heart began to beat,
What dread hand ? and what dread feet ?

The shoulder, the twisted sinews of the stealthily beating heart, carries an awesome aspect of power, of sheer strength, though not merely in its physical aspect. The skill of the creator, positioned in the dark smithy, intent on his craft, moulding and shaping the deadly artifact, are all enveloped in the semantic range of the single word "art". As with anything that is associated with the term art, "the end is ostensibly the making of a significant form, but ultimately the

particularized expression of a creative delight arising from some 'inwardness' of being and driven by a sense of perfection".² The *alamkāra dhvani* is transcended as far as the *dhvani* theorist is concerned, and he has begun to perceive, to feel the poem in its wholeness and intensity and the work assumes the level of a *gunibhūtavyangyākāvya*. The indeterminate elements prompt this competent *sahrdaya* to fill the semantic gaps with the power of his aesthetic sensibilities.

At the purely *vācya* level, the tiger appears physically fearsome, demonic and comes to symbolize evil, grossness, violence and cruelty. At this level can be assessed even the graphological influence and effectiveness of the word "tyger" which serves to enhance the fearsomeness of the beast.

At the figurative, metaphorical level of *laksana* too, the tiger would perhaps remain a picture of destruction, an incarnation of purely destructive forces that have gone into its making. From such a reading to the realization of the poem at the level of *vyangya* requires the imagination of a sensitive reader—here, the creature, no longer perceived as a physical being, becomes symbolic not of destruction, but, paradoxically, of creation at its highest and best. This emergence of a positive force from a purely negative, vicious one jolts the reader into an awareness of the sheer beauty of creation.

The poem can further be interpreted as a true *dhvanikāvya* where the "figure" of the tiger ceases to exist. The dumbfounded question "Did he who make the lamb make thee?" provokes the reader now to consider the lamb-tiger amalgam as symbolizing the beauty of creativity, and the skill of the Divine Hand that worked at its creation.

The "Superstratum", the highest level in the Ingarden concept of literary appreciation is, and can, be perceived only by the hypothetical Ideal Reader. Any elucidation of the poem by this reader would envelop in its entirety, the sounds and the layers of meaning, the form and the content, which constitute the "being" of the poem, thereby endorsing the credo of ancient Indian literary criticism "*śabdarthau sahitaū kāvyam*" (poetry is a blend of sound and sense). The Ideal Reader who finds his counterpart in the *sahrdaya*, might differ from him in that the latter is not a notional frame of reference like the former. This reader needs no commentary to help him understand the terrible indictment of the world of Blake's Tyger. He is at the same time not indifferent to the metrical and auditory representations in the poem, which to him exist to form a storm-center of meanings, sounds and associations, radiating forth to form an imaginative, cohesive whole.

This analysis of "The Tyger" which effectively lends itself to Ingarden's concept, becomes an effective mode of analysis that suits the added requirements of the application of the Indian critical theory of *dhvani*. In order to attain a wholly unified vision, one should synthesise successfully the various stratae of existence of the work of art: sounds, meaning, the felt experience, the emotional response, and the ultimate awareness of the highest truth the poem wishes to convey. But when this explanation ceases to be a means to the end of unifying the poem in our minds, and is, instead, thought of as the actual "form" of the poem, everything goes wrong, and its "infinite variety" is staled at once.

The cognitive response, rather than the affective, is held to be the essential meaning of any work of art; this was an oft-discussed pre-occupation with Ingarden too. He remarks on the term "cognition" thus:

It should be taken to mean . . . a primarily passive, receptive experience, in which we, literary consumers, become acquainted with a given work, get to know it somehow, and thereby possibly relate to it in a more or less emotional way, and continuing on to the kind of attitude toward the work which leads to the acquisition of effective knowledge about the work.³

The semantic interpretation of the "super stratum", according to Ingarden, depends on the "Unbestimmtheitsstellen" (spots of indeterminate elements) that lie beneath the body of the printed page, and whose vast potential is tapped by the trained, initiated reader, and is never attained by the literary dilettante. Indian classical theory too has laid stress on such an activation of the reader's imagination which is stimulated by either a concealed meaning or a hiatus in the text:

gudham sat camatkaroti
gopyamanataya labdha saundaryam.
(concealment lends charm and beauty).

No text can adapt itself to suit the aesthetic requirements of each individual reader. The work assumes an opaqueness and obscurity only to the literary philistine whose dialectic capabilities are restricted, or sometimes even absent; this has many a time, nothing to do with the text, but everything to do with its interpretation. The reading activity assumes broader dimensions in both contemporary theory as well as ancient Indian critical theory, since both attempt to dispense with any mode of straitjacket interpretation. Sartre observes:

The imagination of the spectator has not only a regulating function, but a constitutive one. It does not play; it is called upon to recompose the beautiful object beyond the traces left by the artist.⁴

Interpretation, therefore, is not an onerous task or a painful duty assigned to the reader, but a unique voyage of discovery leading to a state of ultimate aesthetic bliss. Susan Sontag here remarks:

Interpretation is not an absolute value, a gesture of mind situated in some timeless realm of capabilities . . . it must itself be evaluated with a historical view of human consciousness. In some cultural contexts, interpretation is a liberating act. It is a means of revising, of transvaluing, of escaping the dead past.⁵

Ingarden's multi-tiered method of text-analysis as well as the Indian classificatory system of *abhidha*, *laksana* and *vyanjana* serve mainly as frameworks of reference; it would indeed be an unrewarding experience if they are to be considered as rigid compartments. Such systems of analysis are only pointers, indicators of the rich semantic potential that are encoded within the text, and serve essentially as hypostasis that help sharpen the reader's perceptive faculties. A loosely structured hierarchy which deals with each layer of meaning, is what the potential reader should cull from such a framework, whose function it is to enable him to react to an aesthetic "situation" in which he is placed.

It has been the bane of most contemporary theories to "theorize", in the most rigid, narrow sense of the term. Similar has been the case with ancient Sanskrit literary theory which attempted to apply its tenets to a corpus of writing which may have given birth to those literary concepts. The recent upsurge and revival of Indian theories of aesthetics have led many to find areas of affinities between classical Indian and contemporary western theories, which have, however, undoubtedly bridged the wide gaps prevalent until now. But what is needed to strengthen this mutual bond, is a thorough application of these conceptually homogeneous theories to individual texts that represent a writer's oeuvre, bearing in mind the fact that no theory can afford to ignore in the process of theorizing, two integral elements, the text, and the reader.

The literary work, like any other work of art, is a product of the entire imagination. A picture, a painting, or a literary work is neither a purely intellectual nor a purely emotional product; it is obviously both at once. We cannot say that it is the product of a purely reflective or active process; it is both at once. It is neither the product of internal choice nor external compulsion, because no essential distinction is made between the two at the time of creation.

The literary work of art therefore, can be said to "exist" in the state of mind of the poet, of which the poem is an objectified manifestation, and also in the state of mind of the sensitive, responsive reader, who reconstructs the work of art through his interpretation of it.

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Theory of the Novel: An Indian View

KAPIL KAPOOR

It is not meaningful to talk of the novel independently of narrative, for novel is only one kind of narrative and as a category is in opposition to other categories of narrative and because now the investigation into a theory of the narrative is carried out mostly in terms of 'narrative fiction'¹ which is what a novel is.

Late eighties onwards there has been in the West a renewed interest in and a new centrality of the narrative in both literary criticism² and in scriptural interpretation.³ This concern with narrative has developed as part of the general disillusionment with 'theories' or 'isms' as adequate explanatory structures for the complex being of the violence-riven twentieth century, for the vagaries of human action and for the anomalies of human experience. It is clear now that abstract theory building, which is rooted in the 19th century self-confidence, and founded on a generally 'external' socio-economic view of man, has failed at crucial moments to anticipate or account for tumultuous, mass, and often inexplicably sudden upheavals. Why should poetry-reading, music-loving, wine-connoisseur men be actually blood-thirsty? Why should civilised men indulge in mass bloodshed? Why should men revel in violence? Why should a leper who has a younger leperous sister to look after remain an integrated human being, when others like him usually break-up and are destroyed? And of late, why after seventy years of proscription of the religious sentiment, after two generations of dissociation from the spiritual, why should millions choose to walk all of a sudden behind a candle lighted at the Church in the streets of East Germany, East Europe and Russia? That is the most recent of the many twentieth century stories. Every story such as this one asks as well as answers some question - in a complex way one story, while yet another story would need to be recalled to resolve the problem in the first story. These questions are handled by theories and 'ism' which interpret the events in a pre-determined frameworks which had been reliable constructs. Now, it is being suggested that to answer such and other existential questions, we need to recall what has already been, to retrieve from our memory the right narrative, the right record, the appropriate story that would serve as an analogy and an illustration of the events of to-day. In other words, there is a need to employ narrative as *interpretation*. The category of narrative is now being used, it has been noted, to explain human action, the nature of agency, the structure of consciousness and human traditions, as "an alternative to foundationalist

and/or other scientific epistemologies, and to develop a means for imposing order on what is otherwise chaos".⁴

This is now the orientation in the West - to argue from a narrative, in addition to the argument based in a general theory.⁵ In the process the relationship between the two - narrative and theoretical knowledge - has also been defined and recognised: the narrative may constitute an independent epistemology and may also function as an elaboration or illustration of the abstract knowledge.

Now we know that in India, this has always been the case, at least for long. The Indian intellectual tradition has relied heavily on the narrative - *kathá* in different forms and at different levels, as we shall see below. To take one major example - the *Mahábhárata*, the Indian novel/narrative par excellence, and the *puránas* have clear ontological status in the spheres of culture and socio-geographic - historical knowledge about the Indian civilisation, and at the same time, they function epistemologically as extended interpretive systems for the 'foundationalist' knowledge of the Vedás. As Sri Veda Vyása says in the very beginning of the *Mahábhárata* -

"With the *Ithihása* and *Puránas* alone meaning of the Vedás can be expounded and its validity understood . . . (I.267-268).


Sri Veda Vyása, in the typical Indian fabulous mode, also claims, a little later, an independent status for the *Mahábhárata* as a text of knowledge-

"In the far-off, ancient times, the gods got together and weighed the *Mahábhárata* against all the four Vedás - the *Mahábhárata* outweighed them . . . in the matter of truth, this text proved to be of greater significance, seriousness, and depth". (I. 269- 273).

The general truths interspersed with illustrative narratives, which yield in turn several general 'truths', is the organising principle of another major text, a prose text, the *Hitopadesa*, which is a recension of the *Pancatantra*. The stories of the *Hitopadesa* are realistic accounts of human experience and human nature, though they are couched in the animal fable mode.

However, the substance, format and structure of story-telling - both in itself and in the context of the whole text - vary from one text to the other. This is evident from the number of categories and sub-categories (at least 24) of *Kathá* enumerated, for example, by Bhoja.⁶ These categories of narrative are defined by one or more than one of the several parameters that have been invoked by different poeticsians - language, metre, subject-matter, narrator, goal, type of major protagonist, the span of time, etc. In the Western theory, too, the three defining characteristics are - Time, subject and place of the Individual. In the

context of Indian theory of narratives, one can postulate the following totality of discourse, in which narrative and kinds of narrative find their place :



There are thus five kinds of narrative - (i) Fictional Now; (ii) Fictional non-Now; (iii) Romance; (iv) Myth or Legend (viz. *Pūrāṇas*); and (v) Historical. Of course, through the interaction of types, new kinds of narratives emerge. The *Mahābhārata*, for example, is dominantly an *itihāsa*, but has inter-mingling of at least three narrative categories - the fictional non-now, myth/legend, and history. Again subsidiary narratives (*upākhyāna*) within a narrative may belong to any of the five kinds of narratives, resulting in a rich texture of story-telling. The one defining property of all narratives is their *temporality* - in the world of a narrative. There is overwhelming instability, constant change and flux. Every moment one thing becomes another. Also, secondly, all narrative is a form of biography - a retelling of someone's or some experience - which is what makes the narrative an appropriate illuminating analogy or explanation, for reader's recipients' particular experience. Hence, its value.

Each cultural community, expectedly, has, at one time or other, in one place or another, in one language or another, produced all kinds of narratives - from the fictional to the marvellous. But each culture has a genius, a preference for one kind or some kinds of narratives over others. Thus the Indian cultural tradition, the Indian people, seem to express themselves best in the marvellous and the historical narratives. That the Indian mode prefers 'historical' as well may surprise many, for it is generally believed that ancient Indians had very little or no interest in history or biography. But recall what professor Warder says in his *Indian Kāvya Literature* in the context of Magadhan literature (4th c. B.C.) "...careful inquiry shows that (history and biography) were carefully cultivated".⁷ It is the highly empirical orientation of the Indian mind which

prestige biography, but at the same time the Indian world view has no permanent interest in the details of the individual or the individuating details of human experience. Nor does the Indian world view underscore the sequentiality of observed/observable temporality. Rather, the individual experience is meaningful for the 'time-less' message it may yield even for a part of the universal human experience, for the unchanging, time-less core in the flux of time. What form would such a biography take? What would be the preferred narrative mode, if that is the case? Obviously myth, legend and history, separately or interwoven - the *purānas* and the *Itihāsa*, which transcend the local and the particular and create generalised structures.

It has been said that such preferred modes are a product of the culture to which they belong - the culture creates them in a cause-effect relationship. But this is by no means convincingly demonstrable - does the culture generate the text, or do the texts constitute and define a given culture in a constant dialectic? The enterprise of re-writing stories can be quite mistaken, if it is inspired from outside a living society, by a fashionable or profitable or an alien framework. such a rewriting would not be a genuine critique of the range of a culture's values and emotions. However, a genuine re-writing that springs both from the text and from the changed expectations of a living society - an-intrinsic rewriting is part of the narrative - dynamics and has been resorted to at the level of both literary and mass cultures in India, constituting an 'enrichment of the paradigm experience'.⁸

Itihāsa - *purāna* narratives satisfy both the society's need to break the stranglehold of narrative - time and specificity, and some of them may get promoted in the common community consciousness into a primary, primitive status and serve to measure and interpret, even if symbolically, and make sense of the immediate experience and this is possible because our experience is in any case perceived as a temporal sequence. In the course of a remarkable analysis of the role of the mythical-legendary narrative, Stephen Crites says that such narratives achieve 'a kind of pure spatial articulation we find in painting Traditional myths . . . have functioned in this way: by taking personal and historical time up into the archetypal story, they give it a meaning which in the end is timeless'.⁹

The predominant status of the marvellous and the historical does not imply the absence of social realism in such narratives or of direct narratives of social realism. The impression that 'novel' was nonexistent in India, and has appeared as a form only under the impact of Western, specifically, British literature hinges entirely on the definition of *novel* as a modern western genre. It is a

very recent narrative form, is generally referred to as 'narrative fiction' and constitutes the principal area of investigation for studies in narrative, which as a category is not just the novel, nor just the literary forms. The 'novel' has, in terms of its generic identity, a history of about two hundred years and its rise in the west is correlated with industrialization and rise of the middle class. It is said to be distinguished from the pre-novel narratives (romance, etc.) by its temporal and spatial specificity, by its individual and life-like characterization. It is recognized as a 'mixed genre .. eclectic and various ... Its origin lies in a dozen different forms: essay, romance, history, the "character", biography, comic and sentimental drama, ..." ¹⁰ This points to the difficulty of unambiguously defining the novel. Somehow no one criterion seems to succeed. Thus the contexts of industrialisation and middle-class do not seem to relate uniquely to the novel, for the Spanish *Don-quixote* (1605-15) is decidedly a novel. Near home, same is true of Bána's *Kádambri*. Stevick has reviewed a number of criteria employed to mark 'the' province of the novel - perceptual, structural, sociological, mythic, typographic, philosophical, subjective and cultural - to show how no criterion really leads to a definition of the novel ¹¹, because each criterion applies equally well to some other genre as well, and may not in fact apply to some well-known novels. So, concludes Stevick, "the theory of the novel at the present time pursues to varying degrees each of those classic approaches..." ¹² this fragmentary approach is necessitated by the fact that the novel has had "the systematic attention of no great critic, no powerfully synthesizing mind of the order of Aristotle, Johnson or Coleridge". ¹³ In sum, there is no one theory of the novel.

However, when it is said that the novel is absent in the Indian literary tradition, some dominant features of the English novel are there at the back of our mind - it is an imaginative construction, a fiction; it is a realistic narrative and has specificity of time, space and detail; it has linear temporality and it explores - in serious modern realism - the depths of the individual mind in transaction between itself and the forces of society and human nature. It is easy to see that these are the properties of important *English* fiction. Now this kind of 'novel' came to be written in India only in the middle of the nineteenth century under the impact of English education and reading, and represented the urban, middle-class, educated India's creativity. The new form was not easy in developing and as Meenakshi Mukherji has described so clearly and precisely, 'the Indian novelist has had to overcome several constraints of tradition and culture in the process of shaping the Indian novel in Indian languages'. ¹⁴

But then when one says that the novel is absent in the Indian literary tradition, what one is actually saying is that the available prose fiction from the tradition does not have the concerns of modern fiction. But it would not do to say that the Indian prose narratives show no interest in social matters, or in the ordinary individual and his dilemmas - for all narrative is social - even the sacred narrative. What one can legitimately say is that the social issues and concerns are different from those of today, and that does not amount to saying much. Consider for example professor Warder's extensive reporting on the prose-Kávyás in the Sanskrit Literature, which convincingly establishes that even if one ignores verse narratives, even prose narratives have a long attested history in India.¹⁵ The tradition of story-telling in India, informs Professor Warder, "combines two conflicting elements: realism and criticism of social evils on the one hand and the growth of fantasy, of the acquisition of superhuman powers, in connection with extra-ordinary adventures, on the other".¹⁶ For example, the first century A.D. prose work, *Brhatkathá*, literally 'the giant fiction', which according to prof. Warder, is the first and perhaps the greatest Indian novel¹⁷, "appropriated . . . boldly in a prose fiction the entire scale and scope of the epic: the grand and leisurely manner, the rich detail, the whole range of aspirations and emotions and *rasas*, but with more realism . . ."¹⁸ This was a narrative fiction composed in a major Indian language - The early Maharashtrian (known as Paisáci) which was the literary vernacular of Central and Southern India. This early narrative fiction initiated the tradition of realism and of the use of vernacular medium. Several later writers - Bána, Dandin, Dhanapála - "like him . . . blend realistic narrative and character study, in varying proportions, with incursions into a fanciful, semi-divine world on the periphery of the ordinary human world, which enlarges the aspirations of their heroes, or rather materialises their dreams".¹⁹ We are informed that the element of realism in this 'novel' is manifest "in characterization, in the somewhat technical outlook (in science and technology) and in the scenes of worldly deceit, robbery and intrigue . . ."²⁰ In the same way, the remarkable perceptual richness of the narrative - the wealth of detail in descriptions - would satisfy one more of the criteria we listed above for defining the novel.

Consider next the 3rd century A.D. *Pancatantra*, literally 'The Five Systems', 'one of the most famous works of Indian literature, both in India and throughout the world'.²¹ The mode of this narrative is parable or the fable, which was, and still continues to be in the folk tradition, the popularising communicative framework.²² It is an *illustrative* novel - *nidarsana* - *kathá*, the subject of which is *niti*, policy in both private and public affairs. The maxims are drawn from various treatises on law and morality. The moral comes first and forms a sort

of peg on which a fable is hung, with interspersed stories and maxims which carry on the argument. The fables themselves are in prose. Their form or framework is fabulous, but their content is very down to earth and concerns major human experiences, nature and course of human relationships, and the vagaries of human nature. The style is devoid of long descriptions or ornamental questions, but is rich with suggestions and evocative. Bhoja in *Srñcārāprakāsa* notes that a *nidarsana* such as *Panchatantra*, shows what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, not from an ethical but a purely practical point of view.

What is 'social' and what is purely 'individual'? We rarely ask ourselves these questions but once we do, we realise that the meaning we have of these terms is derived by us from our familiarity with a particular body of literature or experience. Thus social experience of the English novel consists of love, marriage, money and sometimes belief. Now love and marriage figure in a big way in the Indian narratives, and the treatment sometimes is far more 'modern'²³ than we would expect in a 19th century novel, for example. On the other hand friendship, peace, enmity and war - the subjects of *Pancatantra* - are also highly 'social' problems. It is not therefore correct to assume/assert that the Indian narrative is either marvellous or ethical alone. In any case ethics is a social construct.

In the same period, 3rd/4th century A.D. we have a Buddhist fictional prose narrative of great length, *Gandavyūha Sūtra*, which is a religious novel treating as it does "a novice's . . . quest for enlightenment". Then of course in Bāna's *Harsacanita* (7th century A.D.) we have a biography of a great king which is structured as a fictional narrative. His last work is the well-known novel *Kadambri*, a narrative in prose of much merit, with numerous exact descriptions and portrayals of places, events and people of the times. The semiotic layers of the narrative extend from the surface characters and textures to the social constructs and the mythology and the philosophy of Indian tradition. This novel inspired much later work; the eighth century Prakrit novel *Lilavati* being the most famous of them all. It is a single continuous narrative in verse. Finally Haribhadra's *Samāraica*, an 8th century Maharashtri novel, may be mentioned. It belongs to the category *Sakalakathā*, the whole or comprehensive story, in which the main narrative dealing with the nine existences of the protagonists which show his progress from being a thoughtless person into a philosopher. This novel is significant for the way it conceptualises and represents an important aspect of the Indian world-view - the evolution of soul in different births - and for its structural ingenuity in having 'emboxed narratives'²⁵ within the main narrative.

This necessarily brief review is very incomplete and also lopsided. As the Indian vernaculars developed, the literature also grew manifold. This brief report has been made to indicate—

1. that prose narratives are very common, in Sanskrit and more so in the Prakrits.
2. that all prose narratives have a social origin and concern
3. that not all prose narratives are marvellous or historical - quite a few are fictions
4. that ordinary men and women and ordinary life, do constitute the themes of many narratives, and
5. above all, ethics and religion are to be understood as major social formations of oriental civilisations.

We cannot fault the Indian tradition for not having treated the typical problems of modern western civilization - broken homes, unwed mothers, neurotic states of mind, inability to relate oneself in the human order. The Indian questions are different - the range, the potentiality and the reality of human nature; the generalized structure of human experience; the concept of an essential ethical order; and the nature of *dharma*, both individual and collective; the conflict between man's *dharma*s in different orders and the necessity of making a choice; the need to do *karma* and the nature of action, inaction and non-action. And these questions are central to *Mahabhārata*, which to my mind is an epic novel, something in the vein of, but much more encyclopedic than, Tolstoy's *War and Peace*²⁶: the wealth of characters, the mass of materials - legendary, didactic, ethical, heroic, aesthetic, philosophical, political and so on - the range of sentiments from the heroic to the elegiac, the whole gamut of human experience, the masterly descriptions, the effortless, the spontaneous use of figures, the beautiful imagery, the conflict of emotions, the possible allegorical readings. Says S.C. Banerji: "The epic has been a veritable fount at which the people of India, and indeed, of all climes and times, have drunk deep in seeking to quench their insatiable thirst for the truth".²⁷ In the classical formulation, *dharma*, *artha* material well-being and right *sukha* (happiness), *nirvāna* and *cikitsa* (restoration of well-being) are the five themes of *Kathā* (narrative).²⁸ The *Mahābhārata* in its epic scale expounds all the five themes. The epic describes itself as *Itihāsa* (1.2.237), *Artha-Sāstra*, *Dharma-Sāstra*, and *Moksa-Sāstra* (1.2.21). Further it is said, that whatever is in the epic may occur elsewhere also, but what is not therein will not be found anywhere else (1.56.33). If we recall the topology of narratives in Figure 1, the *Mahabharata* is a *Mahakathā* (a *mahākāvya* that is a *mahākātha*)

that incorporates in different degrees the different kinds of narratives/narrative modes.

What does the Indian literary theory have to say about narrative and about different kinds of narratives? First, it is useful to remind ourselves that Indian literary theory defines its object of study, defines the genres and sets up sub-topologies within each genre, and also provides categories to analyse each genre and sub-genre. However the long, continuous tradition of literary theory has led to a profusion of terminology, and this creates the interpretive problem of defining each term unambiguously to distinguish it from others. This is the case of *Kathá* (narrative) as well. If we examine the statements about narrative in the Indian poetics from *Bhāmaha* (5th/6th century A.D.) through Bhoja (11th century) to Visvanátha (14th century A.D.), we can construct the following topology of narrative - types: Fig. 2 on page # 93(a)

There are three terms at the first level of opposition - *Kathá* - *ākhyáviká-ākhyána*. The term *kathá* has two meanings in the tradition - a. fictional narrative in general, and b. 'story' which is a narrative of particular scope and size.

Kathá, *Ākhyáviká* and *Ākhyána* together constitute the set *Ākhyána-jāti*, 'class of narratives'. *Ākhyáviká* is (a) a prose tale based on tradition or history, (b) could be biographical or autobiographical in form with the protagonist himself or some protege of his as the narrator.²⁹ *Kathá*, on the other hand, is an imaginary prose or verse tale or a "fictitious working out of a historical fact Though the word *Kathá* as generally used denotes such stories as *Ramayana* also".³⁰ The Sanskrit lexicon *Amara-kosa* defines *Ākhyáviká* as a tale based on recent history and cites '*uplabadhārtha*', (that recounts available/already known events) as its synonym, *katha* is defined as an imaginary composition (*prabandhakalpaná*).³¹ Therefore though Dandin says that as there is no difference between *kathá* and *Ākhyáviká* in terms of narrative, language or chapter division, the two are the same³², we are able to see a clear definable difference between the two in terms of the source and treatment of source of a narrative. Hemachandra, following Bhāmaha's suggestion (*Kāvyalankāra*, 1.29) says that the two also differ in the kind of hero - the hero of *katha* is '*abhijāta*', of noble birth and faultless; *dhīrśānta*, deeply peaceful, is Hemachandra's word. The hero of an *ākhyáviká*, on the other hand, is a man full of deep energy'.³³ *Ākhyána* on the other hand is a legendary story on any of the myths that form a part of the background to the hymns in the Vedas, viz. the stories of Junaśsepa, Mára, of Jábáli Satyakāma, etc. The stories of legendary kinds - Bhagiratha, Raghu etc. are also classed as *Ākhyána*. Even *Ramayana*, being the tale of Rama, in scion of the Raghu race, is referred to as *Ākhyána*. The *Ākhyána* is the most ancient form of story-telling,

and other kinds of stories, *ákhyáviká* and *kathá* may have developed from the ancient *ákhyána*. *Akhyana* thus serves as a more general term for story-telling, while at the same time denoting a specific kind of story. Another opposition seen at the first level is between *Kathá* and *Mahákathá* - a story grand in meaning and a perennial source of pleasure and edification is a *mahákathá*. It is also fairly long and complexly structured. In that sense, *Ramayana* is a *Kathá* that is a *mahákathá* and being in verse may also be called a *mahákavya*, but there is the possibility of a *mahákathá* which is not a *mahákavya*.

The second parameter for sub-classification of narratives is that of scope of and relationship to other narratives. While discussing appropriate literary language, Anandvardhana says that the appropriateness is also determined by the kind of composition, *prabandha-bheda*, and then goes on to mention, among others, the three kinds of *kathá* - *parikathá*, *khanda-kathá*, *sakalakathá*.³⁴

Parikathá is a series of anecdotes illustrative of one theme, generally related to one of the four goals of life - righteousness, wealth and power, desires and wishes, and salvation or liberation - like a pearl garland strung on a string. *Sakalakathá*, on the other hand is a much larger work - it has a series of anecdotes/stories illustrative of all the four goals of life. *Upkathá* is a sub-story: a story that is enclosed in the main narrative. *Kathanika* is used as a synonym. *Upakhyana* is also sub-narrative within an *Akhyana*. *Khanda-katha* is an interesting category. It is a story based on a small part - an episode or character - of a larger work. Anandvardhana/Abhinavagupta say that it is a *Prákr̥t* work. In the case of almost all categories of literary compositions, the theorists have something to say about the language of such compositions - Sanskrit, *Prákr̥t* or mixed. Evidently, from early days - from the time of Magadha, 5th C.B.C. - literary compositions in languages other than Sanskrit - the original literary language - had come into being. The use of *Prákr̥t*ss represented an intellectual revolt against the high tradition. Thus this narrative category - *Khanda Kathá* - represents re-writing of original stories and such re-writing involves, no doubt, re-interpretation. Even in the last two centuries, several *khanda-kathás* have been composed in the 'vernaculars', particularly Marathi, Kannada and Bengali, about certain characters and episodes from *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* - Sita, Kumbhakarna, Vibhisana, Karna, Draupadi, Eklavya, Krishna, Abhimanyu; the killing of Bali, the *cakra-vyuha*, the dice-scene, etc.

Brhatkathá is a *kathá* - if we follow Dandin and Bhámáha - but the text of that name, Gunadhyá's *Brhatkathá* proved so influential, that the text's poetics has been promoted into the poetics of sub-genre by Bhoja - it is well-structured with several divisions, has striking effect (*adbhutártha*) including

the marvellous (as in science fiction in our times); has a huge theme or subject (*mahávisaya*) and is composed in a 'vernacular' language (which means the ordinary language of daily speech making it accessible to a large public). It is evidently a trendsetter.

The next parameter, third, is the nature of subject/interest. A story that has a definite moral purpose is *nidarsana*. It may take the form of a fable, allegory or it may be a straightforward narrative. A humorous prose tale that makes fun of some failure or failing of otherwise reverential subjects - the priest, the sanyasins, the government official - is *manthulli*. They give room for irony, sarcasm and satire. A mystery story that begins with some inexplicable fact which is gradually unravelled is *Manikulya*.

Next, there is a broad division of all narratives on the basis of their organisation: there are some loosely strung compositions - *anibaddha* - and there are narratives likely *Panca-tantra*, or *Mahabharata* which are highly structured. On the basis of available work, the highly structured narrative has been divided by theorists into three classes - (a) *Parva-bandha*: the major division of the *Mahabharata* is *parva* - a node or point where two things (themes) come together; (b) *sarga-bandha*, the well-known divisions of long poems. *Sarga* means a section-division that does not impede the flow of the narrative; (c) *kánda-bandha*, as in *Ramayana*. Each chapter has a name, like *parvas* in *Mahabharata*, and is titled after a stage in life or some place. (In the *Mahabharata*, the *parvas* are titled after the theme of the events narrated - war, peace, etc.) There are other types of divisions also - *lambha*, *ucchavasa*. How these organising divisions differ from each other, merits on independent study.

Finally there is a broad classification into a story (a) created by the writer, *utpadya*, or (b) adapted from available sources - *anutpadya*. In the process of definition of these categories, to separate one from the other, the theorists bring in the following criteria -

1. Language of composition : Sanskrit, Prakrit or mixed.
2. Medium : Prose, verse or mixed.
3. Scope : *mahat* (major) or *laghu* (minor) work - a major work has narratives pertaining to all the ends of life, and affords the whole range of psychical experience (*Rasa*).
4. Narrator : who is the narrator? The protagonist himself or some protégé of his or somebody else (including the author).
5. Type of protagonist : Is a *sthita* - *prajná*; or stable, liberated disposition (as Rama) or a man of energy and action (as Harsa).

6. Relation to ends of life (*purusártha*): does the work relate to only one of the four ends of life, or all the four?
7. Subject of the story : The events - new and imagined by the writer or adapted from available sources.
8. Characters : gods, legendary heroes, great kings, ordinary men and women or at another level of literary representation, animals.
9. Organisation : into *parva*, *sarga*, *kānda*, *lambha* or *ucchavāsa*.

It is clear that like everything else in the Indian literary theory, the analysis of narrative is a descriptive analysis based on available body of work. The richness and precision of categories and sub-categories suggest the pre-existence of a massive body of literature. This 'literature' we know was mainly in the form of oral compositions, was communicated to audiences orally and transmitted from one generation to another orally. As such, we cannot talk of a reader - though reading or study/meditation function is not excluded-but only of a participant who imbibed the aural-visual experience that is Indian literature. Also this literature was designed for mass-participation and was experienced by people in the mass at public functions and festivals, - therefore, its themes and its concerns are general enough to interest the whole cultural community. Hence the linkage of narratives to the four ends of life enjoined in the Indian Dharma-Sastras. And, it is a story that interests and engaged the people more than anything else - therefore Indian Kavya literature, when it is Sravya (aural) is mainly, almost wholly narrative - Katha. For a non-narrative presentation and analysis of all the ideas evoked by the narratives, the Indian people chose to go to the vast body of *Smṛti* - literature, the *sāstras*

Notes and References

1. Jeremy Hawthorn (ed.). 1988. *Narrative*. London : Edwin Arnold, p. XIII. Further, the category of 'narrative fiction' includes "novel, short-story or narrative poem". Shlomith Rimmon - Kenan, *Narrative Fiction, Contemporary Poetics*. London, New York: Methuen.
2. Ibid.
3. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones, 1989, 'Introduction : Why Narrative?' in *Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology*. Grand Rapids Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans, P.I.
4. Ibid., P. 2.
5. It is pertinent in this context to note that the novel developed in England at the time when the historical narrative gained a new prestige and authoritativeness.
6. *Srngāra-Prakāsa*, Ch. XI.
7. A. K. Warder, 1974, *Indian Kavya Literature*, vol. 2, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. (BLBD), p. 110.
8. Cf., for example, Bána's rewriting of *Mahābhārata* themes and the popular *Ramayana* rewriting of Tula's *Rama Charita Manas* (such as Radhey Shyam's *Ramayana* in U.P.).

9. Cf. 'The Narrative Quality of Experience' in Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones 1989, p. 84.
10. Philip Stevick (ed.). 1967. *The Theory of the Novel*. New York: The Free Press, p. 2.
11. Ibid., PP. 3-10.
12. Ibid., PP. 9-10.
13. Ibid., P. 1.
14. Meenakshi Mukherji. 1985. *Realism and Reality : The Novel and Society in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press. PP. 7-9.
15. A. K. Warder. *Indian Kāvya Literature*. Vols. 2-4, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass.
16. Ibid., vol. 2. p. 52.
17. Ibid., vol. 2. p. 116.
18. Ibid., p. 116.
19. Ibid., p. 127.
20. Ibid., p. 128.
21. A. K. Warder, *Indian Kāvya Literature*, vol. 3, p. 49.
22. The apologue or fable with an underlying moral comes natural to the oriental mind. "Without a parable spake He not unto them" - New Testament. The continuity of Indian civilisation explains the continuing preference for this mode in the wider oral. folk tradition.
23. For example, in the eighth century Jaina novel *Yasodharacarita*, Yasodhara's wife Amrtāmati has an affair with a hunchback which she later defends by appealing to precedents among gods and in the dominant tradition for adultery. The novel is a critique of the dominant social philosophy as coded in the dharma-sāstras.
24. See A. K. Warder. *Indian Kāvya Literature*. vol. 3, p. 54.
25. See A. K. Warder, *Indian Kāvya Literature*, vol. 4, p. 521.
26. That it is a verse composition is of no consequence.
27. S. C. Banerji. 1973, 1978. 'The Great Epics' in Suniti Kumar Chatterji (ed.). *The Cultural Heritage of India*, vol. V. Calcutta: The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture. p. 59.
28. Prof. Warder quotes the Sāmgraha text (XXI. 13 ff) of *Brhatkathā* to this effect. Cf. Warder, *Indian Kāvya Literature*, vol. 2. p. 120.
29. See Bhamaha, *Kāvyalankāra*, P.V. Naganatha Sastry (tr.). 1927. Tanjore : The Wallace Printinc House. Parichhada 1. verse 25-27.
30. V. Raghavan, 1963 *Bhoja's Srngāra Prakās* Delhi. Motilal Banasidass p 615.
31. Amarsinha, *Amarakosa*, 1.6.5, and 1.6.6. respectively.
32. Dandin, *Kāvya-Darsa* 1.28. Dandin in this verse talks of 'Ākhyāna-Jāti. 'the whole class of narratives' which may have different kinds of formal structures.
33. See V. Raghavan. op. cit., p. 619.
34. *Dhvanyāloka*. III.7 with *Locana* commentary.
35. See Rudrata, *Kāvyāṅkārā*.

Tagore on Comparative Music Aesthetics : Indian and Western

SITANSU RAY

Introduction :

Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), a superb composer and critic too in the realm of music¹, had tremendous aesthetic reflections on the art of music which may be discussed in the perspective of musical aesthetics. From those reflections we can sum up his parallel and comparative observation and appreciation of Indian and Western music.

Since his boyhood Tagore had been acquiring a considerable degree of knowledge of both Indian and Western music in the cultural environment of his family. In course of time he got more and more familiar with music of various countries of the East and the West. His familiarity was not just a passive act of listening. By virtue of his creative consciousness he got into the depth of the phenomena of music and he reacted to them in his own unique style without caring much for traditional view-points of professionals. As he innovated a newer style in Bengal's music culture, so also his thoughts on music may be discussed to unfold newer dimensions in the world of comparative music aesthetics. His aesthetic reflections are far more than a music-critic's review. Yet, these are perhaps quite unknown in the Western hemisphere and not even widely known in India too. The paper is an attempt to unfold Tagore's views on comparative music-aesthetics with special reference to the North Indian music of the East and the European Music of the West.

Melody and Harmony :

The first and foremost objective distinction between Indian and Western classical music lies in the fact that while the *ragas and raginis* (the classical melodies) are the essence of Indian classical music, the score and execution of Western classical music are manifested in its harmony. The principle of melody is succession of notes, while that of harmony is concordance of two, three or several notes at a time. These very facts led Tagore react in a peculiar way upto his individual fashion. In the context of attending and experiencing the Handel festival held in the-then Crystal Palace in London in 1912, Tagore wrote the essay entitled *Sangit* (Music)², in which (as well as in various other writings) we can find out his comparative aesthetic evaluation of the Western and Indian musical cultures. He observed that while Europe is casting its glance at the varieties, India is concentrating on "one". He was amazed to see four thousand

participants playing and singing in the Handel festival, the organization and execution of which requires tremendous power. The execution of an Indian *raga or ragini*, on the other hand, is the performance of mainly one person, whose aim is to reveal gradually the musical mood associated with that *raga or ragini* sung or played. All movements, as it were, emerge from the predominant tonic drone of the *tanpura* and repose at it again. Thus, it seems that Indian classical music is, as it were, music of "one". Of course, that "one" is not secluded, but all-pervading, that is akin to the infinite.

One may think that these are only metaphorical utterings which are nothing but the outcome of the poetic imagination of Tagore. But deeper aesthetic truths are very often inherent in metaphors. Let us take note of similar comparative evaluations forwarded by some other scholars. A. H. Fox Strangways, the celebrated author of *The Music of Hindostan* made such a comparable evaluation of the Western and Indian musical systems :

"The one seems to say- Life is puzzling, its claims are many, its enthusiasms hardly come by; but we will hammer out a solution not by turning away from ugliness but by compelling it to serve the ends of beauty. The other Life is simple, and beauty close at hand at every moment whenever we look or listen or whenever we go; the mistake is in ourselves if we do not train our eyes and ears and hearts to find it."³

".....in India the singer's tones can still carry all the artistry which his mind can conceive, and while in England, especially concerted music has always been highly prized, and rightly so, for its social elements....."⁴

On the whole, both Tagore's and Strangway's reflections point to the multitudinous character of Western music and the melodiousness of Indian melodies. Tagore also analogized the solo performance of an Indian melody with the infinite oneness still midnight and the multitudinous character of Western music with the din and bustle of active day time⁵.

Tanpura for the Tonic Drone

Regarding the tonic drone of the *tanpura*, Ananda K. Coomareswamy said :

"We have here the Sound of the *tanpura* which is heard before the song, during the song, and continues after it: that is the timeless Absolute, which is as it was in the beginning, is now and ever shall be. On the other hand there is the song itself which is the variety of Nature, emerging from its source and returning at the close of its cycle."⁶

Experimentations of Harmony in Indian Music :

During the British rule in India some musicians tried to introduce harmony in Indian music. All the activities remained in the experimental stage and the results did not show any promise of advancement. That is why Arnold Baker commented in the chapter, assigned to him, in the **New Oxford History of Music**—

"Mistaken attempts to foist the finished western system of harmony on to the perfect model system of Indian monophony have been made for the last hundred years, not only by missionaries but also by enthusiastic Indian admirers of European culture. In this process the delicate structure of Indian music is crushed out of existence".⁷

Fortunately, experimentations of harmony have been limited to semi-classical and light compositions, orchestrations and chants. The delicacies of classical music remains unaffected.

The *Sahnei* and the Band Party :

Both the *Sehnei* (North Indian classical instrument played by blowing) and the band party in western style are very much popular in India during a marriage ceremony. It seemed to Tagore that the music of band party expresses lavish grandeur of a gathering engaged in merriment and that of the *Sahnai* expresses the monistic calmness full of pathos or the pangs of the dualistic hearts for re-union. He explained further that human marriage is nothing but an earthly paradigm of that dualism, i.e., the original 'He' (*purusha*) and the original 'She' (*prakriti*), pangfully urging for re-union into the monistic whole, wherefrom they had been separated.⁸

Cosmic Emotions and Social Enjoyments :

Off and on Tagore felt that Indian *ragas* and *raginis* are related to cosmic emotions and never associated with the social enjoyment of human life. A *raga* or a *ragini* expresses the solitude and vastness surrounding us from all sides. To quote a little from Tagore -

"It is never its function to provide fuel for the flame of our gaiety, but to temper it and add to it a quality of depth and detachment. The truth of this becomes evident when one considers that *Sahana* is the *ragini* especially used for the occasion of wedding festivals. It is not all gay or frolicsome, but almost sad in its solemnity".⁹

Gildings and fixed intervals :

That sort of ethos emerges from the very fact that very often the notes of Indian classical music, especially during the *alapa* (tonal elaboration and improvisation), are linked together with the preceding and following notes with different *relationships* of needs (glidings) and *shrutis* (micro-tones). That is why the key-board instruments used in Western music are generally unsuitable for Indian classical music. The notes or intervals in Western music are fixed and straight in their own tempered positions and clearly separated from one another during their application.

Quite in early youth, Tagore had made a comparative evaluation in this way -

Pathos and Jubilation :

"There is no jubilant tune in our *ragas* and *raginis*. The very mood of our music is but gradual rise and gradual fall. There is no sudden ups and downs. Tunes for jubilant outburst require abruptness. Such an utmost outburst can be found in English tunes but hardly in our *raginis*. But there is no dearth of painful tunes in the music of our country. Each *ragini* can be expressive of pathos,

"... very often in course of composing a jovial song we set it to fast tempo irrespective of the tonal mood, as fast tempo is a part of jovial mood."¹⁰ (translated)

Tagore had exploited this principle in his music-drama *Valmiki-Pratibha* (The talent of Valmiki). He had incorporated a few western tunes in it and even in the Indian tunes also he had employed free rhythm for the sake of musical dialogues in the drama. However, this music-drama was a real innovation in the history of music of Bengal.

Free variations and fixed scores :

In the course of comparative music-aesthetics, the next important point of distinction between Indian and Western classical music as revealed through Tagore's reflections lies in this characteristic phenomena that whatever is performed in Western classical music is a pre-planned finished composition, already determined and scored by the composery whereas in Indian classical music each and every moment is intuitively ever-creative, full of extempore variations and improvisations over a little set of compositions. That is why, there are notations in front of the Western musicians; an Indian artiste, on the other hand, sings or plays by virtue of his or her creative training, rich memory, fertile imagination and its artistic application throughout the performance without the help of a pre-fixed notation.

Except a little composition, variations of melody flourish, ornamentations and rhythmic intricacies cannot be pre-determined. They emerge a new time and again and yet maintain the pathways of the respective raga or ragini being sung or played and the basic infra-structure of the rhythm to which the composition is set.

Freedom of Melody and Freedom of Time :

The next point, Tagore noticed, is that, in spite of melodic freedom, the beat-structure and tempo are rigidly fixed in Indian music. During a course of discussion with Albert Einstein, Tagore told him -

"In European music you have a comparative liberty about time, but not about melody. But in India we have freedom of melody with no freedom of time".¹¹

The rhythmic tempo of Western music is flexible. It rises and falls according to the musical moods to be expressed.

The Problem of Representation :

Another important point of comparison between Indian and Western music is associated with the age-old problem of representation. During his first visit to London at the age of seventeen Tagore had heard the singing of Madam Nilsson¹², the-then songstress of great reputation. She sang nature-songs with imitation of birds' cries, a kind of mimicry as it were. Tagore could recollect that experience in later days. During a close conversation with Romain Rolland at Villeneuve in France in June 1926 he referred to that phenomena and differentiated it with Indian music in this way -

"Music should capture the delight of birds' songs, giving human form to the joy with which a bird sings. But it would not try to be a representation of such songs. Take the Indian rain songs. They do not try to imitate the sound of falling rain drops. They rekindle the joy of rain-festivals, and convey something of the feeling associated with the rainy season".¹³

The Nature of Emotional Aspects :

Regarding the role of emotion in music Tagore asked Rolland -

"I want to ask you a question. The purpose of art is not to give expression to emotion but to use it for the creation of significant form. . . . Emotion only supplies the occasion which makes it possible to bring forth the creative act. . . . In European music, I find, however, that an attempt is sometimes made to give expression

to particular emotions. Is this desirable? Should not music also use emotion as material only, and not as an end in itself?" ¹⁴

Rolland replied -

"A great musician must always use emotion as substance out of which beautiful forms are created. But in Europe musicians have had such an abundance of good material that they tended to over-emphasize the emotional aspects. A great musician must have poise, for without it his work perishes" ¹⁵

No final judgment is possible on the role of emotional representation in the art of music whether in India or in the west. The Wagner-Hanslick confrontation is a well-known episode, out of which came out Hanslick's *The Beautiful in Music* ¹⁶, a revolutionary work and landmark in the history of musical aesthetics. No emotional influx, but only the dynamic property of emotion is admitted in music by Hanslick ¹⁷. Susanne K. Langer argued to prove Music as a tonal analogue of emotive life ¹⁸. Deryck Cook's contention was - "Music is, in fact, 'extra-musical' in the sense that poetry is 'extra-verbal'" ¹⁹. Disputes are still going on regarding representational power of music and the nature of emotion and meaning in music.

In India too, differences of opinion have been persisting from Bharata's time to the present day. Bharata ascribed different sentiments to different notes ²⁰. Pandit Vishnu Narayan Bhatkhande dismissed such associations. To him musical enchantment must lead to trance-like absorption (*nāda-moha*) ²¹. So, there must not be any question of representation of worldly emotion.

Tagore on a few Ragas and Raginis :

Tagore reinterpreted the concept of *raga* as colorfulness associated with passion. When metaphorically applied to human mind, it signifies illumination and colouration, of course, with the help of melodic tones. Yet, it produces some sort of impersonal sentiment, cosmic in nature, or even unworldly. Tagore pronounced :

"*Bhairon* (a melody of the day-break) is, as it were, the first awakening of the morning sky; *Paraj* (a melody of the last quarter of night) is, as it were, overwhelmed drowsiness of the weary late night; *Kanara* (a melody of the midnight) is, as it were, the nocturnal confusion of path towards assignation in the dark dead night, *Bhairabi* (a morning ragini) is, as it were, never-ending pangs of estrangement of the solitary infinite; *Multan* (a melody of the last quarter of the daytime) is, as it were, the

fatigued breathing of the sultry day-ending: *purabi* (a ragini of the sun-set time) is, as it were, the shedding of tears, by a bereaved widow in her lonely abode just at the advent of night"²² (translated).

Above Absolutism and Referentialism :

The phrase "as it were" has a very important significance. It not only refers to metaphor but also suggests some subtle linkage between the worldly and unworldly, the personal and the impersonal, the human and the cosmic, the tangibility and the abstraction. That is the ethereal realm of the art of music. At least, Tagore's realization of the *ragas and raginis* is suggestive of that no-man's land, or we may call it every man's land, in between the strictest absolutism and the staunch referentialism, the two poles of modern musical aesthetics.

Composers' Status and their compositions :

Most of *ragas and raginis* are age-old and traditional. In comparison to Western music Tagore observed that Indian classical music, especially the Hindusthani system does not glorify the composer, but goes in the name of the particular *raga or ragini* being performed, whereas each and every composition in Western classical music is individualistic in status and goes in the name of the composer²³. Whereas the revelation of a *raga or ragini* is dependent upon the individual artistry of the performer, the European classical music is "epic in character" and "Gothic in its structure"²⁴ according to Tagore's appreciation.

Relationship between words and music in song : The aesthetics of the song-form of music must be different from the art of pure music. Aestheticians differ regarding the relative importance of words in song. Hanslick thought that song is a bit lower graded art than pure music. In his opinion, musical beauty is of a divine²⁵ nature in the sense that it has little connection with worldly experience, while poetry, even when transcendental, deals with ideas emanating from word-meanings. So, he propounded that union of poetry and music is a sort of "morganatic union"²⁶.

Susanne K. Langer's observations on this point is very noteworthy. She did not devalue song as Hanslick did, nor did she lay over-emphasis on the literary appeal of a song. She felt that words of a song tend to give up their literary status and turn into purely musical elements. A music-minded person may not always be aware of the meaning of the words of a song while singing or listening to it. But quality of the tune is a must in the art of composing or singing a song in order to satisfy the listener. Therein lies the musicality of a song. In Langer's own words -

"When words and music come together in song, music swallows words; not only mere words and literal sentences, but even literary word-structures, poetry. Song is not a compromise between poetry and music, though the text taken by itself be a great poem; song is music".²⁷

Helmholtz, while investigating on the sensations of tone, assumed that pure music, though an independent art now, has evolved from song. Historically all music has been developed from song. Instrumental accompaniments resembled human voice. Afterwards, absolute music was attained by instruments having compounded tones²⁸. Moreover he observed -

"The union of music to words is most important, because words can represent the cause of the frame of mind, the object to which it refers, and the feeling which lies at its root, while music expresses the kind of mental transition which is due to the feeling."²⁹

According to Herbert Spencer's speculation³⁰, *What* man uttered turned into words and *how* man produced his voice (the change of pitch), while uttering, was the original germ of musical notes.

Rabindranath Tagore, in his early life, subscribed to and elaborated³¹ Spencer's speculation. But, in course of time, his aesthetic reflections on words and tunes evolved otherwise. Though he was in favour of aesthetic fusion of words and tunes in good songs as his own songs are, he differentiated the respective inherent principles of words and tunes in the following manner—

"Tune itself is a sort of dynamism. It vibrates in itself. Words have to plead for semantics. Such is not the case with tune, which expresses nothing but itself. Some particular notes, combining with some others, produce a tonal *ensemble*. Rhythm adds dynamism to it. The acceleration infused in our heart by this tonal dynamism is pure passion, without any other referential connection. Generally we are stimulated with pleasure and pain in connection with some particular events in our world. But when musical tune moves our consciousness, it does so directly. So, the passion it generates is altogether unaccountable"³² (translated)

If this be the case, it is very difficult to find out any satisfactory principle of union between word and tune. Yet, apart from the specialized branches of pure poetry devoid of music and pure music devoid of poetry, the song-form of music synthesizing the two has been successfully evolving both in the East and in the West.

Tagore metaphorized this union in various ways. Sometimes he called the word and the tune as twin brothers, sometimes two sister arts, sometimes brother and sister, and very often, husband and wife. From time to time, poetry is the husband, tune its wife, and sometimes just the reverse. Another metaphor is also found where Tagore called word and tune as two co-wives, one very often tending to suppress and dominate over the other. The most ideal metaphor, Tagore used, is that of *Ardhanarishwar*³³, i.e., the deity, whose one half is feminine and the other masculine. Yet, regarding their relative supremacy of one over other, Tagore's extreme opinion runs thus :

"Man has been singing songs assimilating words and music. There has not been any controversy whether music is greater or words are. If any debate is opened at all, I would say that in this case music itself is the husband who has uplifted language to its own clan".³⁴

Another sort of metaphor is found when Tagore quoted Gluck—

"My idea was that the relation of music to poetry was much the same as that of harmonious colouring and well-disposed light and shade to an accurate drawing, which animates the figures without altering their outlines."³⁵

Yet, drawing and painting are static. Poetry and music on the other hand are dynamic arts, always in motion along with the motion of human heart creating and enjoying them. Gluck's pictorial analogy cannot catch that motion.

More thorough discussion is there in G. E. Lessing's *Laocoon*. In some portion of the appended notes of *Laocoon*, Lessing wrote that song should not be considered the union of the two arts (i.e., poetry and music), but, rather, one and the same art³⁶

Matthew Arnold, in his poem "Epilogue to Lessing's *Laocoon*"³⁷, ascribed supremacy of poetry over painting and music, since poetry incorporates elements of both painting (imagery) and music (i.e. tune and rhythm of recitation), and it can depict the continuous stream of life. Music, as he thought, expresses a single feeling.

Tagore, in his early youth, read the poem critically, explained his observations over it and put forth his views that music can, in course of its gradual advancement, express the dynamism of life apart from choosing a single lyrical feeling. His hypothesis, foretold in his essay "*Sangit O Kabita*" (Music and Poetry)³⁸, got gradually proved by virtue of his creativity in variety of his songs, music-dramas and dance-dramas, where words and tunes got united in the perspective of emotive human life. It is needless to say that variety of rhythmic

structures along with suitable tempo add to the ups and downs of those sonorous expressions.

Regarding Western examples, Tagore referred to Wagner's operas in contrast to Beethoven's symphonic pure music³⁹

Regionality versus universality of the Art of Music :

One problem of comparative music-aesthetics, we must take into account, is concerned with the aspects of regional characteristics of a particular form and style of music, whether or not giving way to universal values. Some say that music is a typically culture-bound art. Some other, on the other hand, claim that music is a universal art. Forms and styles of the art of music must and should differ in the East and in the West, nay, in every region in the same culture. After all, music is a performing art taking varieties of evolving forms and styles throughout the world. Yet, some distinguished personalities opine that music is a universal thing. Some such personalities are Romain Rolland, H. G. Wells and none the less Rabindranath Tagore. Tagore told Rolland—

"What is pleasant to the European ear must have something in it which is universal. Indian music also must have an appeal to foreigners who have the necessary training"—⁴⁰

In a lively discussion with Tagore, Wells pronounced—

"Music is of all things in the world the most international."⁴¹

Tagore explained to him -

"Certain forms of tunes and melodies which move us profoundly seem to baffle Western listeners; yet, as you say, perhaps closer acquaintance with them may gradually lead to their appreciation in the West".⁴²

Despite differences of forms and styles there must be some subtle unity of spirit in all systems of music throughout the world. To get into that internal spirit, one must first get acquainted with forms and styles. Out of the "relative value", "absolute value" will be determined and established only in course of time⁴³. Familiarity and cultural exchange can have the way to real appreciation. A westerner, listening to a *kheyal* or *dhrupad*, for example, for the first time may not make any sense out of the configuration of varying sonic patterns. Gradual familiarity clears away the bar. In the long run, culture-bound musical forms may seem to possess universal appeal. Without sacrificing unique cultural identity, every piece of good music may win the test of universal standard, the parameter of which will emerge only through more and more healthy cultural exchange.

Notes and References

1. Please see Rabindranath Tagore's *Gitabitan* (Collection of songs in three volumes including his music-dramas *Valmiki- Pratibha*, *Kalmrigaya* and *Mayar Khela*, and dance-dramas *Chitrangada*, *Chandalika* and *Shyama*), *Swarabitan* (notations in sixty-two volumes) and *Sangit-Chinta* (thoughts on Music: a posthumous anthology of his lectures, essays, diaries, letters, conversations and discussions on the art of music) - all published by the Visva-Bharati publishing Department.
2. Rabindranath Tagore, "*Sangit*" (music). *Sangit-Chinta*. Visva- Bharati, 1392 B.S., pp. 31-43.
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3. A. H. Fox Strangways. *The Music of Hindostan*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1914, Ch. XII, p. 314.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
5. Rabindranath Tagore, *Chhinnapatravali* (letters to his niece Indira Dēbi), letter dated Silaidaha 10th August 1894. compiled and reprinted in *Sangit-Chinta*. pp. 189-190.
6. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *The Dance of Shiva*, The Noonday Press, New York, 1954, pp. 95-96.
7. Arnold Bake, "The Music of India", *New Oxford History of Music*, Oxford University Press, London, (1957), reprint 1960, vol. I, p. 225.
8. Rabindranath Tagore, "*Sangit*", *Sangit-Chinta*, op. cit., pp. 33-34, "*Sangiter Mukti*" (emancipation of music). *Sangit-Chinta*, pp. 48-49, *Dharma* (Religion). *Rabindra-Rachanavali* (Tagore Works) Volume 12, Tagore birthday centenary edition, Govt. of West Bengal, 1961, p. 10 and in many other portions in Tagore's works.
9. Rabindranath Tagore, "Foreword" to *Thirty Songs from the Punjab and Kashmir*, written by Ratan Devi and A. K. Coomaraswamy. Old Bourne Press, London, 1913, *Sangit-Chinta*, op. cit., p. 327.
Ratan Devi was an European musician, married to the great art- critic Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. She learnt Indian music from a traditional Court musician of Kapurthala Estate. Tagore listened to her singing in London in 1912. She sang superbly with a *tanpura*. The "Foreword", written by Tagore, to their book, is an excellent aesthetic evaluation of her singing.
10. Rabindranath Tagore, "*Sangit O Bhav*" (Music and Feeling). *Sangit-Chinta*, p. 270.
The essay was read with singing by Tagore in the Medical College Hall, Calcutta under the auspices of the-then Bethune Society on April 19, 1881.
11. "Tagore and Einstein", *Sangit-Chinta*, op. cit., p. 345. Originally, the conversation was published in *Asia* (the-then American journal) in March 1913 issue.
12. Christine Nilsson (1843-1922), Swedish prima donna. See "Tagore and Rolland". *Sangit-Chinta*, op. cit., p. 337-338
13. *Ibid.*, p. 338.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 334.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 334.
16. Eduard Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music (Vom Musikalisch Schönen)* 1954) tr. Gustav Cohen, ed. Morris Weitz, The Liberal Arts Press, U.S.A., 1957.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
18. Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953, Ch. 3, p. 27.
19. Deryck Cook, *The Language of Music*, Oxford, 1962, p. 33.
20. Merriment and love were ascribed to the fourth and fifth notes; heroism, rage and astonishment to the first and second notes; the third note was associated with pathos and the sixth one with awkwardness and terror. See Bharata's *Natyashastra*, ch. 29, verses 16A and 16B. Bharat utilized music in theatrical arts. Principles of pure music must have been different.
21. Pandit Vishnu Narayan Bhatkhande, *Hindusthani Sangit- Peddhati*, part 6, *Sangbat* 2011, pp. 34-37.
22. "*Sangiter Mukti*" (The imancipation of music), *Sangit-Chinta*, op.cit., p. 48.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
24. "Tagore and Einstein". *Sangit-Chinta*, *op. cit.*, p. 346.
25. "A vital spark of the divine art than the beautiful of any other art". Eduard Hanslick, *The Beautiful in Music*, *op. cit.*, ch. VII. p. 127.
26. *Ibid.*, Ch. II. p. 45-46.
27. Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1953, Ch. 10, p. 152.
18. Hermann L.F. Helmholtz, *On the Sensations of Tone*, Dover Publications, New York, 1954, Ch. XIX, p. 363.
29. *Ibid.*, Ch. XIV, p. 251.
30. Herbert Spencer, "The Origin and Function of Music", *Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative*. Williams and Norgate. London. 1868, pp. 210-238.
31. *Sangit-Chinta*, *op. cit.*, pp. 274-282.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
34. *Ibid.*, "Words and Music", p. 83-84.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
36. G. K. Lessing, *Laocoon*, translated by Robert Phillimore. George Routledge & Sons, London (date not mentioned). "Appendix", p. 317.
37. Matthew Arnold, "Epilogue to Lessing's *Laocoon*". *Political Work* Oxford University Press, London, 1969, edition, pp. 221- 227.
38. Rabindranath Tagore, "*Sangit O Kabita*". *Sangit-Chinta*, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.
39. Rabindranath Tagore, "*Katha O Sur*" (Words and Music). *Sangit-Chinta*, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.
40. "Tagore and Rolland". *Sangit-Chinta*, *op. cit.*, p. 340.
41. "Tagore and H. G. Wells" (Geneva, June 1930), *Sangit-Chinta*, *op. cit.*, p. 348.
The conversation was originally published in Asia. March 1931 issue (U.S.A.)
42. *Ibid.*, p. 348.
43. For detailed discussion, see *Sangit-Chinta*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-104.

The Contemporary Relevance of Indian Aesthetics : Some Reflections

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Although there has been a gradual awakening of interest in Indian aesthetics¹ in academic circles², the doubts still persist (even amongst its advocates) about its relevance for the present-day scholar or literary artist. And they are not totally unfounded. Indian aesthetics, however rich, is a thing of the past. It was the product of a culture or *weltanschauung* which has almost disappeared or radically changed. Our literatures in modern Indian languages are not only basically different in character but also shaped and conditioned by western influences. How can Indian aesthetics, which is grounded in a 'dead' literature, help us in appreciating the living literatures which are predominantly western in temper and technique ?

The neo-champions of Indian aesthetics are trying to counter this argument with their efforts to demonstrate the validity and viability of the ancient literary theories. They intend to prove that the theories expounded by Indian aestheticians are not only better suited to the appreciation of Indian literature but are also universally valid, and can profitably be applied to western literature, perhaps the national seminar on "Indian and Western Poetics at Work" organised by the Sahitya Akademi at Dhvanyaloka, Mysore in 1991 was prompted by such considerations. The emphasis was on applying Indian literary theories to modern literary texts, both Indian and Western. There were several papers by distinguished scholars but none, however, was able to establish the efficacy of Indian literary theories convincingly.³

Such an exercise can hardly succeed, for it is based on false premises. It presupposes the existence of a stable universe which is governed by fixed and universal laws. Once these laws are discovered, they can always be applied without any misgivings. And since they have already been discovered by our ancient thinkers and writers, we have to do nothing but study and follow them. This is exactly the view which the Augustan critics like Pope⁴ propagated with great force but which has since been discredited. Science has proved that there is nothing permanent or steadfast in this universe which itself is in a state of constant flux. Literature is no exception to this process of change and no theory, however catholic, can hope to meet the new challenges without constantly updating itself.

Perhaps the very criterion of testing the relevance of an ancient theory by applying it to modern situations is not proper. Its relevance lies not in its adequacy but in its being part of our tradition. In our tradition we have our roots, and we cannot grow unless we relate to them. They provide the necessary nourishment. But it will be foolish to identify ourselves with our roots and refuse to grow up. The roots are indispensable, but not enough. We need also light and air for our growth. In fact, it is the constant interaction between the internal and external forces which shapes our development.

It is necessary to relate to our tradition because it gives us our identity and provides the *terra firma* on which we can build our home. Unrelated, we remain parasites. The relationship, however, does not entail any restriction on our freedom. Tradition is always open to experiment and innovation. In fact, they are essential for its survival. When it becomes static, it dies. The history of Indian aesthetics itself offers the best evidence of this fact. For more than two thousand years, from Bharata to Panditaraja Jagannatha, it had a glorious and unbroken tradition which was marked by an independent spirit of inquiry. But afterwards this spirit of inquiry declined and stagnation set in. Gradually the tradition came to an end.

There is no way of reviving that tradition now, but by relating to it we can revitalize our critical inquiry. Indian aesthetics, if approached in the right spirit, can help us in developing a genuine Indian literary criticism. So long the literary criticism in this country has been almost entirely dependent on western models or guided by them.⁵ But what has it gained? of thousands of critical works in English by Indian scholars, not more than a dozen or so figure in the latest bibliographical guide published by Penguin Books, *A Guide for Readers* (1984). To some extent, this may be due to the prejudice of English scholars or their un-willingness to accord recognition to their Indian counterparts, but it can hardly be denied that this may be also due to lack of an authentic voice on the part of our scholars. Since they were cut off from their tradition, they could scarcely develop their own thinking. The tradition gives strength to stand on one's own feet. Only a scholar who is rooted in his tradition can meet a scholar of another tradition with authority and assurance. One without a tradition has no roots to hold on; he or she is easily swayed or carried away. Tradition gives us not only strength but also a distinctive authentic voice. And it makes a world of difference when we speak in our true voice. *A History of English Literature* by Legouis and Cazamian offers perhaps the best example of the impact that a genuine voice does make. Though written by French scholars, it succeeded in winning a distinctive place amongst the histories of English literature simply

because it reflected the distinctive genius of a people. There is no reason why an Indian scholar, who writes about English literature, should fail to win recognition. The only condition is that he must write as an Indian. Sri Aurobindo's *The Future Poetry* holds a promise.

And what Sri Aurobindo himself did is a lesson for every Indian scholar in English. He was almost a foreigner when he returned to his country, but he soon realized the need of relating to his roots and studied Sanskrit language and literature. It was this study which shaped his vision and lent a striking originality to his work. His western scholarship, however vast, could hardly make him so distinguished. For real growth is possible only when one is related to one's roots.

Indian aesthetics can provide roots to Indian scholars and help them grow. Its insights will lead them to further exploration and discovery. And once they are firmly rooted, they will be in a position to respond to and interact with other currents of thought authentically and fruitfully. It is only at this stage that a cross-fertilization takes place, resulting in enrichment and furtherance of the parent tradition.

For western scholars, too, Indian aesthetics is equally relevant. It can help broadening their outlook which is almost wholly conditioned by western tradition. It is a well-known fact that many western creative writers have benefited from their acquaintance with Indian philosophy and culture. It is also established that Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of modern linguistics, profited greatly from his study of Indian grammatical thought. There is every reason to believe that an interaction with Indian aesthetics will prove no less beneficial. Its ideas and concepts (i.e., *Rasa*, *Dhvani*, *Vakrokti*, *Sadharanikarana*, *Sahridaya*) are bound to enrich the western critical tradition. It is really unfortunate that western literary scholars and critics have so far made no deliberate attempt to explore and exploit the insights of Indian aesthetics. Even T. S. Eliot, who is believed to have been influenced by the *rasa* doctrine⁶, makes no explicit reference to Indian literary theories. And though Susanne K. Langer (*Feeling and Form*) mentions the concept of *rasa*, her treatment is also nothing but casual. This pervading indifference to the western literary scholars or aestheticians is most probably due to two reasons: they suffer either from some deep-rooted prejudice or from some misconception. May be they think that there is nothing worthwhile in Indian aesthetics or that it belongs to the domain of orientalists. But both the positions are untenable. A tradition, however remote in time and place, never becomes old or meaningless; it contains in itself the seeds of regeneration and recovery. It is always relevant to the present simply because the present is the child of the past.

There may or may not be any immediate gain from the study of Indian aesthetics, but it is not as important as its far-reaching effect. It is no less a means of self-discovery than a stimulus to critical thought.

Notes and References

1. Indian aesthetics (the term "aesthetics" has been superimposed by western thought) refers to a body of Sanskrit writings on literary theory and criticism. In the beginning there were two currents of Indian aesthetics, one relating to drama called "*Natyasastra*" and another relating to poetry and other literary forms called "*alankarasastra*". In the course of time this distinction was obliterated and Indian aesthetics, comprising both poetry and drama, came to be known simply by "*alankarasastra*" or "*sahityasastra*".
2. Among the recent studies in Indian aesthetics the following are most noteworthy: *Sanskrit Criticism* by V. K. Chari (Honolulu : Hawaii University, 1990); Indian poetics by Edwin Geroow in *A History of Indian Literature* ed. Jan Gonda, Vol. 5, Fasc.3; and the English translation of *Dhvanyaloka* with *Locana* by Daniel H. H. Ingalls et al. (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 49).
3. The proceedings of the seminar have lately come out under the title *East West Poetics at Work* edited by C. D. Narasimhaiah (New Delhi : Sahitya Akademi, 1994).
4. Cf. Alexander Pope, *Essay on Criticism*. (London : Macmillan & Co., 1960). especially the following lines :
Those Rules of old discovered, not devis'd,
Are Nature still, but Nature methodiz'd.
.... ..
Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem;
To copy Nature is to copy them. (11.88.9; 139-40)
5. The first book of literary criticism designed for postgraduate students of Hindi, Babu Shyam Sunder Das's *Sahityalochan*, was an adaptation of Hudson's *An Introduction to the Study of Literature*.
6. Eliot's concept of "objective correlative" is obviously a restatement of the Indian concept of *vibhava-s*. See also Lee T. Lemon, "T. S. Eliot's Other Tradition". *Journal of Literary Criticism*, 5:1 (June, 1989), pp. 1-9

BOOK REVIEWS

Robert Magliola, *Derrida on the Mend*, Perdue University Press, West Lafayette, 1984, PP. 238.

Harold Coward, *Derrida and Indian Philosophy*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990, PP. 200.

One of the objects of comparative literature is universalisation of knowledge and human experience. Therefore in any comparative study when one culture is juxtaposed with another, it is expected that the result must be an improvement upon the branch of knowledge concerned notwithstanding the finer nuances that may discriminate one culture from the other. When Derrida is juxtaposed with the Indian intellectual tradition, it should not be desired to discover only the analogical elements in both the contexts, historically demonstrating either Derrida's borrowings from or his being anticipated by the Indian tradition. What the reader expects is that he would be able to understand Derrida better—his power and limitations, his strength and weakness, the universal acceptability of his ideas in the light of similar ways of thinking in the Indian tradition.

Although Derrida himself charges the East with variations of logocentrism and claims the radical novelty of his own ideas, Magliola observes that Deconstructionism was anticipated by Nagarjuna a Buddhist philosopher of the 1st century A. D. and that too by reinstating logic while Derrida is a victim of the logical quandary which he is unable to resolve. Magliola elaborates his observation cogently and justifies the benefits of his comparative study by pointing out that each author is better understood by the writings of the other : Nagarjuna's abstruse system of the 'middle-path' can be understood by a 'modern' reader in the light of Derrida's critical concepts such as 'logocentrism', difference and representation; and Derrida's fallacy of logocentrism can be resolved by Nagarjuna's logical strategy of release from logocentrism by means of logocentrism : "... for Nagarjuna the 'beyond knowing' allows for logocentric (i.e. language-bound) knowing (in a way which frees him from Derrida's quandary concerning entrapment in language); and still Nagarjuna's 'beyond knowing' is not itself logocentric." (P. 88). But the fundamental question is : "is there any scope for this 'beyond knowing' or knowledge of any translinguistic reality

in Derrida ? The basic difference between the two thinkers is clear enough for discouraging any systematic comparison. For Derrida, experience of reality is essentially linguistic—"There is nothing outside of the text", whereas for Nagarjuna operation of language is valid relatively within only the phenomenal world. His controversial doctrines of two-truths and emptiness imply that the linguistic/conventional/phenomenal world/truth is devoid/empty of the translinguistic/ultimate world/reality and similarly the latter is devoid/empty of the former. Nagarjuna is not a logocentrist in the sense that firstly, he believes that the ultimate reality is translinguistic i. e. cannot be realized/understood by language and secondly, (unlike the orthodox philosophic systems) he rejects the idea that ultimate reality is a presence of which the phenomenal world is a Representation. The linguistic world is of course constituted by images only—but not the images of the translinguistic reality. This world is indeterminate only in the sense that no predicate can be applied and the type of negation involved here is not of choice type, but of exclusion type. Therefore Nagarjuna's attitude is completely non-committal. He is attached neither to any identity nor to any difference and in doing so he successfully claims to have forwarded no theory, nor is he prepared to believe the existence/non-existence of any theory. On the other hand, Derrida's negation is of choice type since he is committed to difference and as such he cannot claim that he has defied theories or that his own theory is always already deconstructed. Similarly, the Buddhist doctrine of eternal flux is only marginally applicable to Derrida's doctrine of dissemination.

Another fundamental question: can Derrida be mended in the light of Nagarjuna's thought ? The simple answer is : Derrida mended will cease to be Derrida. The fascination of Derrida's challenge of structuralism has already waned in the nineties and his writings will be read by the posterity more as forms of literature than as philosophical criticism deserving any comparison with any established philosophical tradition such as that of India. Of course Derrida may wish to reconstruct some of his ideas regarding the indeterminacy of the linguistic text following the lines of thinking of Nagarjuna and Bhartrhari notwithstanding the basic difference in the structures of their thoughts.

Harold Coward, who followed Magliola and David Loy in attempting a comparison between Derrida and Indian philosophy, extended his range

beyond Nagarjuna and studied Derrida with Bhartrhari, Sankara and Aurobindo as well. His introduction and the first two chapters on the basic features of the two philosophical traditions Oriental and Occidental and the origin of language are characteristically lucid and interesting for both specialists and beginners. But the comparison chapters, in spite of their most convincing juxtapositions of aspects of linguistic doctrines of Derrida, Bhartrhari, Sankara and Aurobindo (Coward draws much on Magliola and Loy for his chapter on Nagarjuna), the basic question is left unanswered : what for this comparison ? Magliola suggested a mend on the part of Derrida while Coward offers fragmentary juxtapositions to suggest perhaps that some of the Indian philosophers anticipated Derrida. Such an attempt certainly helps a reader understand Derrida in a broader perspective. But the major point is that Derrida's basic structure is simply a misfit in the intellectual ecology of India as developed in both the systems of thought—orthodox and heterodox. When all the orthodox systems including the grammarian Bhartrhari presuppose the Presence/Existence of the Absolute Reality and consider the phenomenal world as Its Representation, the interest in the fragments of similarities becomes only peripheral. Even when Bhartrhari's concept of Reality is linguistic, it is not the spoken or phenomenal language that constitutes this Reality. Bhartrhari's Sabdatattava and Sankara's Brahman are all transphenomenal/translinguistic concepts as is the Buddhist concept of Paramarthika in its own way. It is not understood why Coward has placed the chapter on Nagarjuna after the one on Aurobindo which should rather have been placed prior to Bhartrhari so that an attempt at constructing an integrated view of linguistic function in Nagarjuna, Bhartrhari and Sankara could have been formulated and such a view might have been focused on Derrida for better understanding and criticism of his ideas. In the philosophical tradition of India Aurobindo is certainly not immediately next to Sankara. There are many others who must have contributed a lot to the debate concerned. The chapterization is obviously anachronistic and leaves the long gap of twelve hundred years—from Sankara to Aurobindo—unbridged. Because of this structural weakness of the book, it fails to account for the debate in its appropriate form and turns out to be a collection of some essays published in fragments. Considered in this light Magliola's is rather an integrated and pioneering effort for putting Derrida to a rigorous test by an oriental system relevant in the context.

G. N. Devy, *After Amnesia : Tradition and Change in Indian Literary Criticism*, Orient Longman, Hyderabad, Bombay etc., 1992, PP. 147.

Despite its loose structure the book expresses a genuine anxiety and need of a literary criticism, both theory and practice, suitable for the study and evaluation of modern Indian literatures. The central argument of the author is that contemporary Indian literary history and criticism can be formulated by a comparative perspective on regional literary tradition such as Marathi, Gujrati, Oriya and Bengali. The author wishes to eliminate completely the impact of British colonialism and consider the regional literary traditions (which he calls *bhasa* tradition) of the pre-British period and also wants to avoid the classical and post-classical Sanskrit traditions that have ceased to be relevant in the contemporary social context. He understands that according to Panini an intellectual discourse must receive social legitimacy as a system of knowledge, and literary criticism as a sub-system of intellectual discourse stands "on the point of intersection of an existing body of literature, a logically formulated thing, and a society's acceptance of the correspondence between these two." (P. 90). He traces changes in the history of Sanskrit critical discourse from Bharata (4th c. B. C.) to Abhinavagupta (10th c.) and after that are due to changes in the socio-religious contexts, as evident, for example, in increasing the number of *Rasas* and considering the nature of *Rasa* itself. In Bharata *Rasa* is viewed as an experience of transcendental delight—*aesthetic* delight is similar to, though not identified with, *metaphysical* ecstasy. But in Visvanatha Kaviraja (14th c.) this discrimination is lost; and when Bharata numbers eight *Rasas*, later critics from Abhinavagupta to Rupa Goswami add one more—*Santa* or *Bhakti* and this addition was inevitable since the critics had to respond to the religious tension between the upper/elite class/caste and the lower class/caste and to the final victory of the latter over the former in making them realize that the highest spiritual experience was not confined to only the Vedic rituals or *metaphysical* knowledge monopolised by the higher classes: it was accessible even to the illiterate untouchable in terms of devotion or *bhakti*. The author observes that this *bhakti* tradition is the key sign of the *bhasa* tradition and it was expected that this tradition should have created its own critical discourse as distinguished from the earlier one, whereas it was unfortunately not the reality.

Then comes the principal target of the author's attack—the colonial period which caused such a forceful amnesia that even after half a century

of our political freedom, we have not recovered our cultural and intellectual health. Speaking of literary criticism, our scholars are still struggling with the defensive mechanism either by showing that our classical critics anticipated the British and European theorists, even sometimes with much greater strength or by simply juxtaposing them. Some of the Indian critics are interpreting and evaluating classical or modern Indian literature by the standards of European theories. So the colonialist complex rules everywhere and the only way of redemption is to go back to our *bhasa* tradition (pre-colonialist) and reconstruct a theory/theories and evolve the method (s) of their practice out of these *bhasa* traditions.

The book contains weaknesses galore. But I shall concentrate on a few points which are central to the crisis the author has himself envisaged and shall try to resolve his quandry which he himself has invited. It is true that we have not formulated any contemporary literary criticism. But how to evolve one ? Obviously by drawing upon our tradition and applying the critic's individual talent. The same is also the process of creative literature. And what is our tradition, if not our entire history *including the colonial* one ? It is again true that we still suffer from the colonial complex, but it is equally true that we are speedily recovering and the strong sign of such recovery being the very wing of the current critical movements entitled post-colonialism with which the author himself is obsessed. It is once more true that we suffered from political and cultural amnesia during the colonial period. But that was not the only or the first amnesia we suffered from. Amnesia has rather been an archetypal event in Indian cultural heritage. The very upanisadic slogan "arise, awake and approach the wise" and its echo in Swami Vivekananda reminds us that several times we have suffered from amnesia of all sorts from the spiritual one of the Upanisads to the politico-cultural one of the colonial period. Why so much anxiety for the recent one only ? Besides, like the upanisadic *rishi* even during the colonial period there were some seers like Aurobindo, Coomaraswamy and S. N. Dasgupta who never suffered from amnesia and went on vindicating vigorously the values of Indian culture in its unified form. They are the path-finders—*mahajanas* who awakened us from colonialism. Instead of identifying them with the colonial victims, it will be wise to follow them. What have they done ? They have imbibed the best from the ruler's culture and have assimilated it with our own. Invasion, Political and commercial domination are all unavoidable historical

phenomena in any culture. They form essential parts in the total growth of a culture. We may express our unhappiness about the pedagogic strategy of the British. But finally, that was all annulled and we learnt a great deal about many things other than what was confined to our pre-British Indo-Islamic world. How can we ignore the valuable impact of the European scientific methods through the British? We had certainly a lot, but not all and everything. The cross-cultural methodology in Jones' orientalism is certainly the path-finder for all our Indo-Western comparative intellectual activities. It is, therefore, a great futility on the part of the author to express so much venom in his monotonous rehash of the historical data—even going to the extent of condemning S. K. De for his observation that modern Bengali literature started in the mid-nineteenth century. It is an unpardonable audacity.

The author's paranthetic proposal for writing a social history of Sanskrit Poetics is most welcome, but his hypotheses based on the findings of the sociologists like Weber and Dumont is irrelevant for the purpose. Visvanatha has never *identified* aesthetic delight with metaphysical ecstasy. His metaphor of 'twins' clearly states the similarity between the two experiences—a similarity of kind and not of degree (P. 79). Similarly the tension between the transcendental and the mundane, as the author's sociologist mentors have pointed out, is neither a sign of the transition from the classical to the post-classical, nor the cause of various versions of 'salvation'. It was already there in the Upanisads. Bhakti has been highly spoken of in the *Gita*, it is certainly not a phenomenon, even in its cult form, due to the class-conflict of the medieval Islamic period. The sociological perspective of reading Sanskrit poetics misleads the author and leads him disastrously to observe that Indian culture is multiform: "It is certainly more meaningful to speak in terms of specific linguistic traditions and regions than to speak of an imaginary cultural unit and unity." (P. 3). We have different languages indeed; but not different cultures except only cultural nuances in manners and linguistic behaviour. In spite of linguistic variations we had one culture in the pre-British period and an integrated aesthetic sensibility which determined the common standard of literary criticism for all the *bhasa* traditions. There was no need for any other critical discourse distinguished from the earlier one. The author's expectation for such a distinguished one was therefore an undesirable utopia for the traditions themselves. Our contemporary literary tradition has also been

a common one during the colonial and post-independent period—dominance of a counter tradition of the European aesthetic movements Romanticism, Realism and Modernism. Therefore, we need a single critical method for our appreciation and evaluation of this literary culture as a whole and this method must necessarily be an evolute of the organic unification of the classical Sanskrit and the contemporary global traditions. I do not mean critical monism i. e. one method always, but that whatever the method (s), it should be equally applicable to the literatures of India—from Kashmir to Kerala and from Maharastra to Bengal.

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Chari, V. K. : *Sanskrit Criticism* (Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press), 1990. pp. xiv + 306.

Among the Indian academics of English working in the West, Prof. V. K. Chari has earned the distinction of being a devoted scholar of Indian poetics. Through a number of his original and incisive articles he has drawn the attention of literary theorists to the peculiar relevance of Indian theories to current thinking on the subject in the West. *Sanskrit Criticism* is the culmination of his labours of a life-time and is a thorough and detailed reappraisal of Indian theories of literature. Apart from presenting critiques of the major Indian theories and setting them in comparison with Western counterparts, Chari proceeds to argue the thesis that the Indian theory of *Rasa* is singularly comprehensive and viable as a principle of definition of literature and a general theory of poetics, considerations of structure, style, generic mode, imagery and the like need to be guided by the principle of *Rasa* in the practical business of criticism. In criticising the other theories like figuration (*Alamkara*), style (*Riti*) and suggestion (*Dhvani*), he recognizes the functionality of these features in serving an evocative purpose in their context in poetry. Literature is, however, for Chari not a type of language use but a type of meaning —emotive meaning (*Rasa*), specifically.

Chari's general approach is refreshingly individual : he wants to show that the Indian theories need not be studied only in their religious and

transcendental setting as is generally supposed in the West. On the other hand, their insights and discursive tools concerning questions of language, meaning and truth in literature have an importance in any critical investigation, quite apart from their original metaphysical contexts. Chari can convincingly argue about the modernity and contemporary relevance of the Indian concepts of poetics and draws heavily on *Mimamsa* and Bhartrhari's doctrines of language and harmonizes them with the thought of Austin, Beardsley and Wittgenstein. In the presentation of his material, Chari, however, follows the traditional dialectical model of critical discussion in Sanskrit the statement of the opponent's view, its refutation, and establishment of one's own view. This gives a peculiarly argumentative flavour to the whole work.

The book is divided into ten chapters and after a brief introduction, in the following three chapters Chari gives a masterly exposition of the various aspects of the *Rasa* theory. Despite its preoccupation with emotions and affective experience, *Rasa* theory is shown to be essentially objective in its orientation. Emotion in poetry is presented as meaning inhering in an objective situation and not as private sensation. Poetic apprehension is a feeling response induced by a repeated contemplation of this emotive situation. *Rasa* experience is thus an emotional perception, not accounted for by any other modes of knowledge. The essential value of the experience is that it is pleasurable although its cognitive features are never denied. Chari argues that the *Rasa* theory holds expression of emotions to be the sole aim of literature. And from this standpoint, he provides critical reviews of all other theories—figuration, style and suggestion and asserts that formal features or figurative devices in poetry could be aesthetically significant only when there is a motive or a context for their use, the evocation of emotion or the emotive context presented in a literary work. Literature as a discourse type aims at evocation rather than expression or reporting of feelings and attitudes and in this respect it is different from utterances in ordinary situations of life. It is the presentational force of the literary discourse that is stressed by Bharata in his formula about the configuration of the conditions of an emotive situation. In these three chapters on *Rasa*, Chari not only argues for the essentiality of emotions in poetry but also makes a detailed discussion of Bharata's *Rasa-Sutra* and illustrates the various points involved in it through analysis of particular literary works

in English. In fact, chapter 4 : 'The Logic of the Emotions', is a model of practical criticism through an application of the *Rasa* poetics.

In chapters 5, 6 and 7—'Modes of Meaning : Metaphor': 'Suggestion', 'Style and meaning'—Chari addresses himself to one of the profound topics of Sanskrit criticism, the problem of literary semantics. In these chapters, the author presents detailed critiques of the concepts as discussed by the Sanskrit theorists of language and literature and often draws in sights from the Western aestheticians and philosophers to make his critiques comprehensive. The dominant influence on Chari's thought, as is admitted by him, is of the *Mimamsa* philosophy and naturally, the realist Chari fails to appreciate fully the transcendental roots of the *Dhvani* theory. Further, given his point of view of the essentiality of *Rasa* which is partially confirmed by the *Dhvani* theorists themselves, his critique draws attention to this ambivalence in the *Dhvani* theory. In terms of Chari's favoured doctrine of *Rasa*, emotions are said to be expressed in poetry by their objects and situations, not by virtue of any special arrangement or power of the words. The eighth chapter, the Logic of Interpretation, presents the *Mimamsa* view of interpretation that verbal meanings are explicable purely in terms of the linguistic system in which they operate and through the general principles of reasoning without any reference to the author or the interpreter of the text. The autonomy, impersonality and unity of meaning as well as the rules of interpretation elaborated in the hermeneutical philosophy of *Mimamsa* are set against the Western theories represented by Hirsh, Juhl and the reader-oriented critics.

The next chapter, 'Poetic Apprehension and Poetic Truth', deals with the nature and status of poetic knowledge and the related question of the referentiality of poetic statements as viewed by the Sanskrit critics. Here, too, Chari discusses the Indian ideas in the context of contemporary Western thought. There is a detailed discussion of the concepts of *Sadharani Karana* and poetic imitation and illusion as propounded by Abhinavagupta, Lallata and Sankuka. Poetic knowledge, according to the Indian view, has self-evident validity and is not contradicted by experience. Hence, the question of truth is, in a sense, irrelevant to poetic judgment. The final chapter, 'The validity of *Rasa* as a Theoretical concept', concludes that of all the rival doctrines advanced by the Sanskrit critics, *Rasa* alone promises to be the best definition of literature and accounts for

all its elements and values although Chari recognises certain limitations of the theory.

One marvels at Prof. Chari's scholarship and intimate knowledge of Sanskrit critical and philosophical texts as well as modern developments in Western literary theory and linguistic philosophy. His thesis is argued convincingly and with preceptiveness and the standard of scholarship set by Chari is difficult to surpass. *Sanskrit Criticism* will remain as the *magnum opus* of Prof. Chari and a challenging model for the serious students of Indian poetics.

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Kushwaha, M. S. (ed.) : *Indian Poetics and Western thought* (Lucknow : Argo Publishing House), 1988, PP. xii+266.

New Perspective on Indian Poetics (Lucknow · Argo Publishing House), 1990 viii+111.

One of the most interesting developments in the contemporary Indian critical scene has been the publication of several book-length studies and articles on Indian poetics/sanskrit criticism by the academics of University departments of English. This reflects a growing realization by the Indian scholars of English that imitative work on Western critical lines (the usual labours of the Indian academics) will not take them far enough in the highly competitive world of modern literary scholarship unless they develop an Indian critical scholarship in English that is truly Indian in perspective while benefitting from the Western thought and insights. The two volumes edited by Kushwaha are, as he observes in the "Preface" to the first one, "a modest step in this direction". (p. viii) While the first volume is mainly comparative, the second one offers some unorthodox and original essays on certain categories of Indian poetics. Of the nineteen authors of the two collections, four figure in both the volumes and the twenty three essays are mostly journal articles although some are excerpts from published books. The miscellaneous nature of the essays in the volumes precludes any firm and coherent organization of the material and pointed effect on the readers.

Indian Poetics and Western Thought is divided into three sections. The first one comprising five essays compares Indian poetics and Western criticism in broad and general terms. Prof. Srinivas Iyengar's opening essay is an overview of the two traditions with close-ups on Mimesis and *Rasa* theory and Katharsis and *Dhvani* theory attempting "an exercise in loud thinking...to forge a universal aesthetics" (p. 13). The categories under comparison in the next essay by Prof. Ayyappa Paniker are, however, numerically more : relation of aesthetics with metaphysics and ethics; distinction between poetics and rhetoric; the concepts of poet as seer and maker; the idea of aesthetic depersonalization; the principle of propriety; figurative language and poetic genres. Prof. Panikar does not rest contented after drawing up this inventory of similarities but goes further to show the differences as in the absence of the Western historical and sociological approaches in Indian poetics. Dhavle's essay on Indian poetics and Modern

Hermeneutics focusing on literary language, meaning and interpretation asserts the peculiar modernity of the Indian thought. The final two essays in this section : 'Indian Poetics and New Criticism' by Prof. P. S. Sastri and 'Bharat and the Western concept of *Dvawa*' by V. Y. Kantak are more substantial and detailed studies than the others and so, more illuminating and satisfying to the critical reader. Although both the pieces had featured in earlier collections, they still retain the freshness of their appeal.

The second section consisting of nine essays institutes comparison between Indian concepts of *Rasa*, *Dhvani*, *Riti-Guna*, *Vakrokti*, *Alamkara*, *Sadharanikarana* and *Anchitya* and their analogues in Western criticism. Prof. Krishna Rayan argues for the relevance and applicability of *Rasa-Dhvani* poetics by updating the same with present-day literary theory and criticism. This has been a persistent concern of Rayan in all his publications and in the essay, 'The *Dhvani* theory : A Restatement' collected in the second volume under review, he also argues for a revised and modernized *Rasa-Dhvani* poetics accommodating the Western Romantic-symbolist poetics of suggestion. Rayan demonstrates the viability of his up dated theory of suggestion drawing on the old Indian and the modern Western ideas as a framework of criticism by application to four Oriya poems in English translation. While Rayan blueprints a model of formalist poetics as the basis for an Indian school of criticism, V. K. Chari provides the alternative of a contentual model in his essay, '*Rasa* as a General Theory of Poetry'. Like Rayan, Chari has been a life-long, devoted scholar of Indian poetics and has the additional advantage of being an avid student of both Indian and Western philosophies of language. With unusual perceptiveness and cogent arguments, he makes a plea for accepting the *rasa* concept as "a most convincing account of poetic semantics and a consistent general theory of poetry" (p. 121). A similar conclusion about the superiority of *Rasa* doctrine is reached by A. C. Sukla when he compares it with Eliot's theory of impersonality in "T. S. Eliot and the theory of *Rasa*" and points out confusions in the critic's theory of objective correlative and expression of emotion in art.

Gokak's essay elaborates a syncretic view of style "including constituents ranging from affixes and lexis to vision" (p. 140) and shows how the Indian concept of *guna* can better explain the transformation of language into style in literary art. Pathak makes a masterly survey of the statements of different theorists of *vakrokti* and their counterparts in the West

to highlight the common view that a certain obliquity or indirection characterizes the language of poetry. Venkata Subbaiah discovers no one-to-one correspondence between Kuntaka's six types of *Vakrakti* and the different types of linguistic deviations in poetry formulated by Geoffrey N. Leech. Kapil Kapoor studies the theories of *Alamkara* and *Laksana* and finds surprising parallels between the Indian thinking and the Western on the nature of metaphor and its interpretation. Mohan Thawpi finds similarity between the Indian doctrine of *Sadharanikarana* and some Western theories! Kant's 'Disinterested satisfaction', Bullough's 'Psychical Distance', Eliot's 'Impersonality,' Richards's 'Synaesthesia' and the concept of 'Empathy'. *Auchitya* and the Western ideas regarding decorum and propriety are discussed by the editor in the final essay of this section to show that the Indian treatment of the concept is illustrative rather than prescriptive and, therefore, better suited for employment in literary discourse.

The third section consists of only two essays dealing with the application of Indian poetics to interpretation and appreciation of Western literature. S. K. Ghose instances Sri Aurobindo's *Future poetry* as an original and provocative study of English poetry of different ages from a strictly Indian view point in criticism. Although Prof. Sen Gupta had expressed dissatisfaction about certain aspects of the theories of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* in an earlier publication (see the excerpt included in the second of the books reviewed here) in the later work, 'Hamlet in the light of Indian Poetics', he ably demonstrates the efficacy of those theories in explaining satisfactorily the vexed problems of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. One wishes that the editor had collected more of such pieces highlighting the validity and relevance of Indian poetics in applied / practical criticism rather than amassing a rid catalogues of parallels between Indian poetics and Western critical theory.

The second volume contains seven essays of which the two by Rayan and Sen Gupta have been already referred to. The unconventionality and provocativeness claimed for some of the essays seem to be of dubious nature. Mukund Lath studies the making of *Natyasastra* through a structural approach usually employed in the social sciences and discovers that *Rasa*, far from being an aesthetic concept, is a principle of combining elements of discrete fields of aesthetic activity into a composite, unified whole. For

Prof. Barlingay, Bharata meant by *Rasa* an object in itself created by the dramatist's art and not an experience relished by *Sahrdaya* as Abhinavagupta and others interpreted it to be. While it is true that Abhinavagupta was responsible for psychologising *Rasa*, it is wrong to chastise him for misreading Bharata, for the cue for the later development of Bharata's *Rasa* theory is there in his *Natyasastra* in the use of the term in both the senses. Prof. Gokak's essay, '*Rasa. A psychological Interpretation*' argues for an extended theory of *Rasa* in the light of modern psychology and changing human experience through the ages. It is no longer possible to stick to the eight basic emotions recognized by Bharata in view of our knowledge of new and complex emotions and the factors deepening and intensifying there.

Chari's critique of the concept of *Rasa-Dhvani* points out infelicities in the doctrine by asserting that it is the *vibhavadi*, the causal factors, which bring forth the *Rasa* and, therefore, to posit a special emotive semantics of language is beside the point. *Rasa-Dhvani* is more a matter of the emotive context than of any special suggestive power inhering in the words. The question of *vibhavadi* signifying an *arthantara* which is central to *Dhvani*, is considered rather absurd. Chari's logic presupposes a particular philosophy of language—Mimamsa, Wittgenstein and speech-act theorists. The *Dhvani* theory has, however, a different foundation in the philosophies of Patanjali and Bhartrhari. In a paper, "Truth, consciousness and communication: Ontology, Epistemology and Linguistics in Sanskrit Literary Aesthetics", A. C. Sukla has clearly located the *Dhvani* doctrine in its proper philosophic context. It is natural that bereft of this context, *Dhvani* will appear distorted as it did so to the earlier critics of the theory. Despite the brilliance of its theoretical formulations, Indian poetics could not forster literary criticisms of the same order. In the final essay of the volume, Sivarudrappa speculates on this failure of the Sanskrit Critics and attributes the same to their peculiar preference for theory rather than practical application. The two volumes provide a diverse but sumptuous fare and they are essentially curtain-raisers rather than well-wrought treatises as is observed by the editor himself. Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in projects like this, one can not but commend Kushwaha's efforts and his success in the undertaking.

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V. S. Seturaman (ed.) : *Indian Aesthetics : An Introduction*. Macmillan India, 1992.

Bharat Gupta, *Dramatic Concepts : Greek and Indian*. New Delhi : D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd., 1994, P. P. 295.

These two works relating to Indian aesthetics, notwithstanding their differences, are linked together by a common factors; they all are penned by professors of English. This, indeed, is a healthy sign, for I strongly believe that the future of Indian aesthetics depends more on Sanskrit knowing English scholars than on only Sanskritists.

The first book, *Indian Aesthetics*, is a compilation, intended to serve as "an introduction to Indian poetics for Indian students studying literary theory at the postgraduate and research levels." ("Preface")

Obviously, the book is meant for English students who have no knowledge of Sanskrit but wish to acquaint themselves with Indian poetics. Perhaps it is also intended to be used as a text-book in English courses where Indian poetics has been introduced independently or made a component of literary criticism or theory. The inclusion of extracts from basic Sanskrit texts, with English translations, lends support to this view. But if these are the unstated objectives (there can't be any other), the book fails to achieve them. The primary task of the editor of such a work is to make it intelligible to the reader for whom it is meant. To give English translations of Sanskrit extracts is not enough, they should also be properly introduced and adequately annotated. Moreover, the editor has to ensure that the translations are accurate. For this he needs a sound knowledge of Sanskrit.

The extracts from Sanskrit texts constitute only one section. The remaining two sections contain essays by eminent scholars and thinkers. But for the essays by Mohan Thampi (which are portions of his book, *The Response to Poetry : A Study in Comparative Aesthetics*, published in 1968), they make a difficult reading for the beginner who is likely to be bewildered rather than enlightened by them. It would have been better if the editor himself had supplied a long general introduction.

Incidentally, the name 'Abhinavagupta' should be printed as a single word, not as two words ('Abhinava Gupta') as given in the text.

The second book, *Dramatic Concepts : Greek and Indian* is a comparative study of the dramatic concepts propounded by Aristotle and Bharata in the *Poetics* and the *Natyasastra* respectively. Unlike the other volumes, it is the product of his doctoral engagement. An earlier dissertation on the same subject by R. L. Singal titled *Aristotle and Bharata ; A Comparative Study of Their Theories of Drama* was published as early as 1977. Dr. Gupta's work is definitely more comprehensive as it includes also the theatrical and cultural aspects of the drama. As he himself makes it clear, his accent is comparing "the two works as two systems of performance rather than as two sets of dramatic theory meant for certain dramatic genre." (p. 12) Naturally, there is greater stress on praxis than theory.

Such an approach helps us in understanding not only the nature of the dramatic concepts but also their background and practical bearings. However, in his eagerness to be encyclopedic, the author tends to become a bit discursive in his treatment. The book, though useful and informative, fails to project an over-all comparative view of Greek and Indian systems of drama. Perhaps a separate concluding chapter is needed to highlight the result(s) of his study.

The indiscriminate use of Greek terms hardly serves any useful purpose; it is more irritating than illuminating.

KRISHNA RAYAN, *Text and Sub-Text : A Theory of Suggestion*, Arnold Heineman, 1987, 235 pp. and *Sahitya, A Theory*, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1991, 91 pp:

When read in succession, Krishna Rayan's *Text and Sub-Text* (1987) and *Sahitya, A Theory* (1991) reveal a trajectory of concepts and ideas towards a theory of "literariness" which consists in the dominance of suggestive meaning in the text.

Even though *Sahitya, A Theory* is apparently an improvement upon *Text and Sub-Text*, the danger of some kind of a formalist closure confronts Rayan's concept of literariness as much in this book as in the former. This is because in both books the theory of literariness is underpinned by the formalist notion that the text is a self-contained and autonomous verbal structure.

Text and Sub-Text on its own merits, however, offers a broad range of theoretical possibilities, both synchronic and diachronic, for genre studies and literary history. In this book Rayan presents a suggestion-statement dyad pointing to two fundamental modes of literary presentation. Rayan uses this dyad to account for a wide variety of genres and modes in terms of the binary opposites such as metaphoric vs. metonymic, "signification in code" vs. value in the context", connotative vs. denotative, and the like. He also argues that this dyad has been useful over a century and a half not only to mark poetry off for its non-discursive structure and function, but also to chart gradual predominance of the mode of suggestion over that of statement in all genres of British literature over a span of one hundred years through a series of discontinuities, contradictions and reversals of these modes.

With regard to suggestion in poetry Rayan rightly clarifies that there can be no monolithic definition of it. It may consist as much in metaphor, word play, pun, irony as in intended vagueness, sensuous and emotional evocations. Thus a comprehensive scheme of poetic suggestion is at work covering many poems of Keats, Yeats and the poets of Nineteen forties and fifties, which represent a wide range of experiences and feelings producing unspoken meaning through calculated concealment and withdrawal of obvious semanticity.

As for suggestion in drama, Rayan examines Tennyson's *Becket* alongside three plays of the twentieth century, namely Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral*, Fry's *Curtmantle* and Anouilh's *Becket ou L' Honneur de Dieu* to show how these plays differ in the treatment of the martyrdom of the Canterbury saint and produce different effects. Unlike the nineteenth century Tennyson's play which relies on explicit dialogue form and elaborate dramatic construction, Eliot's play is characterised by intense subterranean level of action and interiority of experience through a muted but intensely suggestive idiom. Frye, for his part, employs expressionist techniques and explores new areas of poetic ambiguity and new modes of oblique suggestiveness. Anouilh's *Becket* still makes an effective communication of subliminal meaning in its own way even though it makes use of prose idiom.

In the last part of the book four major novels of Hardy and three of Margarete Drabble, a contemporary writer, have been chosen for a

comparative study on the basis of their concern with a set of common themes. Rayan shows that in Hardy's novels the dominant mode is statement while in those of Margaret Drabble it is suggestion.

To a discerning reader, the last part is somewhat weak and vulnerable to the accusation that the study of two novelists and a few of their works is rather too inadequate to answer for the shift from statement to suggestion in this genre. The parts dealing with poetry and drama are, however, immune to this problem. Part II (poetry) is fairly comprehensive to cover all historical periods in question and Part III (drama) is justifiably compact to sample plays on the same story and themes, and in the same modes, as in case of Eliot and Frye.

In the second book (*Sahitya, A Theory*) Rayan argues, and rightly so, a case for the necessity of theory to support any kind of critical act, and ingeniously shows how in the absence of a theory and a methodology criticism may run the risk of reaching erroneous conclusions. Literariness in this book is defined as the way the text works towards arousing suggestive meaning through the reader's emotional experience of the verbal structure. One would see here that literariness is not so much implicit in the verbal structure as in its affective function. This book shifts the locus of meaning to reader-response from the text unlike the previous one.

But to the reader of contemporary post-structuralist persuasion, this book does not seem to offer much. For it deals neither with the psycho-analytic and phenomenological implications of reader-response, nor with the post-structuralist problematics of text and meaning. That Rayan does not go beyond the formalist bounds of text and meaning is evidenced by his theoretical propositions. Of them two are cited here :

The verbal structures in a literary work pertain to its nature as fiction and are intrinsic to it, whereas its reference to reality, whether outer (i. e., society) or inner (i. e., the self) is extrinsic. (P. 13)

and

The critic's chief project is to identify as far as possible the normal affective response to the work, examine each of the objective elements in it, analyse their effectiveness as suggestors of the reader's emotion which constitutes the meaning of the work. (P. 15).

Although in this book references to Paul De Man's equation of "rhetorical, figural potentiality of language with literature" and the post structuralist notion that signified undergoes infinite regressions are made in passing, what escapes him altogether is the post-structuralist questioning of the immanence of the text both as signifier and signified. In his conceptual scheme, which is organised around the central notion of the text as a self-contained object, the static categories such as "fiction", "inner" and "literary" are placed in some kind of an a historical opposition to "reality", "outer" and "extra-literary" (society, culture, history, author's biography) and privileged over them. Since Rayan brought up the question of reader-response, he should have thought of the text as *écriture*, a social institution of writting, in which the non-referential principles and suggestive devices of a certain kind of language use get conventionalised and naturalised as "literary" in the act of reading and become credible like reality. The act of reading also should have been discussed as to how it is embedded in the larger social and cultural practices, and defined within other systems of discourse. But Rayan would defend himself saying that his focus is rather on suggestion and evocation of the reader's emotional response or *rasa* by "the internal structures that constitute the literariness *per se* of the text" than the text's materiality and historicity.

Indeed, one would not quarrel with Rayan even if he regards as "strength the indifference of Sanskrit poetics to the questions of author's intention, his personal history and social milieu, which might appear to others as its "chief failing". He is perfectly at liberty to adopt any theoretical model whatsoever if it helps him build up his own theory. Sanskrit poetics in his case does prove to be eminently suitable. What one would object to is Rayan's references to post-structuralist concepts and terms, which are unnecessary and confusing. The glaring example of this is his identification of polysemy with connotation (P. 10).

Be that as it may, Rayan's formalist theory of suggestiveness chimes extremely well with Indian theory of *rasa*, since both focus on the concept of the reader's emotional response as meaning. The elaborate formulation of *Vyanjaka-Vyangya* relationship, typology of *rasas*, classification of meaning as *abhidha laksana* (*suddha* and *gauni*) and *vyanjana* build up a matrix in which Rayan studies the nature and mode of the signifying activity of the objective elements such as imagery, narrative, character,

style and rhythm. One marvels at the skill and clarity with which he examines passages from a vast range of Indian texts in Sanskrit and other Indian languages to illustrate the critical concepts. The texts in this matrix reveal not merely richness, but also the resonance of the great Indian tradition at their back. The analysis of *Gotrayanam*, the poem by Ayyappa Panikar, is a notable case in point.

This book answers to the need for a meaningful exchange of critical ideas and concepts between India and the West. It ably explores an interface of Indian and Western poetics within a formalist conceptual frame. A glossary of Western literary terms with Indian equivalents at the end of the book is intended to provide for the growth of a competent native critical vocabulary, which should be equally sensitive to the Indian and Western critical ethos. At times, however, certain conceptual errors are seen as in case of equivalence between *Vyanjana* and connotative meaning, and between *Vibhava* and objective correlative. It is desirable that Rayan should have drawn on Indian poetics, exegesis, grammar and logic as far as possible for suitable equivalents of Western critical terms instead of coining them. This could have, for instance, avoided pairing 'laghuvada' with minimalism, which is unconvincing.

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Colin Falck, *Myth, Truth and Literature : Towards a True post-Modernism*
(Cambridge :Cambridge UP, 1989) PP. XV+173.

In this controversial book Colin Falck makes daring statements on literary theory calling in question the structuralist and post-structuralist paradigms. He argues that language is not a closed "hermeneutic circle" without any outlet into reality, because, he thinks, the Saussurian idea of the arbitrary nature of the sign is untenable. Trying to establish the primacy of the symbol and viewing referentiality as a derivative aspect of language Falck goes on to see a deep-rooted relationship between language and experience of reality. Because symbol, as the structuralists also agree, unlike the sign has an intrinsic relation to reality. Language, for him, has at its base the bodily gesture of the individual, which is the motorside of

our total imaginative experience, and is a natural way of the individual to convey to others something about what happens around him.

Falck refutes the ideas of the post-structuralists, who side with Nietzsche and maintain that "there is no ontological truth, there is only power or play". Language, he argues, may have its basis in play, but that does not remove it from nature. Play itself is rooted in "our own incarnated nature". In this way he brings back nature—which had been dismissed by the structuralists as something left behind by culture—into the philosophical consideration.

But he also argues in favour of the relevance of an awareness of an extra-linguistic presence. Language is a super-structure, a phenomenon which stands witness and is there to reveal another order. That order, according to Falck, is a pre-verbal awareness for which we require a verbal expression. In the process of attempting to articulate this pre-verbal awareness or our sense of reality we transform whatever comes to us through our senses into something that is intelligible to our rational mind by the help of our imagination and ideas. There is always a gap between our sense of reality and the concepts that we use to give expression to this sense. But this pre-conceptual level also has a kind of linguistic expressiveness which is perpetually found below all our conceptual operations.

The pre-conceptual linguistic expressiveness unites in itself both thought and feeling which always lie at the basis of language. It is the presence of these unities in lyric poetry that makes possible its revelatory power. Language due to this unity and bodily gesture at its basis becomes a process of "meaning creation at its most distinctively human and spiritual level"; and literature is the most intense form of this process of spiritual meaning—creation. It is a revelation rather than a representation of reality, an articulation of a heightened awareness of reality. For Falck, this awareness of reality is not culture-specific. It is rather a glimpse of an ontological truth.

Falck talks about myth as a "mode of a vision of reality", which is there not as a primitive residue yet to be replaced by the modern rational mode of thinking but is perpetually present as a sub-stratum of our basic structure of experiencing. This mythical mode of thinking is instrumental in understanding the ontological truth. The meaning—creating agents like

the mythical mode have a public character but are not culture-bound, and the meanings they create are not cultural but ontological. Because our attempt to understand the world is a consequence of our purposive involvement with it and, therefore, is inextricably bound up with our need to adopt ourselves to it, a characteristic essential to all life. This meaning is accessible through intuition, through a mythic or aesthetic comprehension, which is a spiritual process. That is why Romanticism, which relies so much on the symbolic or the mythic mode is the most favoured of all the literary movements. Falck believes that Romanticism is a spiritual movement, and in this context draws our attention to different spiritual regenerations in the history of the western world. The mythic awareness declined for the first time in the West when Hellenic paganism lost its influence due to the growth of rational thought. Christianity rose to the occasion to save the God-forsaken world from its "directionlessness and lack of spiritual purpose". Again a fresh surge of rationalism and technological culture in the seventeenth century forced christianity to retreat. Christianity could not face the challenge due to its rejection of the Western man's imaginative ideals. This time it was Romanticism which took upon itself the task of respiritualizing the cultural world.

So in the modern world, Falck insists, it is poetry in general that must take the place of religion as the chief source of our spiritual nourishment remaining at once, by virtue of its imaginative character, the most fundamental mode of apprehension of reality, which is not an imposition but a discovery of order. It is a discovery of truth, which is aesthetic and carnal and, therefore, ontological.

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Daniel H. H. Ingalls, J. M. Masson, M. V. Patwardhan (Translated with an introduction by Ingalls), *The Dhvanyaloka of Anandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1990, pp. 837.

Dhvanyaloka and its commentary entitled *Locana* are considered the most important texts in the world of Sanskrit poetics. The present translation of the texts attempts at Europeanising, popularising and acquainting the scholars of the modern world with the history, style and effects of Indian aesthetics in general and with the Dhvanyaloka in particular. Professor Ingalls' contribution to the text includes the introduction, verse-translation, the indices, a large section of the notes and corrections of the Kashi text. Translation of the original lines (Mula Karikas) of the very hard text, the explanation (Vrtti) of Anandavardhana along with the *Locana* commentary (The Eye) of Abhinavagupta are the results of the enduring efforts of J. M. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan.

The introduction presents succinctly the geography, political and cultural history of Kashmir with a special emphasis on literary activities mostly based on the Rajatarangini of Kalhana. Against this background a vivid picture of rise and growth of the concept of *dhvani* is given with finikin details. Further, the bio-data of Anandavardhan, his aptitude, work and style and the genesis of the *dhvani* theory are discussed with its purpose and meaning. Rasa is said, according to Anandavardhana, to be the poet's creative imagination which ensures ultimate and universal aesthetic delight in the heart of the connoisseurs. When *dhvani*, the name of the entire poetic process, is the essence of poetry, *rasa* is the essence of *dhvani*. Finally, disagreeing with the arguments of Abhinavagupta and P. V. Kane, Ingalls with profuse arguments ascribes the single authorship of Mulakarika. Vrtti and the entire *Dhvanyaloka* to Anandavardhana. Ingalls comments that Abhinava's *Locana* gives hundred new insights into the beauty of Sanskrit poetry and presents Ananda's view more logically than Ananda himself. He concludes his introduction with a comparative reference to the Western classical tradition of criticism.

Hundreds of poetic stanzas both in the Mulakarikas of Anandavardhana and the *Locana* of Abhinavagupta have been translated into English verses. This noble attempt is a prolonged and grand effort of the poet-translator,

Daniel H. H. Ingalls, that evokes literary and poetic sensibility in the non-sanskrit English readers. Without *Locana*, only the stanzas of the *Mulakarikas* were previously translated into English verses by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy in 1974. But Daniel Ingalls' encompassing endeavour has incorporated the stanzas of both the portions for English versification and has given new delight and dimension to the readers of *Ananda* and *Abhinava* simultaneously.

In most of the places the translation is with poetic effect and close to the original : "Sarasvatyastatvam Kavisahridayakya Vijayate" is translated as, 'Victorious is Muse's double heart, the poet and the relisher of art (L, 43 p.); 'abhisarikanam bighnam Karosyanya-samapi' is translated as, 'you are making trouble for other ladies stealing to their lovers' and 'hatase' as 'wretched woman' (1. 4e, 101 p.); "hahaha devi dhirabhava" as "Alas, my queen alas, be brave" (2. 1a, A, P. 204); Candagadabhighata as brutal war club (2. 9A, p. 255); gurvi Night is ennobled by moonlight (2. 27a, p. 329). In a number of places the translation is accurate and made with the nearest synonyms in English, i. e. Kunja, thickets (1. 4B A, p. 83); Bhasvanti ratnani mahosadhimsca shining gems and mighty herbs (L. p 120); daksinya hatasya hateful courtesy (1. 4 d A, p. 100); Jagarti samjami ascetic wakes; pasyatah muneh the sage who sees etc. (3. 1b, A, p. 376); dhvamsayate rujah—removes our grief (2. 1. L, p. 201). Never missing the charm of the original the translator at times, has communicated the spirit of the Sanskrit word into English as we may find in dharitri as Mother Earth (p. 120); 'navalata', newly flowered vine and 'prahara' gentle tap (1. 14A, p. 179). In some of the places the translation celebrates Ingalls' intuitive acumen in the personal choice of words : 'Svasruratra nimajjati', Mother-in-law sleeps here; 'udarakalpaballi' magic branch; 'Saptetasamidha Sriyah' these are the seven kindling sticks of Royalty (3. 1, L, p. 372). Over and above the translation speaks of Ingalls' powerful command over Sanskrit and English both. His deep insight, profound scholarship and passion for poetry has extended this celebrating contribution to the field of literature in English.

The foot-notes and references under K, A and L are of high research magnitude which clarifies all possible doubts that ever arise in the heart of the readers. They refer to the multifarious branches of study including philosophy, grammar, nyaya, Vedas and almkaras. But in the notes when

one goes through the explanation of some Sanskrit words, the presence of the text inculcates flickering anticipation in the heart of the readers.

The translation of the entire Sanskrit text by J.M. Masson and M.V. Patvardhan is the result of impeccable scholarship, unfailing zeal and winding perseverance. The translation of the Karikas, Vrtti and Locan commentary are made with an easy and conversational style of English making the meaning as clear as possible for a scholar foreign to Sanskrit literature. In translating Locana Abhinava's style of explanation is maintained all through : Sahrdaya or connoisseur is translated as a sensitive critic', vacya or explicit meaning—"literal" Pratiyamana or implicit—"implied" (1. 2, L, p. 74). At times Sanskrit words are bracketed in the translation for clarity of meaning and to avoid confusion : "The rasa of fury (raudra) in poetry are characterised by excitement (dipti). Strength (ojas) has its proper place in words and meanings that manifest this excitement" (2. 9, K, p. 255). Sometimes pronouns and technical terms are clarified in the brackets : "The varieties of elements subordinate to this [rasa or the like] and the varieties within itself etc, (2.12 K, p. 263). The technical terms always follow a conversational style : "Even where a second figure of speech is apprehended [without being directly expressed] etc. (2.27 K, p.328).

Chapter III is marked with Anandavardhana's novelty of approach. Here the relation of Sanghatana to the theme of *rasa*, the canon of propriety, angangibhava of *rasas*, deterrents of *rasas* etc. have got thread bare discussion. Chapter-IV decides *Kavipratibha* or poetic imagination to be *proyojana* of *Kavya* and explains it with all possible instances. Here a number of technical terms have been clarified in English in the same novel style mentioned earlier. Besides, general index, corrections of the Kashi text with the Balapriya commentary provide ample testimony of the editor's scholarship and zeal. Above all, the work shows that labour and intent study joined with strong poetic insight produce the best results.

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